Two years have passed since Russia began its invasion of Ukraine, euphemistically called a “special military operation,” a war of aggression that had, or at any rate was publicised as having, the support of the Russian people. This support largely seems to have remained strong, but according to data published by the Institute for the Study and Analysis of Conflicts in Russia (IKAR), it may have waned somewhat. A Ukrainian institution, IKAR is dedicated to analysing sociological studies in Russia, using the same parameters and methodological tools as the Russian sociologists themselves—people, it must be said, who in many cases cannot do their work freely for fear they may be imprisoned for spreading ‘disinformation’ or on some other trumped-up charge. The method used is computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI), a telephone survey technique in which the interviewer follows a script provided by a computer application, which is integrated into a database from which the data is extracted.
In a country where the umpteenth opposition figure dies in bizarre circumstances and showing a blank anti-war piece of paper can carry a prison sentence of up to 15 years, it stands to reason that no poll can reflect reality. Dissenting Russians will be afraid to speak out. However, Oleksandr Shulga, director of IKAR, argues that Russians are very willing to talk. That said, as he puts it, “obviously our questions are not directly about Putin or the ruling party, something that might put the respondent off, and our first question is always: What is your biggest concern on a daily basis?”
New research conducted by IKAR to coincide with the second anniversary of the start of the war has shown a significant change in the response to this question. Whereas before it was mostly the “special military operation,” which has gone from 50% to 22%, now it is the economic situation and low salaries and pensions, which have surged from 25% to 40%. “On the one hand,” says Shulga,
the bad news is that Russians seem to have got used to war, there is a routinisation of war and it is just another problem. On the other hand, the economic burden on the Russian population is increasing, and all the propaganda claiming that they don’t feel the impact of sanctions is false and that Russians suffer from it on a daily basis.
Shulga’s claims raise the issue of Tucker Carlson’s recent visit to Russia. After his controversial interview with Vladimir Putin, the American journalist published a series of videos in which he visited a supermarket in Moscow and marvelled at such things as shopping trolleys and escalators. Tucker was outraged at how cheap and good the food was compared to its U.S. equivalents in videos that were all too reminiscent of the 2014 film The Interview, in which American journalists visit North Korea to interview the supreme leader. It even contains a scene showing a whole supermarket full of food, despite the harsh reality of hunger among the vast bulk of North Koreans. “Using nominal numbers like GDP or industrial production,” Shulga reports, “it looks like everything is going well, but it was the same with the Soviet Union,” says Shulga. “Production is increasing, but in the field of arms. It’s the classic Kanonen oder Butter, guns or butter.”
For Shulga, however, the interview provided some very relevant details, not the least of which was the excessively long time the Russian president spent on historical justification for the invasion of Ukraine—a view shared by a relatively stable majority of Russians. In September 2023, an IKAR poll found that 45% of Russians consider the pursuit of historical justice more important than recognising existing international borders, compared to 39% who believe the opposite. This detail should be relevant for those who believe that Moscow’s expansionist appetites will end in Ukraine. The other major justification, of course, is ‘denazification,’ which Putin did not explain but which, according to the Kremlin’s mentality, has nothing to do with Nazism. “Denazification means doing away with Ukrainian national identity and all its attributes: language, culture, symbols, history and so on. And it is the most repeated cliché in the Russian media,” Shulga notes.
But despite the propaganda effort, the data reveal that the number of Russians who profess to understand the objectives of the invasion has declined. In February 2023, it was 74%, now it is 64%. “It should have increased,” according to Shulga, “because during this year tens of thousands of Russians were killed and wounded, thousands were taken prisoner, and there were attacks on refineries and military installations on Russian territory.” As we might expect, those who claim to grasp the aims of the war point to ‘denazification’ as the main objective, followed far behind at just 16% by demilitarisation of Ukraine, and finally, for the first time, by NATO expansion. This is a reflection of an increased insistence in propaganda that Russia is actually fighting NATO.
Not only has the number of those claiming to understand the objectives of the war decreased, but also those who think that the special military operation is going according to plan. A year ago it was 56%, while now it has slumped to 46%, with just 40% holding the view that all is going to plan. Shulga concludes:
We asked Russians whether they would support the decision to end the war tomorrow, and they agreed by 72%. On the one hand, some consider the cost too high; on the other hand, many believe that the objectives of the special military operation are either fully achieved, 45%, or partially achieved, 56%. This is normal, because according to their official statistics the war was already won two years ago.
Another very significant fact is the increase in opposition to a new mass mobilisation, from 60% to 74%, and even more so among young people, 84%. This is explained by the fact that 70% of Russians have relatives or acquaintances who have been mobilised and 60% know someone who has died. On the second anniversary of the ‘special military operation’ there is growing pessimism about the war and a lack of understanding of its aims. “However,” says Shulga, “we cannot be under any illusions. The data are significant, but support for the invasion still remains.”
