Sixty countries are invited to the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg that kicks off on August 22nd. A third of these are looking to join the bloc of emerging economies led by China, which hopes that the new powerhouse will amass enough power and capital to challenge the G7-led global status quo. India, on the other hand, would rather see BRICS as the home of the non-aligned, complicating the internal dynamics of the group. So, what are the main things to expect from South Africa over the next two days?
What is BRICS?
The term ‘BRIC’ was coined by Jim O’Neill, an American economist, in 2001—as an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, and China—to mark the largest emerging markets and, therefore, most attractive investment destinations. The four countries decided to formalize their relationship in 2006 and have been holding annual summits since 2009. During the third summit, in 2011, South Africa formally became the fifth member in the first and last enlargement to date, which changed the group’s name to the now well-known BRICS.
BRICS is often presented as a sort of anti-NATO or anti-West force in the world, which is definitely part of its wide-ranging visions, but it’s important to note several caveats. First, BRICS is an economic forum with no military aspect to it, most akin to the Western advanced economies’ G7 (comprising the U.S., the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, and the EU).
While in 1992, the G7 countries commanded 45.8% of the global GDP (adjusted to purchasing power parity), or nearly thrice the BRICS’ then 16.5%, by last year, their share has fallen to 30.3%, with BRICS taking the lead with 31.7%—largely thanks to China’s massive economy. Nominally, however, the G7 is still ahead with a combined GDP of $46 trillion compared to BRIC’s $27.7 trillion.
Furthermore, while the G7 is united in its desire to promote its preferred political and ideological worldview, centered around liberal, democratic values, BRICS does not possess the same internal consensus. The autocratic political systems in China and Russia are generally viewed negatively by the three democracies of the group, who also created their own separate bloc—the IBSA Dialogue Forum—named in a similar fashion.
Competing visions
The underlying divergence within the current BRICS is not only about preferred forms of governance and associated values but also about the way each member envisions the future role their bloc should play in global politics. The division mostly plays out between the two heavyweights, China and India, which have vastly different approaches to dealing with both the G7 and the West in general.
New Delhi sees BRICS as the primary facilitator of cooperation between developing nations in the future (with special attention to staving off the harmful effects of climate change), as well as a vehicle to find and promote ways to reform the international economic and financial system into something that would accommodate the third world better—all while engaging in friendly and constructive dialogue with G7 countries. In short, focus on peaceful economic growth while staying out of the Sino-American struggle for global hegemony. It’s no surprise, therefore, that India’s Prime Minister Modi attended the last G7 Summit as a guest, playing the role of a liaison between East and West.
Beijing, on the other hand, has a different plan in mind. In the Chinese vision, BRICS would gradually evolve to become another venue for its anti-U.S. activism, as well as a counterbalance—then, direct challenger—to the G7’s economic dominance. Through BRICS, China seeks to offer an alternative for the third world to the U.S., the IMF, the dollar, and even Bretton Woods—as well as, eventually, to liberal democracy itself. Getting caught up in geopolitics, however, could easily risk BRICS’ ability to effectively deliver the much-needed assistance that the developing nations are looking for in the membership.
The way to enlargement
Naturally, neither of these visions would materialize overnight. So far, India has enough weight to balance China’s potentially dangerous ambitions within the group. But this is where enlargement comes in. This year’s Summit is shaping up to be special because it could mark the first time that prospective members receive an official invitation to join the bloc since 2010.
Both China and India are in favor of admitting new member states and thus increasing BRICS’s global influence, but while China wants as many members and as soon as possible, India is more cautious when it’s about admitting a lot of (primarily African) countries which are already in the back pocket of Beijing. Besides recalibrating the internal power dynamics of the group, an enlargement too big and too sudden could also dilute its operating structure, rendering it ineffective as it struggles to reach a consensus.
Pre-summit comments from officials clearly indicated the growing tension within the group regarding the outcome of the enlargement. “If we expand BRICS to account for a similar portion of world GDP as the G7, then our collective voice in the world will grow stronger,” a Chinese official told the Financial Times, laying out Beijing’s primary objective: becoming an anti-G7 coalition.
Naledi Pandor, the foreign minister of South Africa (which leans heavily toward New Delhi’s side in the dispute), said it was “extremely wrong” to see or to portray the prospective enlargement as an anti-Western move. However, one can easily find auto- or kleptocratic states among the applicants (such as Iran, Belarus, or Venezuela), and admitting them would be a hard sell in the West without sounding a few alarms.
From five to 28?
Regardless, there are reportedly 23 countries seeking to gain an invitation to the Summit, all of which applied for membership during the past 1.5 years since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. The applicants are from every part of the developing world, including Africa, Latin America, and Southeast (and even Central) Asia.
Their backgrounds vary from an economic perspective—poor African countries, like Nigeria, are looking for stability, while rich nations, like the UAE, look to make more money—as well as from a geopolitical one, as regional powers (such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, or Indonesia) applied along with their uninfluential neighbors.
Furthermore, 16 other countries have expressed interest in applying for membership at some point (including Mexico, Turkey, and Pakistan). The results of this Summit (and the treatment of the applicants) will also send an important message to all of them, based on which they will eventually decide whether to formalize their intent.
Application, of course, does not mean all of these countries will be invited during this Summit to begin their accession process. The main point of interest, after all, will be deciding who can join, and when, along with designing a set of conditions for every future member.
“It’s important that criteria are defined for the entrance of these new members,” a senior Brazilian diplomat said, adding that it was unlikely that all 23 countries would join at the same time but “they need to know why the decision was taken so that, if future expansions happen, the candidates know the priority issues.”
One condition is expected to be to join the currently eight-member-strong New Development Bank, a Shanghai-based lender established by the BRICS countries as their own IMF alternative. The NDB was later joined by Bangladesh, Uruguay, and the UAE, with Saudi Arabia’s application currently pending. Since the NDB is hailed as one of the BRICS’ most important achievements, it would be natural to expect all future members to join the “BRICS Bank” as well.
On the other hand, officials confirmed that establishing a single currency (as rumored in the past months) is not on the table for this Summit. Instead, ‘de-dollarization’ will take a slower, more gradual approach, first with fixed exchange rates and agreements to use local currencies in inter-group trade. Our in-depth pre-summit economic analysis can be read here; also, expect one after the summit.
