There were two types of Germans we met in Berlin while trying to gauge the public sentiment in the last days leading up to the election: Those who believe only the AfD can save Germany from its endemic problems, created by past governments; and those who think the only thing the country needs saving from is the AfD. There seemed to be no in-between, and most disturbingly, no willingness to listen to the other side, which was especially apparent on the Left.
The election was rightly called historic for multiple reasons. Both big establishment parties (the CDU and the SPD) delivered one of the worst performances in their history, while the parties on the far sides of the political divide doubled their share of votes—all with a record-high voter turnout. But there has been much said already about the results and why Germans abandoned the center, so let’s make an additional point instead, namely that the results you saw mark only the beginning, and not the end, of the process.
Yes, AfD broke through the psychologically important 20% threshold for the first time, but there is no sign of them getting anywhere near a glass ceiling yet. To understand why, you have to look at the two primary factors driving the AfD’s growth: the establishment’s willful ignorance of the people’s legitimate concerns—whether about energy prices, immigrant crime, or something else—as well as its insistence on the cordon sanitaire, the undemocratic firewall, against those calling for a change.
“The firewall will collapse, because it has to,” we heard from AfD supporters time and time again. AfD fights for democracy, freedom of speech, security, and peace, they said, and deserves to participate in the public discourse as much as anyone else.
Needless to say, AfD also has some homework to do before it can truly consolidate itself as a force not only able to shape but to lead the public discussion about Germany’s future. And that means distancing itself from some of its more radical elements. For instance, Björn Höcke’s Der Flügel faction might have a place in German politics, but AfD must decide whether it’s possible to push them to be more aligned with the rest of the party or if it’s better for the two to go their separate ways. The same could be said for Maximilian Krah—whose China spy scandal was first broken by the europeanconservative.com—and whose recent readmittance into the AfD might not have been the wisest choice.
Still, the frustration about the isolation of the Right is entirely justified: the entire political establishment essentially told every fifth German that their opinions don’t count. Expecting people to just give up after this would be utterly naïve: they will keep voting AfD until the party reaches a critical threshold where exclusion is simply not an option.
Yet, a significant portion of society seems bent on denying them the chance to finally get their voice heard, regardless of who ends up in government or what damage to social cohesion and democratic integrity the firewall causes.
“The only thing that matters now is that the far-right is stopped. Nothing else comes close,” one person told us while we were standing next to Berlin’s famous Holocaust memorial, where a radicalized asylum seeker nearly fatally stabbed a Spanish tourist the night before after weeks of plotting to “murder Jews,” according to police.
Yet, when we tried to ask this person what he thought about the increase in violent crime—a perfectly reasonable question given that the police cordons around the memorial were a visible reminder of the night’s attack—he quickly cut the interview short. “Are you a far-right media?” No, just conservative. “But not too conservative, right?”
What is ‘too conservative’ in today’s Germany? Many make the point that AfD’s program is nothing more than what mainstream right-wing parties, such as CDU, were advocating just a few decades ago. Given the left-wing shift that establishment center-right parties have undertaken, particularly since the early 2010s, perhaps it’s better to flip the question. If one claims to represent conservatives but is unwilling to recognize the harm that uncontrolled migration has caused to our nations, then they’re not conservative enough.
We were expecting similar interactions with antifascist protesters outside the AfD’s Lichtenberg headquarters. The East Berlin district has been voting for the far-left Die Linke since 2005, with the AfD now coming within touching distance of flipping it, finishing in second place with only a one percent difference. But when we tried to talk to anyone from the two protesting groups that completely surrounded the AfD’s little rally—one organized by Die Linke and the other by hardcore ‘Antifas’—we only received silence, or worse: violent threats. A few of them even began pushing us around, and we owe it to the intervening police that it didn’t escalate further.
Everywhere we looked, we met these two sides of Berlin: the ‘only AfD’ and the ‘anything, but AfD.’ And it’s somewhat understandable, given that the party has been enduring unprecedented demonization from both mainstream media and politics. AfD’s opponents don’t waste time nitpicking through their program; instead, they just carelessly throw around the Nazi card, and the historical guilt deeply embedded in German society takes care of the rest.
But, again, this will inevitably lead to two things. One is the further polarization of Germany’s political landscape and the fragmentation of its society, and the other is the unavoidable collapse of the firewall.
For a few weeks, the CDU’s tactic of posing as more right-wing did more to preserve the firewall than years of propaganda. Yet, voters were once again slapped in the face when Merz took a U-turn on migration and called reports on his previous commitment on border control “disinformation.”
The possible impact of this betrayal in the coming years should not be underestimated, as you can only ignore your voters for so long. The firewall will collapse, because it has to.