Although the death in prison of opposition figure Navalny is not part of this survey, I asked Dr Shulga about it. His response was as follows:
I think there is a parallel with the interview with Tucker Carlson. Putin talked for 45 minutes about fake history because it was interesting for him, not for Carlson and not for the Western public. It may seem irrational to us, but it is not irrational to him. The same goes for Navalny, for us there are no logical political reasons to assassinate him at the moment, and the propaganda uses the same reasoning, but it would also not be logical from a Western point of view to poison an opponent, put him in jail and assassinate him three years later. We do not follow the logic of the Kremlin and Putin, and according to their logic it was necessary to kill him. It’s a different mentality, it’s their own paranoid, irrational style of reasoning, as they have demonstrated on many occasions.
Russia in the Midst of War
Celebrating on the eve of Russia Day, June 11, 2023
Kirill Kudryavtsev / AFP
Two years have passed since Russia began its invasion of Ukraine, euphemistically called a “special military operation,” a war of aggression that had, or at any rate was publicised as having, the support of the Russian people. This support largely seems to have remained strong, but according to data published by the Institute for the Study and Analysis of Conflicts in Russia (IKAR), it may have waned somewhat. A Ukrainian institution, IKAR is dedicated to analysing sociological studies in Russia, using the same parameters and methodological tools as the Russian sociologists themselves—people, it must be said, who in many cases cannot do their work freely for fear they may be imprisoned for spreading ‘disinformation’ or on some other trumped-up charge. The method used is computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI), a telephone survey technique in which the interviewer follows a script provided by a computer application, which is integrated into a database from which the data is extracted.
In a country where the umpteenth opposition figure dies in bizarre circumstances and showing a blank anti-war piece of paper can carry a prison sentence of up to 15 years, it stands to reason that no poll can reflect reality. Dissenting Russians will be afraid to speak out. However, Oleksandr Shulga, director of IKAR, argues that Russians are very willing to talk. That said, as he puts it, “obviously our questions are not directly about Putin or the ruling party, something that might put the respondent off, and our first question is always: What is your biggest concern on a daily basis?”
New research conducted by IKAR to coincide with the second anniversary of the start of the war has shown a significant change in the response to this question. Whereas before it was mostly the “special military operation,” which has gone from 50% to 22%, now it is the economic situation and low salaries and pensions, which have surged from 25% to 40%. “On the one hand,” says Shulga,
Shulga’s claims raise the issue of Tucker Carlson’s recent visit to Russia. After his controversial interview with Vladimir Putin, the American journalist published a series of videos in which he visited a supermarket in Moscow and marvelled at such things as shopping trolleys and escalators. Tucker was outraged at how cheap and good the food was compared to its U.S. equivalents in videos that were all too reminiscent of the 2014 film The Interview, in which American journalists visit North Korea to interview the supreme leader. It even contains a scene showing a whole supermarket full of food, despite the harsh reality of hunger among the vast bulk of North Koreans. “Using nominal numbers like GDP or industrial production,” Shulga reports, “it looks like everything is going well, but it was the same with the Soviet Union,” says Shulga. “Production is increasing, but in the field of arms. It’s the classic Kanonen oder Butter, guns or butter.”
For Shulga, however, the interview provided some very relevant details, not the least of which was the excessively long time the Russian president spent on historical justification for the invasion of Ukraine—a view shared by a relatively stable majority of Russians. In September 2023, an IKAR poll found that 45% of Russians consider the pursuit of historical justice more important than recognising existing international borders, compared to 39% who believe the opposite. This detail should be relevant for those who believe that Moscow’s expansionist appetites will end in Ukraine. The other major justification, of course, is ‘denazification,’ which Putin did not explain but which, according to the Kremlin’s mentality, has nothing to do with Nazism. “Denazification means doing away with Ukrainian national identity and all its attributes: language, culture, symbols, history and so on. And it is the most repeated cliché in the Russian media,” Shulga notes.
But despite the propaganda effort, the data reveal that the number of Russians who profess to understand the objectives of the invasion has declined. In February 2023, it was 74%, now it is 64%. “It should have increased,” according to Shulga, “because during this year tens of thousands of Russians were killed and wounded, thousands were taken prisoner, and there were attacks on refineries and military installations on Russian territory.” As we might expect, those who claim to grasp the aims of the war point to ‘denazification’ as the main objective, followed far behind at just 16% by demilitarisation of Ukraine, and finally, for the first time, by NATO expansion. This is a reflection of an increased insistence in propaganda that Russia is actually fighting NATO.
Not only has the number of those claiming to understand the objectives of the war decreased, but also those who think that the special military operation is going according to plan. A year ago it was 56%, while now it has slumped to 46%, with just 40% holding the view that all is going to plan. Shulga concludes:
Another very significant fact is the increase in opposition to a new mass mobilisation, from 60% to 74%, and even more so among young people, 84%. This is explained by the fact that 70% of Russians have relatives or acquaintances who have been mobilised and 60% know someone who has died. On the second anniversary of the ‘special military operation’ there is growing pessimism about the war and a lack of understanding of its aims. “However,” says Shulga, “we cannot be under any illusions. The data are significant, but support for the invasion still remains.”
Although the death in prison of opposition figure Navalny is not part of this survey, I asked Dr Shulga about it. His response was as follows:
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