In a few months’ time, the rotating presidency will hand the reins of the European Union first to Hungary and then Poland, starting in July 2024, just one month after the next elections. This prospect is of the utmost concern to a number of MEPs who are currently exploring all avenues to try and prevent these two Eastern European countries from coming to power.
A broad coalition of parties in the European Parliament—the EPP, the Socialists and Democrats, the Renew Europe liberal party, the Greens, and the European Left—intend to have a Parliament vote in early June on a resolution stating that Hungary is not fit to assume the duties of the rotating presidency, “as it does not respect EU law, the values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union or the principle of sincere cooperation.”
The resolution, which is not binding, accuses Viktor Orbán’s government of “systemic corruption” and condemns “the Hungarian government’s anti-EU communication campaigns, which are part of the government’s strategy to distract attention from its failure to respect the values enshrined in Article 2 of the EU Treaty.”
While the measures targeted by the MEPs concern Hungary first and foremost, if only because Hungary will be the first to take over the rotating presidency, Poland could also suffer the same fate.
The Meijers Committee, an independent group of Dutch experts specialising in European affairs who have been called upon by the European institutions for over thirty years, has apparently been commissioned to examine possible remedies and scenarios for blocking Hungary’s and Poland’s path to the presidency.
A report, the fruit of their investigations, was published on May 19th. Who commissioned the report is—deliberately—not mentioned. On reading the document, it is striking that the starting point—namely, the legitimacy of preventing Hungary and Poland from taking over the rotating presidency—is not, despite the stated intentions, really put into perspective or even questioned. The design is initially defined in the following terms: “this comment discusses whether, and under what conditions, a Member State can exercise the Presidency.” But the “whether” is very quickly dropped in favour of “under what conditions.”
Now that Hungary and Poland have repeatedly clashed with the Parliament and the Commission, it is considered necessary to take steps to prevent them from taking over the rotating presidency, despite European regulations stipulating that this function must be divided equally between the member states in accordance with the principle of ‘equal rotation.’ The manifestly anti-democratic nature of the decision, and the exclusion of tens of millions of European citizens who would thus be deprived of their country’s six-month presidency, is not even raised.
In the words of the report’s authors, the question of whether these disputes—and in particular the conflict over Article 7, which allows the EU to sanction a country for failure to respect the rule of law—render the countries in question unworthy of the presidency is “not fully resolved.” In the face of this persistent vagueness, the question quickly shifts to ‘how to prevent bad performers from undermining the smooth running of the European Union.’
Three solutions are put forward by the committee of experts.
The first consists of an arrangement with the member states accompanying the country holding the rotating presidency—Spain and Belgium for Hungary, Cyprus and Denmark for Poland—for them to deal with sensitive issues, voluntarily sidelining the offending countries from meetings and negotiations. In other words, the responsibilities would be transferred not to the country holding the presidency, but to its assistants, allowing the latter to be duly silenced and reduced to the role of a mere extra. “Finding a solution within the respective Presidency troikas”—the phrase used by the experts to describe this scenario has all the hallmarks of understatement, not to say Soviet phraseology.
The second solution would be to change the rotation calendar and postpone the Hungarian and Polish Presidencies until a later date, based on a precedent already observed when certain states join or leave the Union.
The third solution would be to change the rules of the game by passing a law that would make access to the rotating presidency conditional on compliance with the famous rule of law, thus making it impossible for a country to hold the presidency if it has not complied with the Commission’s demands on the subject—a law that would be adopted by a qualified majority to prevent any blockage on the part of the countries concerned.
The experts on the Meijers Committee are clear on the fact that the first solution put forward has little chance of working, and are more in favour of the second or third solution, i.e., the postponement—sine die?—of the Hungarian and Polish Presidencies.
The motion for a resolution mentioned above, which expresses reservations about Hungary’s suitability to hold the presidency, is due to be put to a vote by MEPs on June 1st. The Commission and Parliament find themselves in an uncomfortable position: they cannot formally decide to expel Hungary—and after it, Poland—but are seeking “by all means, even legal ones,” in the words of Charles Maurras, to prevent them from playing any political role. The war is openly ideological and has been acknowledged as such by the Green MEP who has been leading the offensive against Hungary for several months, Gwendoline Delbos-Corfield: “Hungary would be speaking on behalf of 27 member countries, when we know what they say about migrants and LGTBQ rights”—and this cannot be tolerated. The Meijers Committee’s report merely dresses up this eminently political battle in legalistic garb.
