Paweł Lisicki is editor-in-chief of the Polish conservative weekly Do Rzeczy. In contrast with most political commentators in Poland, he has criticised the government’s hawkish stance on the war in Ukraine. He has argued that while weakening Russia is important, it should not come at the cost of weakening the Polish economy and possibly dragging Poland into the war. Therefore, he says, peace talks should be prioritised. With parliamentary elections—as well as a referendum focusing on migration and security—taking place in less than two months, we asked Paweł Lisicki about the effect of the war on the campaign, and the reasons behind the rise of the Konfederacja (Confederation) party.
With the elections in Poland coming up on October 15th, hot topics would appear to be the war in Ukraine, the threats from Russia and Belarus, mass migration to Europe, the cost-of-living crisis, and Poland’s rule-of-law dispute with the EU. Which one of these will decide the outcome of the elections?
The first two topics you mentioned—the war between Russia and Ukraine, and the threat from Belarus—should be the focus of attention in Poland, but interestingly enough they don’t actually play any role in public discussion. Nobody is questioning whether the political approach of the Polish government regarding the war has been a good one or not—can be justified or not. There is no difference between the main opposition party and the governing party concerning the situation in Ukraine. The only thing the parties accuse each other of is that one is more pro-Russian than the other. This is not what you’d expect, given the present situation.
Why do you think there is a lack of discussion about Ukraine? Is it because the voters are generally in favour of what the government is doing and believe the opposition would do the same?
Poles enthusiastically supported Ukraine from the beginning of the war, no matter what their political affiliation was. Most of them believed in the message conveyed by most of the Polish media: that Ukraine was going to win the war in a matter of weeks, and the support of the West, especially the United States, would be enough. And because most of the people were convinced this was true, there was no real difference of opinion between the main parties. The only political party that tried to distance itself with regards to supporting Ukraine was Konfederacja, but even they weren’t very clear on what exactly they were critical of. If we compare the Polish election campaign with the one in Hungary last year, the message of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was much clearer. He said that if Hungarians re-elected him, then Hungary would not participate in the war. You cannot find any similar messages in Poland. The topic of Poland’s possible or probable involvement in the war is not the subject of debate, and the reason for that might be that Poles still believe in the U.S. They believe that American support is enough for Ukraine to win, therefore we don’t have to be afraid.
The war started 18 months ago. Are Poles still enthusiastic about supporting Ukraine?
Opinion polls suggest that this wave of enthusiasm is diminishing and there is a slight shift in public mood. But it is connected primarily with the status of Ukrainian refugees in Poland, not so much with the general approach to the war. There is a slowly-growing group of Poles who think that Poland should be more neutral in the war, but it is still a very small minority, because most Poles believe that if Russia defeats Ukraine, then Poland would be the next country in Russia’s sights.
You have argued many times that the Polish position on Ukraine could be harmful because the longer the war lasts, the more negatively it can impact Poland’s economy, the more refugees it will have to tend to, and the more it could raise the risk of the country being dragged into the war. Do these possible negative scenarios have an impact on how Poles perceive the war?
The situation of refugees definitely does have an impact on the Polish debate, that is one of the main reasons why Konfederacja—which exploited the problem—is backed by 12 to 15% of voters. That is also why the main governing party, PiS’s (Law and Justice) rhetoric has changed in the last two months, and why they are more sceptical of accepting Ukrainian refugees. The refugees received enormous social privileges right from the outset of the war, much more than what was expected from the Polish government. The government believed that their policy would be useful—Ukrainian refugees would solve demographic and labour shortage problems—but the general attitude towards them has changed, politically speaking.
PiS is considered to be a right-wing, populist party in Europe, on the right side of the political spectrum concerning issues such as migration, abortion, or gender ideology. How is it possible that there was further room to the right of PiS? Why is Konfederacja so popular?
Konfederacja partly gets its support from disappointed PiS voters, who thought that Law and Justice would better represent Polish national interests in Brussels. From their point of view, words were not followed by actions. The PiS government accepted decisions taken in Brussels that were not in the country’s interests: for example, the decision on EU funds being tied to rule-of-law issues, and the so-called ‘Fit for 55’ package, which imposes limits on member states’ energy policies. Even though the government promised they would veto these programs, they didn’t. The interesting thing is that Konfederacja has also attracted voters from the opposition Civic Platform, especially voters who believe in a free-market economy. If you look at the Polish political debate, it is very difficult to say which party is more liberal in terms of supporting the free-market economy. PiS’s popularity is based on social welfare programmes, and in this respect, Civic Platform, is very similar. Under the current government, a family is entitled to receive a benefit of 500 Polish złoty (currently €112) per month for each of their children. The amount is set to rise to 800 złoty (€179) from January. So the rising support of Konfederacja is also a protest against these welfare-state policies.
