Turkish Election: Migration, EU, and Russia on the Table

In less than a day, President Erdoğan faces the toughest political battle during his 20-year rule, as the general economic mismanagement, ambiguous foreign policy stunts, and fallout from the devastating earthquake compel voters to flock under the opposition’s banner. 

At the moment, the six-party coalition National Alliance (NA)—united behind the opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, nicknamed the “Turkish Gandhi” is leading the polls at 50% while Erdoğan (and his own People’s Alliance) is trailing behind at 46%. 

In order to clear the presidential race in the first round without having to go to run-ups, a candidate needs to pass the 50% threshold. Judging from the figures, Kılıçdaroğlu might just be able to do it, especially given the fact that one of the lesser candidates, Muharrem İnce, dropped out of the race on Thursday, and many expect his voter base polling around at 2% to flip mostly the NA.

But whoever comes out victorious on May 14th, it will be a seminal moment in the country and the entire Middle East’s history. That is because the election will also decide the fate of many of the highly important security issues within the region and beyond, as the 85-million-strong, aspiring geopolitical player will either continue on its curious path toward global isolation or turn around completely and begin its relationship with the West anew.

EU Accession is Back on the Menu

For what it’s worth, Kılıçdaroğlu’s National Alliance is confident it will be able to resume negotiations with Brussels about Turkey’s European Union membership, which although pending since 1999 has been frozen for at least five years because of the democratic backsliding EU officials witnessed in the country under President Erdoğan’s rule.

If, however, the rule of law is restored according to the Commission’s preferred guidelines—with reforms guaranteeing media freedom and the independence of the judiciary, as well as the release of political dissidents thrown in jail by Erdoğan (such as human rights activists and representatives of the Kurdish minority), just as the European Court of Human Rights demanded, Ankara’s standing in Brussels could very well change overnight.

“There will be a change from an authoritarian single-man rule, towards a kind of a teamwork, which is a much more democratic process,” Ünal Çeviköz, one of Kılıçdaroğlu’s chief advisors promised earlier, adding that “this will simply give the message to all our allies, and all the European countries, that Turkey is back on track to democracy.”

However, democracy is only step 0, and there is much more upon which the success of such a venture would depend. For one, anti-Western sentiments will continue to persist among both the people and politicians, and no one knows whether the six parties making up the National Alliance will be able to find a common approach once elected, given that the only thing that truly links them together is the desire to overthrow Erdoğan.

Furthermore, there’s no doubt there would be heavy resistance in Europe as well, both among the elite and the voters, a good portion of whom—let’s remember Brexit—would not buy into the idea of a Middle Eastern country with eighty million people having access to the “free movement of labor” across the bloc.

Navigating the U.S.-Russia-Ukraine Triangle

To say at least, Erdoğan has shaken Turkey’s reputation among its fellow NATO members as well, especially angering the United States, by buying state-of-the-art Russian weaponry, recklessly meddling in Syria, and—more recently—stalling Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership bid as political leverage. 

As a clear sign of the growing divide between the two allies, the U.S. kicked Ankara out of the F-35 fighter jet program in 2019, following the Turkish purchase of Russian S-400 missile systems, and even imposed certain sanctions on its defense industry. 

Kılıçdaroğlu, therefore, promised the opposite: healing the relationships with Washington and NATO and getting back on the F-35 program as soon as possible. A meeting between the top candidate and U.S. Ambassador Jeff Flake back in March indicated that America would be open to such talks as well.

Of course, Ukraine remains the biggest geopolitical priority right now, so any change within the security circles must begin with addressing the U.S. concerns that Turkey is acting as a middleman in Putin’s effort to evade Western sanctions—as testified by Pentagon papers leaked last month—even if it also continues to supply weapons to Kyiv.

For a regional power like Turkey, the appeal of presenting as mediator between the warring nations is quite understandable. After all, Ankara’s efforts to help uphold the grain deal have already gained it a great deal of international prestige, which is something that Kılıçdaroğlu would want to keep up as well. 

However, even if his approach ended up being similar to Erdoğan’s—acting like a neutral peace broker while somewhat pandering to both sides—Kılıçdaroğlu promised to fall closer to the official NATO point of view whenever representing his country’s interests. 

“We will simply emphasize the fact that Turkey is a member of NATO, and in our discussions with Russia, we will certainly look for a relationship among equals, but we will also remind Russia that Turkey is a member of NATO,” he said.

Migration: The Elephant at the Border

As far as Brussels is concerned, perhaps the biggest question is what would happen to the 2016 EU-Turkey Refugee Deal, under which Ankara promised to take care of millions of Syrian refugees fleeing the civil war next door, taking off the stress of the underprepared European countries at the height of the refugee crisis. 

Although the agreement, brokered by Erdoğan, was regarded as quite successful by both parties—with Turkey receiving €6 billion to shelter the migrants—it’s unlikely that a National Alliance government under the presidency of Kiliçdaroğlu would strike a similar one. Focusing on an array of socio-economic issues as the backbone of its domestic campaign platform, the NA has simply different priorities than upholding the deal.

In fact, one of Kılıçdaroğlu’s main campaign promises was to send two million Syrians back home (out of the 3.4 million still in the country under temporary protection), to alleviate the economic burden that asylum seekers represent on the country’s social systems. The popular demand for such a move has been steadily growing for some time now, gaining even stronger momentum in the wake of the earthquake earlier this year which killed tens of thousands and damaged millions of buildings.

Kılıçdaroğlu’s four-step solution would start with the fostering of a more fruitful dialogue with Damascus, seeking to facilitate a voluntary return migration plan. “Our approach would be to rehabilitate the Syrian economy and to create the conditions for voluntary returns,” Ünal Çeviköz said, adding that Ankara would also reach out for international assistance in this regard.

“A new Turkish government will be more eager to essentially shake hands with Assad,” he explained, even if there would be certain “conditions attached on the side of Syria to this normalization,” such as withdrawing the Turkish troops from the north of the country.

But with most of the refugees in question having lived in Turkey for around a decade, some experts fear that the majority will not want to leave voluntarily—at least, not for Syria—and NA will be unable to deliver on its promise. 

In that case, will the EU’s migration deal suffer the consequences? Well, not necessarily, but no one knows for sure what happens when push really comes to shove. 

“Many countries in Europe see Turkey as a kind of a pool, where migrants coming from the east can be contained and this is something that Turkey, of course, cannot accept,” Çeviköz said, commenting on the deal. 

But at the same time, he added, “this doesn’t mean that Turkey should open its borders and make the migrants flow into Europe. But we need to coordinate and develop a common migration policy.”