On June 9, Greeks elected the country’s 21 representatives in the European Parliament. The ruling, center-right New Democracy (ND) secured 28.31% of the vote and seven seats in the European Parliament.
Leftist SYRIZA (The Coalition of the Radical Left—Progressive Alliance) followed with 14.92% and four seats, PASOK (The Panhellenic Socialist Movement) with 12.79% and three seats, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) with 9.25% and two seats, and the conservative Elliniki Lysi (Greek Solution) with 9.30% and two seats. Other Greek conservative parties have also entered the EP. Niki (Victory) received 4.37% of the votes, electing one MEP, and Foni Logikis (Voice of Reason) with 3.04% and one seat. The left-wing Plefsi Eleftherias (Course of Freedom) received 3.40% of the votes and one seat.
The European Conservative interviewed Professor Kostas A. Lavdas about the EP elections, the changing political landscape in Greece, and threats Turkey poses to Greece and Cyprus.
Lavdas was born in Athens and studied in Greece, Britain, and the USA. He has been, among others, senior research fellow at the London School of Economics, professor and the Konstantinos Karamanlis Chair of Greek and European Studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Boston, dean of the School of Social Sciences and vice-chancellor for academic affairs and personnel of the University of Crete, professor and visiting professor at other American and British universities, lecturer at the National School of Public Administration (Athens), chairman of the scientific committee of the ministry of the interior for citizenship exams, and regular member of the board of directors of many organizations, institutions, and organizations.
Professor Lavdas is an author of numerous books, articles in international scientific journals (such as European Journal of Political Research, West European Politics, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Politics, etc.) and chapters in collective volumes in Greek, English, and German in the fields of European politics, comparative foreign policy, and applied political theory. He has coordinated and participated in a number of European and Greek research programs and has been a referee in leading scientific journals of political science and European studies (such as Political Studies, Governance, Journal of European Integration, European Journal of Political Theory, West European Politics, Ethnic and Racial Studies, and others).
He is currently the director of the graduate program in International Relations and Strategic Studies of the Department of International, European, and Area Studies of Panteion University in Athens.
A record 60% of registered Greek voters abstained from the EU vote in June. What do you think is the cause of this abstention?
Abstention is increasing as a result of three main parameters. First, more Greeks appear to doubt the impact of electoral participation on policy choices. This is of course an international phenomenon and a hotly debated one, but in Greece, the passage from the political voluntarism of the 1980s and part of the 1990s to the severely constrained policy environment of the 2010s was traumatic. The extent to which there is a sense of impact on politics and policy weighs heavily on the decision to participate electorally. A gap has emerged: citizens in EU member states have realized that the national political systems are increasingly irrelevant in a number of policy areas, while the growing significance of the European Parliament has not yet been fully understood. This has been exacerbated by the ill-suited candidates in the lists of many parties.
Second, the experience of a SYRIZA-led government’s voice, experimentation, and failure in 2015 led many left-wing voters to the choice of electoral exit.
Third, the June 2023 legislative election resulted in a strong ND (New Democracy) government but also a parliament with many parties. Up to now, increased fragmentation has not led to ungovernability because many Greek voters, assisted by the electoral system, chose to give ND a clear parliamentary majority in a show of preference for stability over experimentation. This also reflects a growing sentiment in political culture encouraging voters in the direction of choosing a seemingly solid, predictable player or refraining from voting.
The ruling New Democracy (ND) party, which has led Greece since 2019, came first in the EU election with 28.3% of the vote. But this was well below the 40% that the party received in the June 2023 national election. In fact, none of the big three parties of the establishment (namely the ND and the left-wing opposition parties, SYRIZA and PASOK) reached their stated goals. Can we talk of changing dynamics in the Greek political establishment? Why do you think the mainstream political parties are losing public support in Greece?
I believe that abstention is the major factor here, and, as a result, shifts in electoral alignments and party dynamics have to be interpreted in this context. Following the enormous financial and fiscal crisis of 2010 and the considerable refugee crisis of 2015, the main players—especially ND and PASOK—took a serious beating in the polls. But, unlike PASOK, a party that, in addition, suffered from the electoral rise of SYRIZA at its expense, ND has maintained a relatively stable, albeit declining, base.
Indeed, ND has also been able to make extensive inroads into center-left territory, with issues such as same-sex marriage. While at the same time, despite too much talk by pundits and observers in the media about the rise of the so-called ‘far Right,’ ND has not faced serious contenders from the Right.
To sum up, the situation today is as follows: ND leads by a considerable margin while at the same time alienating voters of the Right who cannot find a worthwhile alternative; SYRIZA has split and embarked on endless soul-searching with no sign of substantial recovery; PASOK possesses political potential, which is however hampered by continuous internal disputes and the attempt to project often nuanced policy views without being able to translate them into clear communicable messages.