‘You’re Not Too Conservative, Right?’—Election Weekend in Berlin
Photo: Odd ANDERSEN / AFP
There were two types of Germans we met in Berlin while trying to gauge the public sentiment in the last days leading up to the election: Those who believe only the AfD can save Germany from its endemic problems, created by past governments; and those who think the only thing the country needs saving from is the AfD. There seemed to be no in-between, and most disturbingly, no willingness to listen to the other side, which was especially apparent on the Left.
The election was rightly called historic for multiple reasons. Both big establishment parties (the CDU and the SPD) delivered one of the worst performances in their history, while the parties on the far sides of the political divide doubled their share of votes—all with a record-high voter turnout. But there has been much said already about the results and why Germans abandoned the center, so let’s make an additional point instead, namely that the results you saw mark only the beginning, and not the end, of the process.
Yes, AfD broke through the psychologically important 20% threshold for the first time, but there is no sign of them getting anywhere near a glass ceiling yet. To understand why, you have to look at the two primary factors driving the AfD’s growth: the establishment’s willful ignorance of the people’s legitimate concerns—whether about energy prices, immigrant crime, or something else—as well as its insistence on the cordon sanitaire, the undemocratic firewall, against those calling for a change.
“The firewall will collapse, because it has to,” we heard from AfD supporters time and time again. AfD fights for democracy, freedom of speech, security, and peace, they said, and deserves to participate in the public discourse as much as anyone else.
Needless to say, AfD also has some homework to do before it can truly consolidate itself as a force not only able to shape but to lead the public discussion about Germany’s future. And that means distancing itself from some of its more radical elements. For instance, Björn Höcke’s Der Flügel faction might have a place in German politics, but AfD must decide whether it’s possible to push them to be more aligned with the rest of the party or if it’s better for the two to go their separate ways. The same could be said for Maximilian Krah—whose China spy scandal was first broken by the europeanconservative.com—and whose recent readmittance into the AfD might not have been the wisest choice.
Still, the frustration about the isolation of the Right is entirely justified: the entire political establishment essentially told every fifth German that their opinions don’t count. Expecting people to just give up after this would be utterly naïve: they will keep voting AfD until the party reaches a critical threshold where exclusion is simply not an option.
Yet, a significant portion of society seems bent on denying them the chance to finally get their voice heard, regardless of who ends up in government or what damage to social cohesion and democratic integrity the firewall causes.
“The only thing that matters now is that the far-right is stopped. Nothing else comes close,” one person told us while we were standing next to Berlin’s famous Holocaust memorial, where a radicalized asylum seeker nearly fatally stabbed a Spanish tourist the night before after weeks of plotting to “murder Jews,” according to police.
Yet, when we tried to ask this person what he thought about the increase in violent crime—a perfectly reasonable question given that the police cordons around the memorial were a visible reminder of the night’s attack—he quickly cut the interview short. “Are you a far-right media?” No, just conservative. “But not too conservative, right?”
What is ‘too conservative’ in today’s Germany? Many make the point that AfD’s program is nothing more than what mainstream right-wing parties, such as CDU, were advocating just a few decades ago. Given the left-wing shift that establishment center-right parties have undertaken, particularly since the early 2010s, perhaps it’s better to flip the question. If one claims to represent conservatives but is unwilling to recognize the harm that uncontrolled migration has caused to our nations, then they’re not conservative enough.
We were expecting similar interactions with antifascist protesters outside the AfD’s Lichtenberg headquarters. The East Berlin district has been voting for the far-left Die Linke since 2005, with the AfD now coming within touching distance of flipping it, finishing in second place with only a one percent difference. But when we tried to talk to anyone from the two protesting groups that completely surrounded the AfD’s little rally—one organized by Die Linke and the other by hardcore ‘Antifas’—we only received silence, or worse: violent threats. A few of them even began pushing us around, and we owe it to the intervening police that it didn’t escalate further.
Everywhere we looked, we met these two sides of Berlin: the ‘only AfD’ and the ‘anything, but AfD.’ And it’s somewhat understandable, given that the party has been enduring unprecedented demonization from both mainstream media and politics. AfD’s opponents don’t waste time nitpicking through their program; instead, they just carelessly throw around the Nazi card, and the historical guilt deeply embedded in German society takes care of the rest.
But, again, this will inevitably lead to two things. One is the further polarization of Germany’s political landscape and the fragmentation of its society, and the other is the unavoidable collapse of the firewall.
For a few weeks, the CDU’s tactic of posing as more right-wing did more to preserve the firewall than years of propaganda. Yet, voters were once again slapped in the face when Merz took a U-turn on migration and called reports on his previous commitment on border control “disinformation.”
The possible impact of this betrayal in the coming years should not be underestimated, as you can only ignore your voters for so long. The firewall will collapse, because it has to.
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