Dr. Oleksandr Shulga is the director of the Institute of Russian Conflict Studies and Analysis (IKAR), the only Ukrainian institution that conducts monthly sociological monitoring in Russia. He has 16 years of advanced experience in the field of quantitative and qualitative sociological research, and has conducted studies in various fields, including in the potential risk of escalating tensions and instability.
In the West, do we really know what Russia and Russian society is like, or do we often fall prey to myth and propaganda?
I wrote a paper on this for the Center for European Foreign Policy Analysis (CEPA) and titled it “Russia – A Myth Wrapped in Opinion Surveys.” Yes, it is true that we get carried away by the myth. Most people in the West have no idea about what Russia is, the processes that go on there, or the attitudes and opinions of Russian society. It is very convenient for the Russian regime that this is the case and, in fact, they try to advance these myths about themselves. The most important myth is: “You can’t understand Russia, don’t even try.” For the Russian regime, this is an advantage, because those who don’t understand their counterparts and don’t try to understand them have lost from the start.
To keep Russia under a “sacred canopy” of inscrutability is also a goal of the Russian liberal opposition—those who are supported by Western countries and call themselves an alternative to Putin’s regime. For the opposition, denying the possibility of understanding Russian society gives them an advantage when they are faced with scepticism about whether Russia can become a democratic society, because they present themselves as the only ones who can understand and explain Russia, and therefore the West must deal exclusively with them. But when we carry out scientific surveys we see, for example, that Russian society has supported the invasion of Ukraine and that it is not just “Putin’s war.” This means that the liberal opposition does not speak the same language as their society, and that their slogans of democracy and freedom do not resonate in Russia. That is why this “sacred canopy” is the first myth that needs to be dismantled, and that is our work and strategic goal in IKAR.
One of the most striking surveys that has been repeated over the years is the one that identifies Stalin as the most important historical figure for Russians. Is this a consequence of the lack of decommunisation after the collapse of the USSR; or, is it related to the Putin regime’s propaganda that has made Stalin and the Second World War the Russian national myth?
The lack of decommunisation in Russia is very important. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia did not even try to change its historical narratives. That is why Russia’s most important national historical myth was inherited from the Soviet Union: the victory in the “Great Patriotic War,” which is what they call the Second World War. For Russia, the war lasted only from 1941 to 1945, forgetting that from 1939 to 1941 they were allied with the Nazis, during which time they carved up Poland, occupied the Baltic States, and attacked Finland. After Perestroika, the Russian elite, including Putin, indulged in wild capitalism and grabbed everything they could. But with Putin’s rise to power, they returned to the old ways and discourses. So the positive view of Stalin is not surprising. And it is also this lack of decommunisation that has prevented real democracy in Russia, which is another problem for the liberal opposition—because there is no point of return, no golden age to go back to.
Another myth much repeated in the West, especially to appeal to conservative sympathies, is that of the traditional and highly religious Russian society. However, the contrary figures—for example, for attendance at religious festivals—are ridiculous.
Yes; it is an example of the dissonance between what they believe and what they are actually doing. Russian society, in terms of self-identification towards the West, promotes religion and traditional values. But this is nothing new and it is linked to other national myths: “nation, autocracy, and orthodoxy.” Russian nationhood, composed of Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Russians; autocracy, led by an autocrat, i.e., a strongman, be it the Tsar, the party general secretary or the president; and Orthodoxy, the true religion. These myths have a long history, going back to the Third Rome after the fall of Byzantium. This is the social and historical background of the myth.
But on the other hand, we have reality. Recent surveys in Russia show that the percentage of people who attend mass or religious festivals is very small indeed, and the percentage of those who engage in any religious practice, such as not eating meat on certain dates, is marginal.
It is, after all, a society that is an heir to Soviet society.
Yes, but in this orthodox statement there is also a sense of superiority to the decadent Western countries: “We are more spiritual and have higher moral values than you.”
In the Afghan war, there was a negative reaction from part of Russian society because of the number of soldiers killed. It significantly impacted the Soviet regime. Now, having suffered huge casualties compared to that war, do you think there could be a similar reaction?
In March-April 2023, one year after the start of the invasion, we asked Russians what the casualty limit of the special military operation was. Some 55% said that the casualties were already enormous and had exceeded the limit, and almost 20% thought that more than 20,000 dead and wounded were already too many—a figure that, at that time, have already been far exceeded. In other words, nine months ago three quarters of Russians thought the casualties were enormous.
Russian society is automated—lacking in what is called “civil society”—and over the years the regime has ensured that it remains so, giving life to Kremlin-friendly groups and branding all those outside its control as “foreign agents,” meaning that if they try to carry out their work in Russia they can be tried and convicted. Repression is an integral part of this system, as we have seen in the protests of the mothers and wives of the mobilised.
It was precisely the mothers and wives of Soviet soldiers who began to protest about the casualties in Afghanistan.
Yes, and in this war we have seen an evolution. The first step was the professional army, and the problem for the Kremlin was that many professional soldiers wanted to break their military contracts because of heavy casualties. The second were those recruited in Donetsk and Lugansk, occupied since 2014, and we saw the complaints of their relatives and wives. This is an old Russian tactic and was already used by the Tatars: they conquer one territory and use the men from the occupied territory to conquer another. The third step was the recruitment of prisoners, which began as early as the summer of 2022. And the fourth step has been the mobilisation of 300,000 men in September 2022. In Dagestan, there were many protests against the mobilisation, and consequently the number of men recruited was reduced there. But this was not the case in the rest of Russia, where protests began with the “Council of Mothers and Wives,” an association that was labelled as a “foreign agent” and had to cease its activity.
Now we are in the fifth step, an ongoing mobilisation, overt or covert, which already has a larger number of recruits than the mobilisation of September 2022. All of this has caused a very important and dramatic dissonance for Russian society; on the one hand, hundreds of thousands of non-military Russians were dragged off to serve in the war, and a year later they are still on the front line. On the other hand, we have tens of thousands of prisoners who have been acquitted of their crimes and are now returning home after six months of service. This disproportion is truly dramatic: law-abiding Russians are still at war and prisoners with very serious crimes are pardoned and released. This situation is causing social unrest and represents a threat to the Kremlin, because it could pose problems for its presidential race. For this reason, during Orthodox Christmas, Putin met with the relatives of fallen soldiers.
Is there a possibility of social unrest in Russia that could change the current course of events?
Yes; there is that possibility, and it is very important to understand that it is possible. Putin is not going to go to the trenches, nor is he going to send his family or friends, so he is going to keep sending Russians as cannon fodder. What affects the Russians? What can make them change their minds and oppose this situation? The most important and crucial reason for a change would be an operational or strategic failure on the front line. If the Ukrainians get accurate weapons that can demonstrate to Russian society that this war and all its losses have been futile, and the Russians realise that becoming cannon fodder will not change anything and will only diminish their lives and the lives of their families, a change can happen. Putin’s image—as a leader who has a plan and is always two or three steps ahead—is already being questioned, and the Prigozhin mutiny confirmed these doubts.
Paradoxically, providing more weapons to Ukraine now may mean having to deliver fewer weapons in the long run in a long trench war, because that is what may force the war to stop more quickly. Demonstrating strategic failures on the front line, such as the liberation of the city of Kherson or Kharkiv oblast, affects Russian society, because it shows that the war is futile and that its leadership has lost its sense of reality and strategic capability. This may cause Russian society, including its elites, to consider that its leader has lost his sharp vision, and that the time has come finally to change course.