What do you think are the greatest problems and concerns faced by Greek people today?
Price hikes, relatively low salaries by EU standards, housing issues in the main cities but also in certain islands, and a problematic functioning of the independent regulatory agencies, which appear unable to regulate conglomerates, avoid the abuses of dominant market position, and encourage domestic competition—these are the main issues. Followed by a growing sense of unease stemming from regional and international challenges and, especially, Turkish expansionism.
The votes received by conservative or anti-globalist parties are also rising in many European countries. What do you think are the causes of this change?
This is a complex phenomenon, and stereotypical approaches may prove misleading. I have argued in the past that we tend to exaggerate the common features in so-called ‘far-right’ and anti-globalist parties. There are considerable nuances that we need to consider. In fact, nuances have become more, not less, significant in the last couple of years.
It is a fact that in the new composition of the European Parliament, “Patriots for Europe” have become the parliament’s third-largest group, having France’s National Rally in its ranks. But some of the traditional themes, publicly declared or latent in the past, are now almost extinct. Antisemitism has been officially denounced, euroscepticism has been redefined, and there is a growing trend—a trend I have called eco-skepticism—signifying the discontent with and reactions to the allocation of the costs of energy transition.
In other words, some parties adapt and mutate, while others—including some local branches of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and, to an extent, elements of the federal party in general—persist in exhibiting strong nationalist, antisemitic, and authoritarian features. At the same time, the general picture, according to Eurobarometer, shows that support for EU membership (whether EU membership is a good thing for the particular country) has been rising in most member states. In the elections for the European Parliament in June, the so-called eurosceptic ‘far Right’ made only modest gains overall, despite predictions to the contrary.
In fact, the winner was the European People’s Party (EPP), the group of center-right parties. In short, in most European countries, including Greece, the center Right has been taking full advantage of the increase in support for EU membership in a context of rising concerns about European security, partly caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the continuation of the Russia-Ukraine war.
Turkey keeps engaging in expansionist policies in the Aegean Sea and the eastern Mediterranean, attempting to steal the territorial waters of both Greece and Cyprus. How are Turkey’s attempts affecting the EU’s security and regional stability?
As I have argued in the past, Greek-Turkish relations constitute a palimpsest, largely as a result of the history of the relations but also due to the complex regional and international environment, in its often-surprising discontinuities and equally baffling continuities. Conflictual elements in the relations have become prominent, indeed dominant, at different junctures. What is at stake is the ability to nurture conditions that favor a sustainable peace rather than focusing—as successive Greek governments have done—on tactics that may or may not help avoid further instances of conflict.
From Greece’s perspective, a sustainable peace requires further growth in its deterrence capability combined with developing alliance networks. On four different occasions in recent decades—in 1974, 1987, 1996, and 2020—the two NATO allies found themselves on the brink of war. In diverse international environments, including Cold War and post-Cold War politics, different domestic configurations, and different sets of global and regional stimuli.
On European defense and security, Turkey officially supports strengthening ties between the EU and NATO but is committed to ensuring that NATO maintains its leading role in such cooperation, while Ankara enhances its own independent strategies of expanding regional influence and developing its role in political Islam. By constantly challenging NATO and EU member Greece and EU member Cyprus, Turkey has played a destabilizing role in the region. In view of the above, attempts to further integrate Turkey into Europe’s defense projects are ill-advised and will ultimately serve to derail advances made by EU agencies and the planned EU defense industrial strategy.
Since 1974, 36% of the Republic of Cyprus has been illegally occupied by the Turkish military. In other words, a 50-year-long illegal occupation of a significant part of European territory has occurred. What do you think Europe should do to challenge Turkey’s occupation of Cyprus?
The issue of Cyprus cannot be ‘solved’ in the foreseeable future, if by ‘solution’ we mean the application of relevant international agreements and UN resolutions. After the Turkish invasion of 1974, successive Turkish governments have sought to legitimize the Turkish occupation in part of Cyprus. In addition, since the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s approach to this and other regional issues has reflected the country’s relentless pursuit of greater strategic autonomy and a greater role in Turkey’s neighborhood and beyond.
The Turkish position is a major obstacle to further negotiations in Cyprus. The fact that the EU has often overrated the value of Turkey’s role led to further Turkish demands and expanding Turkish claims.
There are different views within the EU, indeed within most EU member states, on the desired nature of future relations with Turkey. Full membership is untenable, but—as I have argued for many years—constantly evoking the possibility of future membership serves as a mantra that prohibits serious debate on the future of the actual relationship.
All things considered, a probable scenario is that of a special regime, encompassing not just customs union and trade but other areas also, being dependent on good neighborly relations with all EU member states, including Cyprus, and open to assessment and revision. In this context, sanctions should be brought back as a possible instrument in EU-Turkey relations, irrespective of whether or not a new EU-Turkey regime is put in place.
