According to the last census, 68.8% of Slovaks identify as Christians, with the vast majority identifying as Catholic. More than one-third attend church services at least weekly. Moreover, when it comes to fundamental anthropological issues, Slovak Christians generally hold conservative worldviews. Despite that, as journalist Jaroslav Daniška recently observed, political conservatism effectively does not have a vehicle for political influence in Slovakia. The two major competing political streams in Slovakia are the social democrats and progressive liberals, neither of whom advance a conservative agenda.
After last Slovak general elections, many foreign conservatives thought ‘their party’ had been victorious. The winning party, Smer-SSD (Direction–Slovak Social Democracy), was considered to be nationalist-sovereignist, and Hungarian prime minister Orbán tweeted that it is “Always good to work together with a patriot,” pointing to Róbert Fico, the party’s leader. It makes sense that foreigners think that Smer is conservative, since it won these elections by renouncing gender ideology, saying no to unrestricted migration, and stressing the idea of ‘Slovakia first’ in EU and NATO relationships, especially on the question of the war in Ukraine. Unfortunately, reality is not as promising.
Public speeches, especially those before elections, do not always align closely with the actual outcomes of party’s politics. Smer’s history provides significant insights into what one can expect from them in practice.
The party was founded by its current leader Robert Fico in 1999, who left The Party of Democratic Left, which was formed from the ashes of the former Communist Party of Slovakia after the Velvet Revolution. Fico himself was a member of Communist Party from 1986 until 1989. In its beginnings, Smer defined itself as “a party representing a modern progressive centre-left political stream similar to the British Labour Party or the German SPD.” Even though the party never pushed progressive narratives hard, it initially expressed support for initiatives such as same-sex unions. In 2002, during its first elections, Fico relied mostly on young and urban voters, akin to the electorate of today’s Progressive Slovakia party.
However, Fico realized the limited potential of this electorate and started to adjust his public rhetoric towards working-class Slovaks, who tend to be socially conservative but economically socialist. He started to cultivate also a conservative wing in his party. Smer communicated about pressing issues in a conservative way, but they didn’t hesitate to appoint outspoken progressive activists to important administrative roles. Speaking of EU politics, Smer was a member of the Party of European Socialists (PES) from its beginnings, and the voting behaviour of Smer members closely aligned with the main positions of PES. Additionally, the party’s support for the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008 contrasts with its currently declared sovereignist stance.
Fico’s usual political strategy was to deliver conservative messages to Slovak public, but act in favour of the personal ambitions of party’s members behind the scenes. Considering this, a well-grounded concern arises that Róbert Fico is not going to do any substantial good to the Right’s cause in Slovak politics. A post-election conservative surge via think tanks and other institutions of public life, akin to what occurred in Hungary, is more of a wish than a realistic expectation.
Moreover, it is common knowledge in Slovakia that Smer is far more interested in looking out for business interests than the interests of individual citizens. This has been convincingly documented by investigative journalist Marek Vagovič of the conservative daily Postoj.
To give some credit to Róbert Fico and Smer, there are also some nontrivial positive outcomes of their politics. It’s worth acknowledging that it was Smer, together with the Christian Democratic Movement, who amended the constitution to define marriage as the unique union between man and woman. It’s no small matter that Fico, unlike other prime ministers, is able to lessen the feeling of political chaos amongst the populace thanks to his skilful communication. His success in the last elections was also a consequence of the enormously chaotic style of the previous, ‘anti-Fico,’ governments.
However, it should be noted that, in the fundamental anthropological issues as well as in the question of social cohesion, Smer’s aforementioned conservative moves are more of an ad-hoc political calculation than a long-term integral effort. To give an example, Smer repeatedly failed to support very moderate proposals in favour of social support of pregnant women considering abortion by MP Anna Záborská. And this is no minor thing: in some cases, the success of these proposals depended precisely on the votes of Smer MPs.
It is evident to every Slovak with his eyes open who Fico and Smer are and what one can expect from them. Why, then, isn’t there a powerful, explicitly Christian-conservative political vehicle in Slovakia?
Unfortunately, Slovak Christians and conservatives in politics are stuck dealing with a false dilemma. Instead of forming their own credible program in one strong party firmly rooted in a Christian-conservative worldview, they argue amongst themselves. The subject of the arguments is all too often whether it is better to align with Fico against progressives or side with progressives against Fico. Consequently, they are politically dispersed across various parties and effectively serve as auxiliaries to either Fico or the progressives.
Despite the existence of the Christian Democratic Movement, which secured parliamentary representation after two unsuccessful terms, their 6.8% result falls significantly short of what a Christian-conservative party in Slovakia could accomplish. Although there is potential in this movement, its post-election public communication suggests that they have chosen to side with progressives against Fico. Though there are subtle indications that not everybody in the movement is content with this stand, thinking outside of the borders of this false dilemma still remains the greatest challenge for Christian conservatives in Slovakia, hindering their ability to reach their full potential.
Fico, Progressives, and Slovak Christian-Conservative Dilemma
Saint Elizabeth Cathedral in Košice, Slovakia, one of Europe’s most easternmost cathedrals in the Gothic style.
