Pavel Latushka is a Belarusian lawyer and diplomat. From 2002 to 2008, he was ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of Belarus to Poland. He then served as minister of culture from June 2009 to November 2012, resuming his career as ambassador to France and permanent representative to UNESCO, and since 2013 as ambassador to Spain and Portugal. In March 2019, he was appointed director of the Yanka Kupala National Academic Theatre, a position from which he was dismissed on 17 August 2020 for supporting the artists’ strike during the protests against electoral fraud. On 19 August, Latushka became a member of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Coordinating Council, which resulted in a criminal case against him for attempting to seize state power and undermining national security. At the end of August, Latushka moved to Poland, where he currently resides.
Since October 2020, Latushka has been the head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, a coalition of experts and professionals that make up the shadow government created by the Belarusian Coordinating Council for the Peaceful Transition of Power. I interviewed Pavel Latushka at the Karpacz Economic Forum in Poland, where he gave two lectures on the repressive situation in Belarus. He told me about the ways that he was resisting the rule of Alexander Lukashenko, who has been president of Belarus since 1994. “I hope you are not like Pablo,” he said when I introduced myself and told him I was Spanish. The Belarusian politician later told me that the ‘journalist’ Pablo González/Pavel Rubtsov had visited him twice.
What role has the Lukashenko regime played in the abduction of Ukrainian children?
Our team in the NAU has collected information about the crimes of the Lukashenko regime’s role in the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children from the temporary occupied territories to Belarus. We analysed them from May 2022 to 2023, and we know that more than 3,500 children from twenty Ukrainian cities were taken to Belarusian territory on Lukashenko’s orders. Lukashenko himself confirmed this on two occasions, stating that in a telephone conversation with Putin he had suggested that Ukrainian children be taken to Belarus. First, it is illegal to transfer children who supposedly have no parents without the consent of the country of which they are citizens, in this case Ukraine. Second, the regime has attempted to indoctrinate these children, organising meetings with propagandists spreading the Russian narrative and even conducting military training. We have gathered abundant evidence of this, for example, a video of two Belarusian singers chanting in front of hundreds of Ukrainian children: Let Zelensky die! Let Biden die! Let Putin prosper!
We have sent two communications to the International Criminal Court on this matter, and we are sure that there is sufficient evidence of this crime by the Lukashenko regime: the organisation was carried out by several ministries and the funding came from the resources of the so-called Union State of Belarus and Russia, of which Lukashenko himself is president. This action has led to sanctions against, for example, the former Russian ambassador Dmitry Mezentsev or the Paralympic athlete Alexey Talay, whose NGO was one of the organisers of the transfer of the Ukrainian children. Our findings were subsequently confirmed by an independent investigation by Yale University.
Are any of these children still in Belarus?
The children spent several weeks in Belarus receiving indoctrination before being returned to the occupied territories. But we have confirmation that at least fifty of them were sent to Russia and their names were put on the official adoption list.
In recent, weeks there have been reports of an increased presence of Belarusian troops on the Ukrainian border. Is there a possibility that Lukashenko could intervene militarily in the war?
It is impossible. Lukashenko will never send Belarusian soldiers against Ukraine. The main reason is that 85-90% of the population opposes such a possibility, and the death of Belarusian soldiers in a war against Ukraine could become a powerful trigger of internal instability against the regime. Of course, Lukashenko has no affection for Ukraine or Ukrainians; he simply cares about maintaining power and fears the reaction of Belarusian society should he support Russia militarily. But this does not mean that Lukashenko will not again allow Putin to use Belarusian territory for his war of aggression. The question is whether Putin has sufficient resources at his disposal, in which case it would be possible for elements of the Belarusian special services to take part in the war.
Lukashenko’s role in this war is that of a provocateur. He is provoking instability in Ukraine by forcing the Ukrainian army to keep units on the border that cannot be sent to the front or to the Kursk raid, and he is provoking instability in Poland by using illegal immigrants to attack the Polish border. Illegal immigrants used to be flown directly to Belarus, now they come from Russia. Everything Lukashenko does, such as military manoeuvres near the border, is a provocation that serves Putin also in addition to his own narrative. At home, Lukashenko presents himself as a strongman defending a fortress surrounded by enemies: Ukraine wants to invade us; Poland wants to occupy the western regions of Belarus; Lithuania wants to attack us, and so on. But I can tell you that this narrative has not been very successful.
Lukashenko uses the same framing as Putin when he claims that Russia is surrounded by enemies.