Coming back to my first question, what are the topics that are of concern to the Polish voters and could influence the outcome of the election?
The interesting thing is that if you compare the current Polish debate with the ones in previous years, there is no big change. Even the actors are the same: Jarosław Kaczyński [PiS] and Donald Tusk [Civic Platform]. Some months ago it seemed that PiS would use Donald Tusk’s allegedly suspicious relationship with Russia as its main political weapon. A law to set up a special committee to investigate Russian influence in Poland was approved, but it looks as though PiS has given up on pursuing this goal for the time being [the appointment of the committee has been delayed until after the elections]. So PiS’s main political weapon is the referendum, especially the question that asks voters whether they support the forced relocation of illegal migrants imposed by the European Union. [Phrased as: “Do you support the admission of thousands of illegal immigrants from the Middle East and Africa, in accordance with the forced relocation mechanism imposed by the European bureaucracy?”]
It is a clever manoeuvre by PiS because according to the polls, most voters are against this. Another question refers to the wall on the border of Poland and Belarus which voters strongly support. So generally speaking, the main idea is to connect the elections with a referendum on opposing unpopular solutions by the European Union.
So it’s an effective tool to get more people to vote for PiS?
I think so, yes, because the compulsory relocation [to Poland] of refugees is extremely unpopular in Poland. In that respect, you could even say that the European Union has given Law and Justice a political boost. It is interesting to see that at the same time, the opposition is focusing primarily on the issues of abortion. Donald Tusk is organising a big march against the strict abortion laws on October 1st, two weeks before the elections. I think it is a completely absurd idea, because even though there is a discussion concerning whether the laws are too strict or not, it is not an issue that will help the opposition garner votes.
Though strongly opposing illegal migration, the PiS government drew up plans to grant 400,000 work permits annually to non-EU country citizens. They later abolished the plans fearing a loss of support before the elections. How does the government try to balance opposing migration with the need for skilled workers in the labour market?
The key word to explain the situation is “compulsory.” Poland has about 130,000 migrant workers from all over the world, but Brussels is intent on a compulsory relocation of migrants who are not workers. There is a big difference between people who come to Poland to work and people who come here as migrants and are supported by the state.
And migration is not the only issue causing tensions in Poland’s relationship with the EU. The European Commission is still withholding recovery funds over rule-of-law issues in Poland. A ruling by the Polish Constitutional Court in 2021 which questioned the primacy of EU law over national law also caused concern in Brussels. Can we expect any changes in the relations after the elections?
It depends on the results of the election. I think PiS will win, but the question is whether they can gain a majority in parliament, and govern by themselves. If they were able to form a new government, the European Union would have to accept it. That could pave the way for recovery funds, but on the other hand, we saw what happened in Hungary: despite Viktor Orbán’s landslide victory last year, they still haven’t received their share of the funds. A lot will depend on how strong Law and Justice will be, because the opinion polls suggest that they will need to look for coalition partners.
Who could those coalition partners be? What are the most likely scenarios?
Let’s wait for the results. As I said, the best scenario for Law and Justice would be to govern alone. If that doesn’t happen, it is very difficult to imagine that they would find somebody from some part of the opposition. In this case I think there would most probably be a government formed by the opposition, tolerated by Konfederacja.
The war has impacted the cooperation of the members of the Visegrád Group, with main allies Hungary and Poland disagreeing on how to deal with Russia. Viktor Orbán also said in a speech in July that in the struggle between federalists and sovereigntists “the Czechs have basically changed sides, Slovakia is wobbling, and only the Poles and Hungarians are holding out.” How do you see the future of the group?
It is very difficult to be optimistic concerning the future of the Visegrád Group. I think that Viktor Orbán’s assessment is right. Fortunately Law and Justice, even though they have a completely different approach with regards to the war, are still a sovereigntist party, and should cooperate with Hungary. I’m afraid that the Czechs and Slovaks are giving up this sovereigntist position due to the impact and the position of Germany, and some other big players. It’s a pity, because I think that the idea of a federal Europe is a wrong one, a very dangerous one.