Photo by Mohammed Thoufik on Unsplash.
According to the last census, 68.8% of Slovaks identify as Christians, with the vast majority identifying as Catholic. More than one-third attend church services at least weekly. Moreover, when it comes to fundamental anthropological issues, Slovak Christians generally hold conservative worldviews. Despite that, as journalist Jaroslav Daniška recently observed, political conservatism effectively does not have a vehicle for political influence in Slovakia. The two major competing political streams in Slovakia are the social democrats and progressive liberals, neither of whom advance a conservative agenda.
After last Slovak general elections, many foreign conservatives thought ‘their party’ had been victorious. The winning party, Smer-SSD (Direction–Slovak Social Democracy), was considered to be nationalist-sovereignist, and Hungarian prime minister Orbán tweeted that it is “Always good to work together with a patriot,” pointing to Róbert Fico, the party’s leader. It makes sense that foreigners think that Smer is conservative, since it won these elections by renouncing gender ideology, saying no to unrestricted migration, and stressing the idea of ‘Slovakia first’ in EU and NATO relationships, especially on the question of the war in Ukraine. Unfortunately, reality is not as promising.
Public speeches, especially those before elections, do not always align closely with the actual outcomes of party’s politics. Smer’s history provides significant insights into what one can expect from them in practice.
The party was founded by its current leader Robert Fico in 1999, who left The Party of Democratic Left, which was formed from the ashes of the former Communist Party of Slovakia after the Velvet Revolution. Fico himself was a member of Communist Party from 1986 until 1989. In its beginnings, Smer defined itself as “a party representing a modern progressive centre-left political stream similar to the British Labour Party or the German SPD.” Even though the party never pushed progressive narratives hard, it initially expressed support for initiatives such as same-sex unions. In 2002, during its first elections, Fico relied mostly on young and urban voters, akin to the electorate of today’s Progressive Slovakia party.
However, Fico realized the limited potential of this electorate and started to adjust his public rhetoric towards working-class Slovaks, who tend to be socially conservative but economically socialist. He started to cultivate also a conservative wing in his party. Smer communicated about pressing issues in a conservative way, but they didn’t hesitate to appoint outspoken progressive activists to important administrative roles. Speaking of EU politics, Smer was a member of the Party of European Socialists (PES) from its beginnings, and the voting behaviour of Smer members closely aligned with the main positions of PES. Additionally, the party’s support for the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008 contrasts with its currently declared sovereignist stance.
Fico’s usual political strategy was to deliver conservative messages to Slovak public, but act in favour of the personal ambitions of party’s members behind the scenes. Considering this, a well-grounded concern arises that Róbert Fico is not going to do any substantial good to the Right’s cause in Slovak politics. A post-election conservative surge via think tanks and other institutions of public life, akin to what occurred in Hungary, is more of a wish than a realistic expectation.
Moreover, it is common knowledge in Slovakia that Smer is far more interested in looking out for business interests than the interests of individual citizens. This has been convincingly documented by investigative journalist Marek Vagovič of the conservative daily Postoj.
To give some credit to Róbert Fico and Smer, there are also some nontrivial positive outcomes of their politics. It’s worth acknowledging that it was Smer, together with the Christian Democratic Movement, who amended the constitution to define marriage as the unique union between man and woman. It’s no small matter that Fico, unlike other prime ministers, is able to lessen the feeling of political chaos amongst the populace thanks to his skilful communication. His success in the last elections was also a consequence of the enormously chaotic style of the previous, ‘anti-Fico,’ governments.
However, it should be noted that, in the fundamental anthropological issues as well as in the question of social cohesion, Smer’s aforementioned conservative moves are more of an ad-hoc political calculation than a long-term integral effort. To give an example, Smer repeatedly failed to support very moderate proposals in favour of social support of pregnant women considering abortion by MP Anna Záborská. And this is no minor thing: in some cases, the success of these proposals depended precisely on the votes of Smer MPs.
It is evident to every Slovak with his eyes open who Fico and Smer are and what one can expect from them. Why, then, isn’t there a powerful, explicitly Christian-conservative political vehicle in Slovakia?
Unfortunately, Slovak Christians and conservatives in politics are stuck dealing with a false dilemma. Instead of forming their own credible program in one strong party firmly rooted in a Christian-conservative worldview, they argue amongst themselves. The subject of the arguments is all too often whether it is better to align with Fico against progressives or side with progressives against Fico. Consequently, they are politically dispersed across various parties and effectively serve as auxiliaries to either Fico or the progressives.
Despite the existence of the Christian Democratic Movement, which secured parliamentary representation after two unsuccessful terms, their 6.8% result falls significantly short of what a Christian-conservative party in Slovakia could accomplish. Although there is potential in this movement, its post-election public communication suggests that they have chosen to side with progressives against Fico. Though there are subtle indications that not everybody in the movement is content with this stand, thinking outside of the borders of this false dilemma still remains the greatest challenge for Christian conservatives in Slovakia, hindering their ability to reach their full potential.
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