Yes, because all dictators need enemies. Lukashenko’s first enemy was Belarusian society, which did not vote for him in 2020 and which today, living under a totalitarian system, mostly wants to live in a democratic country. And against this enemy, his own society, Lukashenko has gone all out: there are thousands of political prisoners; he has liquidated all opposition political parties; he has closed down all independent media; he has eliminated 1,700 NGOs that cooperate with EU countries and imposed a totalitarian regime. Lukashenko is the main enemy of Belarusian society.
If Putin were to fall because of his failure in the war, do you think Lukashenko would follow him? Would it be possible for the elements of the regime that keep Lukashenko in power to turn their backs on him?
Lukashenko is a player who is always trying to maintain a balance. During his rule, he has made many disingenuous overtures towards the West. These were not to establish cooperation with EU countries nor to meet human rights standards or cultivate freedom of the press, but to get more money. Lukashenko leveraged these overtures to convince Putin to give him more economic support in exchange for not moving closer to the West. If it is in Lukashenko’s interest to support Putin, he will become his staunchest ally, but if it is in his interest to move away from him, he will turn back to the West. He is a political actor in the worst sense, one who does not care about the security or welfare of his country, only about staying in power. Lukashenko knows that, as soon as he loses power, he will be prosecuted for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against the Belarusian people.
As a politician and as a Belarusian, I want to stop this regime that has been in place for thirty years, but if someone in the West tries to beat Lukashenko at his game, they must know that they will lose and that Belarusian society will lose as well. The last game was when I was ambassador between 2015 and 2019, when Lukashenko was invited to have a closer relationship with the EU, up to half a billion euros were granted by various European institutions and a special programme of the European Commission was created. The result we saw in 2020 was massive repression, people killed and tortured. All these politicians must understand that they cannot make the mistake again of doing business with a bandit who has abused his power for years and has not been punished. If everything that has happened is forgiven because of political games, they will lose the Belarusian democratic society.
Looking back at the 2020 protests, many compared them to what happened on the Maidan in 2014, but argued that, unlike Ukraine, Belarus lacks a strong national identity. Do you agree with that?
The 2020 protests were against the dictator, against his violence, and to punish those responsible for crimes against the Belarusian people, because in the first days of the protests many people were arrested and thousands were tortured. But at the same time, all the protests were under our national flag: white, red, and white.
I remember that a few weeks before the elections we had a confidential meeting with the head of the KGB, the speaker of parliament and the chairman of the State Control Committee. We were told that the Russians wanted to remove Lukashenko as president of the country, but after 9 August the Russians understood that there was a risk that the Belarusians would create a nation state. That was damaging to them, and I think at the last moment they changed their minds and decided to support Lukashenko. For the Russians, it was much better to support a dictator than a democratic leader supported by a nationally-oriented population. The 2020 protests were an awakening of the Belarusian nation, and today this feeling is much stronger. We see Ukrainians fighting to defend their nation, and there are many Belarusians fighting alongside them, so we have a much stronger national orientation today.
The main problem we had in 2020 was the absence of leaders, because they were all imprisoned. In my case, I was the director of the National Theatre after finishing my ambassadorial duties, and when I decided to take the side of the Belarusian people and demonstrate against Lukashenko and his system of power, I had no team. You can’t be a leader without a party. Now it’s different, I have a good team, supporters, and well-developed social networks—I can do much more. The other big mistake we made at that time was not to have a plan B. To understand that it is necessary to struggle, not just to protest peacefully, but be more active—proactive—to change the situation.
How do you see the immediate future, and do you think there can be change in Belarus?
I am optimistic, even though Lukashenko wants to kill me. In Poland, the National Prosecutor’s Office has started an investigation to identify a person from the intelligence services, although I don’t know whether he belongs to the Russian FSB or the Belarusian KGB, who wants to kill me. This is not the first time, and there have been several attempts at different times. Lukashenko told me: “I will strangle you if you betray me.” But I don’t want to kill Lukashenko; I want to put him in prison. My team is doing a great job collecting evidence, preparing dossiers, and sharing them with our partners, so I am sure Lukashenko will be punished. I always say give Ukraine all the Leopards and F-16s available; we need tools to share responsibility in the Lukashenko regime to split the list. It is very important to understand that splitting the list is one of the fundamental steps for change in Belarus, because not many inside the regime want to be passengers on that train; many do not want Lukashenko and they are simply people who serve the state.
Of course, our strategy is not a one-way street, and we are working to create media, to prevent Belarus from becoming North Korea, and to encourage the opening of border crossings and the mobility of Belarusians; to develop educational programmes to counter the Russian propaganda that is now flooding our country and to change our mentality. For the first time in our history, we have institutions: we have a transitional cabinet, a coordinating council elected in an online vote last May, and we are developing all sorts of initiatives. Lukashenko could die tomorrow, and if that day comes, we must be ready.
