It has been a hundred days since Giorgia Meloni won the Italian legislative elections at the head of a centre-right coalition that enabled her to become Prime Minister. It is a good time to take stock of her first actions, successes, and failures, as her election raised high hopes in the conservative camp in Europe and around the world.
The worst fears had been aroused by the person whom some of her opponents did not hesitate to portray as the direct heir of Il Duce. But it has to be said that after one hundred days in power, Meloni has remained extremely wise in almost all areas of her political action. Very wise, or too wise?
In her regular communication to the Italian people, Meloni was keen to stress the convincing results of her policy and her ability to maintain confidence:
the interest rate differential with Germany has fallen from 236 to 175 basis points, the stock market has risen by 20%, the Bank of Italy is announcing a strong recovery in the second half of 2023 … Italy is in a stronger position than some would have us believe.
As a result, popularity is high: according to figures from Ipsos-Italy: 46% of voters now appreciate Meloni’s government action, which represents an increase of 20% compared to the 26% who brought her to power. As proof of this state of grace, references to the ‘fascist peril’ have almost all disappeared from the Italian press, and the opposition is struggling to make a credible voice heard.
But what was Meloni’s strategy to lull the pack of those who wanted her dead? The first key is to be found in her strategy of aligning herself with the policy of her predecessor Mario Draghi on many central issues—which she describes as “realism.” The budget presented by Meloni in Brussels was along the same lines as Draghi’s, and Meloni abandoned certain projects that might have irritated the European authorities, such as her policy of increasing the thresholds for cash payments. This ‘realism’ means that, in reality, she has little choice: Italy is one of the main beneficiaries of the European recovery plan, and the promised €190 billion in grants and loans will only be released if the reforms are respected. By reintroducing petrol taxes at the beginning of 2023, Meloni risked upsetting part of her electorate, but this move, too, bowed to the demands of fiscal ‘realism.’
It is in the field of foreign policy that she is most keen to assert her European orthodoxy. She insists on Italy’s unwavering support for Ukraine, even though her allies in the coalition, Silvio Berlusconi and Matteo Salvini, would like to see a more balanced position towards Russia. The sending of the joint Franco-Italian ground-air defence system, the Mamba SAMP/T, to Ukraine is currently under discussion between the two countries’ defence ministers. In the field of energy, Meloni has revived and even taken forward policies defended by her predecessors and against which she had fought, such as the continuation of gas extraction projects in the Adriatic. She also went to Tripoli to invest in gas fields, continuing the policy of rapprochement with Libya initiated by Draghi with the former Italian colony in the spring of 2021.
In the end, the long-awaited ‘break’ with previous Italian governments did not happen, which had the effect of reassuring Italian and international opinion. “70% of Meloni is following in Draghi’s footsteps,” explains editorialist Claudio Cerasa in Il Foglio. This continuity with Draghi, almost scholastic, raises questions in Meloni’s own camp, which remains hungry, precisely, for ‘rupture.’ For example, Meloni had promised a major replacement of the leading elites in the public sector: this has not happened, and people in many key posts in the Italian administration have not been removed.
Conversely, what pledges has Meloni made to her right-wing supporters? A few symbolic but limited measures, such as the ban on raves, or the imposition of strict disembarkation rules on migrant boats chartered by NGOs, effectively reducing their activity. In the field of immigration, she wants to achieve results at the European level, which implies no longer taking a swipe at the Brussels bureaucrats. The goal announced during the campaign of zero illegal immigration in Italy is not yet in sight.
The next decisive step for Meloni is the European elections of 2024. In this perspective, she is deploying intense energy to try to forge a right-wing and centre-right alliance in the European Parliament, which would unite the EPP and the ECR group. She therefore intends to play the next elections on the Right, but for the moment, the signals sent to her traditional right-wing electorate are still a little weak. “To win the votes of the Right, she will have to implement a real right-wing programme, which she has not done so far,” explains political scientist and historian Giovanni Orsina to Le Figaro.