How To Prevent an ‘Undesirable’ European Presidency: A Report
Photo: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock.com
In a few months’ time, the rotating presidency will hand the reins of the European Union first to Hungary and then Poland, starting in July 2024, just one month after the next elections. This prospect is of the utmost concern to a number of MEPs who are currently exploring all avenues to try and prevent these two Eastern European countries from coming to power.
A broad coalition of parties in the European Parliament—the EPP, the Socialists and Democrats, the Renew Europe liberal party, the Greens, and the European Left—intend to have a Parliament vote in early June on a resolution stating that Hungary is not fit to assume the duties of the rotating presidency, “as it does not respect EU law, the values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union or the principle of sincere cooperation.”
The resolution, which is not binding, accuses Viktor Orbán’s government of “systemic corruption” and condemns “the Hungarian government’s anti-EU communication campaigns, which are part of the government’s strategy to distract attention from its failure to respect the values enshrined in Article 2 of the EU Treaty.”
While the measures targeted by the MEPs concern Hungary first and foremost, if only because Hungary will be the first to take over the rotating presidency, Poland could also suffer the same fate.
The Meijers Committee, an independent group of Dutch experts specialising in European affairs who have been called upon by the European institutions for over thirty years, has apparently been commissioned to examine possible remedies and scenarios for blocking Hungary’s and Poland’s path to the presidency.
A report, the fruit of their investigations, was published on May 19th. Who commissioned the report is—deliberately—not mentioned. On reading the document, it is striking that the starting point—namely, the legitimacy of preventing Hungary and Poland from taking over the rotating presidency—is not, despite the stated intentions, really put into perspective or even questioned. The design is initially defined in the following terms: “this comment discusses whether, and under what conditions, a Member State can exercise the Presidency.” But the “whether” is very quickly dropped in favour of “under what conditions.”
Now that Hungary and Poland have repeatedly clashed with the Parliament and the Commission, it is considered necessary to take steps to prevent them from taking over the rotating presidency, despite European regulations stipulating that this function must be divided equally between the member states in accordance with the principle of ‘equal rotation.’ The manifestly anti-democratic nature of the decision, and the exclusion of tens of millions of European citizens who would thus be deprived of their country’s six-month presidency, is not even raised.
In the words of the report’s authors, the question of whether these disputes—and in particular the conflict over Article 7, which allows the EU to sanction a country for failure to respect the rule of law—render the countries in question unworthy of the presidency is “not fully resolved.” In the face of this persistent vagueness, the question quickly shifts to ‘how to prevent bad performers from undermining the smooth running of the European Union.’
Three solutions are put forward by the committee of experts.
The first consists of an arrangement with the member states accompanying the country holding the rotating presidency—Spain and Belgium for Hungary, Cyprus and Denmark for Poland—for them to deal with sensitive issues, voluntarily sidelining the offending countries from meetings and negotiations. In other words, the responsibilities would be transferred not to the country holding the presidency, but to its assistants, allowing the latter to be duly silenced and reduced to the role of a mere extra. “Finding a solution within the respective Presidency troikas”—the phrase used by the experts to describe this scenario has all the hallmarks of understatement, not to say Soviet phraseology.
The second solution would be to change the rotation calendar and postpone the Hungarian and Polish Presidencies until a later date, based on a precedent already observed when certain states join or leave the Union.
The third solution would be to change the rules of the game by passing a law that would make access to the rotating presidency conditional on compliance with the famous rule of law, thus making it impossible for a country to hold the presidency if it has not complied with the Commission’s demands on the subject—a law that would be adopted by a qualified majority to prevent any blockage on the part of the countries concerned.
The experts on the Meijers Committee are clear on the fact that the first solution put forward has little chance of working, and are more in favour of the second or third solution, i.e., the postponement—sine die?—of the Hungarian and Polish Presidencies.
The motion for a resolution mentioned above, which expresses reservations about Hungary’s suitability to hold the presidency, is due to be put to a vote by MEPs on June 1st. The Commission and Parliament find themselves in an uncomfortable position: they cannot formally decide to expel Hungary—and after it, Poland—but are seeking “by all means, even legal ones,” in the words of Charles Maurras, to prevent them from playing any political role. The war is openly ideological and has been acknowledged as such by the Green MEP who has been leading the offensive against Hungary for several months, Gwendoline Delbos-Corfield: “Hungary would be speaking on behalf of 27 member countries, when we know what they say about migrants and LGTBQ rights”—and this cannot be tolerated. The Meijers Committee’s report merely dresses up this eminently political battle in legalistic garb.
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