After weeks of intense negotiations resulting in all 27 member states approving the two countries’ negotiation frameworks, the European Union formally opened accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova during a first meeting in Luxembourg on Tuesday, June 25th, which EU leaders hailed as a ‘historic’ day for the future of the EU.
“We stand at the threshold of a significant and transformative moment for these two countries and for our Union,” Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said in her official statement. “The path ahead will be challenging. But it is also filled with immense opportunities. … Together, we can forge a larger, more dynamic, and forward-looking Europe.”
EU Parliament President Roberta Metsola was similarly enthusiastic, saying that June 25th “will go down in history. … Our shared future starts now.”
Government representatives from Kyiv and Chisinau met with members of the European Commission as well as the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, held by Belgium for another five days.
In fact, an outspoken objective of many Western European member states was to kick off accession talks with the Eastern European candidate countries just before Hungary’s national-conservative government took over the rotating presidency in July, but still not before the EU elections, as leaders were afraid that furthering Ukraine’s membership prospects would turn even more voters to Eurosceptic right-wing parties.
Hungary’s pro-ceasefire approach to the war and frequent warnings about the need to take Ukraine’s accession slowly to be able to analyze its (potentially devastating) economic impact led other member states to believe that Budapest would use its position as Council president to hinder the process.
However, the fear was largely baseless since Hungary—as any other member state—will have dozens of opportunities to veto Ukraine’s accession process on individual issues over the next few years, as the beginning of the talks is just a first, albeit highly symbolic, step.
Furthermore, if Budapest really wanted to take the initiative during its presidency, it would have needed to wait only a few more days to approve the negotiation framework, a roadmap of specific reform objectives a candidate country needs to clear before joining the EU.
It is true that Hungary was the last hold-out, but it did approve the plan as soon as the Council agreed to include additional phrasing about the protection of fundamental minority language rights—something that Ukraine violated with several pieces of legislation in 2017 and 2019. Those discriminatory laws invited the condemnation of all major international organizations (including the EU), but they are yet to be repealed.
“Ukraine will adopt [legislation] dedicated to the protection of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, including inter alia, in the field of non-discrimination, fight against hate speech, the use of minority languages and minority language education,” the now updated negotiation framework text reads, also adding that Kyiv must implement “good faith relevant bilateral agreements with EU member states.”
On the other hand, Budapest never objected to the EU membership of Moldova and even stated that it would treat the country’s accession process as a priority during its EU presidency.
Nonetheless, clearing all the milestones in their respective negotiation frameworks is expected to take years for both Moldova and Ukraine. On average, previous candidates needed about a decade to properly implement all the judicial, economic, and constitutional reforms needed to enter the EU.
Four other countries are currently in the active open negotiation phase: Albania, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro. Two of them, Serbia and Montenegro, have been in open talks for over a decade now, yet, out of their 34 and 33 milestones, only two and three are deemed complete, respectively.
This leaves many in the region feeling cheated by the EU, leading to disillusioned voters turning away from pro-accession parties in general. This is also why Hungary had stated that the EU could no longer turn its back on the Western Balkans and promised to support their accession processes while implying that Brussels is hindering the process only because it is afraid of admitting conservative governments.
In the case of Ukraine and Moldova, however, Brussels’ approach is radically different and it aims to fast-track their accession as part of a geopolitical power play against Russia. The vast majority of member states agree (for now) that Ukraine cannot become an EU member state as long as the war is ongoing, but support the Commission in its effort to increase pressure on Moscow by strengthening the ties between Kyiv and Brussels.