100 Days of Meloni: A Path to Normalcy?
It has been a hundred days since Giorgia Meloni won the Italian legislative elections at the head of a centre-right coalition that enabled her to become Prime Minister. It is a good time to take stock of her first actions, successes, and failures, as her election raised high hopes in the conservative camp in Europe and around the world.
The worst fears had been aroused by the person whom some of her opponents did not hesitate to portray as the direct heir of Il Duce. But it has to be said that after one hundred days in power, Meloni has remained extremely wise in almost all areas of her political action. Very wise, or too wise?
In her regular communication to the Italian people, Meloni was keen to stress the convincing results of her policy and her ability to maintain confidence:
As a result, popularity is high: according to figures from Ipsos-Italy: 46% of voters now appreciate Meloni’s government action, which represents an increase of 20% compared to the 26% who brought her to power. As proof of this state of grace, references to the ‘fascist peril’ have almost all disappeared from the Italian press, and the opposition is struggling to make a credible voice heard.
But what was Meloni’s strategy to lull the pack of those who wanted her dead? The first key is to be found in her strategy of aligning herself with the policy of her predecessor Mario Draghi on many central issues—which she describes as “realism.” The budget presented by Meloni in Brussels was along the same lines as Draghi’s, and Meloni abandoned certain projects that might have irritated the European authorities, such as her policy of increasing the thresholds for cash payments. This ‘realism’ means that, in reality, she has little choice: Italy is one of the main beneficiaries of the European recovery plan, and the promised €190 billion in grants and loans will only be released if the reforms are respected. By reintroducing petrol taxes at the beginning of 2023, Meloni risked upsetting part of her electorate, but this move, too, bowed to the demands of fiscal ‘realism.’
It is in the field of foreign policy that she is most keen to assert her European orthodoxy. She insists on Italy’s unwavering support for Ukraine, even though her allies in the coalition, Silvio Berlusconi and Matteo Salvini, would like to see a more balanced position towards Russia. The sending of the joint Franco-Italian ground-air defence system, the Mamba SAMP/T, to Ukraine is currently under discussion between the two countries’ defence ministers. In the field of energy, Meloni has revived and even taken forward policies defended by her predecessors and against which she had fought, such as the continuation of gas extraction projects in the Adriatic. She also went to Tripoli to invest in gas fields, continuing the policy of rapprochement with Libya initiated by Draghi with the former Italian colony in the spring of 2021.
In the end, the long-awaited ‘break’ with previous Italian governments did not happen, which had the effect of reassuring Italian and international opinion. “70% of Meloni is following in Draghi’s footsteps,” explains editorialist Claudio Cerasa in Il Foglio. This continuity with Draghi, almost scholastic, raises questions in Meloni’s own camp, which remains hungry, precisely, for ‘rupture.’ For example, Meloni had promised a major replacement of the leading elites in the public sector: this has not happened, and people in many key posts in the Italian administration have not been removed.
Conversely, what pledges has Meloni made to her right-wing supporters? A few symbolic but limited measures, such as the ban on raves, or the imposition of strict disembarkation rules on migrant boats chartered by NGOs, effectively reducing their activity. In the field of immigration, she wants to achieve results at the European level, which implies no longer taking a swipe at the Brussels bureaucrats. The goal announced during the campaign of zero illegal immigration in Italy is not yet in sight.
The next decisive step for Meloni is the European elections of 2024. In this perspective, she is deploying intense energy to try to forge a right-wing and centre-right alliance in the European Parliament, which would unite the EPP and the ECR group. She therefore intends to play the next elections on the Right, but for the moment, the signals sent to her traditional right-wing electorate are still a little weak. “To win the votes of the Right, she will have to implement a real right-wing programme, which she has not done so far,” explains political scientist and historian Giovanni Orsina to Le Figaro.
Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni waits to welcome president of the European Council at Chigi palace in Rome on January 30, 2023. (Photo by Alberto PIZZOLI / AFP)
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