Thirty years have passed since Nelson Mandela was sworn in as the first president of the national democratic Republic of South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC) is still in control, but not for long. In fact, it is increasingly difficult to ignore the inevitable constitutional rearrangement of South Africa. The results of the 2024 national elections have just come in. Here is what you need to know.
The first important point is that the ANC seems to be on the verge of collapse. Having gone from 69.7% of public support in 1999 to 57.5% in 2019 was already a cause for concern. However, 2024 marked the first year ever in which support for the ANC has dropped to below 50%, plummeting to 40.2%. The immediate result of this is that, for the first time since Mandela took office, South Africa would be governed by a coalition.
The easy explanation for the decline in support is the founding of the uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MK) under former president Jacob Zuma. Zuma, who was recently sentenced to 15 months imprisonment for contempt of court, cannot stand for parliament but has decided to form his own party and contest the elections, nonetheless. This is due to the breach of trust between Zuma and the current president, Cyril Ramaphosa. MK is essentially the ‘Zuma party’—running on the basis that they are the real ANC, although it is unclear what that means. In truth, MK is a faction in the ANC that lost control when Ramaphosa took power, and now have come back for revenge.
But, stealing ANC voters is only part of the reason why MK outperformed expectations; the party also convinced non-voters to vote. MK is the new player on the South African scene, having stood for office for the first time and won 14.6% of the vote.
The liberal party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), maintained its position as the second largest party, and achieved a small increase from 21% in 2019 to 21.8% in 2024.
Other than the ANC, the biggest loser is the radical leftist Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) of Julius Malema. The EFF had become known as the ‘Kill the Boer’ party, since their brand is largely built around populism and anti-white hatred. Now a single digit party, the EFF has declined from 11% to 9.5%.
There is lots of speculation about potential coalitions and what the new government might look like. Ideologically, the ANC—still the biggest party—is much closer to MK and the EFF, but a joint ANC/MK/EFF coalition will create the risk for the ANC of a reverse takeover. Allying with MK seems highly improbable due to the dismal relationship between Zuma and Ramaphosa, and allying with the EFF would not suffice, as the two parties together do not have enough support. So, there are multiple options, including getting the smaller parties on board. However, the outcome most people seem to prefer—and certainly the one that the markets would prefer—is an ANC/DA coalition. This seems more probable than one would initially think, given that ANC leaders have announced that now is the time to put pragmatism above ideology.
Nonetheless, the parties have 14 days to decide what they are going to do before the first sitting of the new Assembly will take place, where a president will be elected (in South Africa the president is both head of government and head of state). It is most likely that Ramaphosa will be re-elected. The question is how.
There are some important lessons that we ought to take from this election—lessons that are not only relevant to people living in South Africa, but also to the international conservative movement.
The first is that social media is not real life. If the election was to take place on X, the EFF would have won, since they are by far the most vocal on social media. South Africa also has had multiple examples of groups obtaining significant support on social media and then deciding to register as a party and run for the elections, only to fail dismally. South African politics has shown that you can have hundreds of thousands of likes on Facebook, only to get less than 5,000 votes in an election.
Another important lesson is that it is not sufficient to look at party political support without considering what people actually vote for. Even though the ANC has dropped from its two-thirds majority, the fact remains that two thirds of people who voted, voted for parties that regard socialism as the solution. In that sense, a decline in ANC power is not necessarily the good news people would like it to be. Its rivals—especially MK and the EFF—seem to argue that they would be more efficient at implementing the ANC’s leftist policies.
Finally, the South African election has made it quite clear that there has been a shift from national allegiance to cultural and regional allegiances. The parties that campaigned on identity generally did better than those who did not. Advocating for the interest of, for example, the Zulu people is much more promising and yields better results than merely advocating for the rights of all South Africans. This is because the former is tangible, while the latter is much more abstract. The lesson herein lies in the fact that people still—and probably always will—attach value to their cultural and regional identities over and above national identities. Theories to the contrary, such as open borders, the end of history, and the proliferation of new and artificial identities might look good on paper, but it simply doesn’t resonate with people outside Hollywood and the media establishment.
The decline in public trust in the political system is phenomenal. Back in 1994, 86.9% of voters participated in the election. In 1999 the number went up to 89.3%. In the 2024 election, voter turnout was a mere 58.8%. Of the roughly 40 million South African citizens eligible to vote, of which about 27 million actually registered to vote, only 16 million did in fact cast their votes. If we consider votes as percentage of the voting-age population, the ANC only got 16.1% support, the DA 8.8%, MK 5.9% and the EFF 3.8%. This effectively means that 60% of South African citizens have lost faith in the system and are not buying in.
This is extraordinary considering the extent to which the South African political dispensation with its ‘best’ and ‘most modern’ constitution in the world was celebrated back in the 1990s. It turns out the South African dream never materialised, and that constitutional change is at its doorstep. This does not necessarily imply that the constitution as a written document would change significantly. In fact, this is highly unlikely in the short term.
It does mean—without a shadow of a doubt—that the South African constitution in the Aristotelian sense of the word has already changed and will continue to change. With this, I refer to the political arrangement, the de facto reality, which is no longer comparable to South Africa in 1994. Little similarities that still exist are becoming increasingly insignificant.
South Africa has developed a political vacuum. This vacuum is already being filled by forces outside politics. On the one hand we can already witness the rise of dark forces such as organized crime, gangs, and mafias taking control of certain areas and certain spheres of society. On the other hand, well-organized communities are filling the void by simply taking ownership of what is important to them by building community-based institutions to do the work that the government was supposed to have done in the first place. In this sense, the Solidarity Movement with its network of institutions is a fantastic example.
This is just one more reason why South Africa is not behind much of the Western world, but way ahead of it.
South Africa’s Elections and the Changing Constitution—What You Need to Know
Thirty years have passed since Nelson Mandela was sworn in as the first president of the national democratic Republic of South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC) is still in control, but not for long. In fact, it is increasingly difficult to ignore the inevitable constitutional rearrangement of South Africa. The results of the 2024 national elections have just come in. Here is what you need to know.
The first important point is that the ANC seems to be on the verge of collapse. Having gone from 69.7% of public support in 1999 to 57.5% in 2019 was already a cause for concern. However, 2024 marked the first year ever in which support for the ANC has dropped to below 50%, plummeting to 40.2%. The immediate result of this is that, for the first time since Mandela took office, South Africa would be governed by a coalition.
The easy explanation for the decline in support is the founding of the uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MK) under former president Jacob Zuma. Zuma, who was recently sentenced to 15 months imprisonment for contempt of court, cannot stand for parliament but has decided to form his own party and contest the elections, nonetheless. This is due to the breach of trust between Zuma and the current president, Cyril Ramaphosa. MK is essentially the ‘Zuma party’—running on the basis that they are the real ANC, although it is unclear what that means. In truth, MK is a faction in the ANC that lost control when Ramaphosa took power, and now have come back for revenge.
But, stealing ANC voters is only part of the reason why MK outperformed expectations; the party also convinced non-voters to vote. MK is the new player on the South African scene, having stood for office for the first time and won 14.6% of the vote.
The liberal party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), maintained its position as the second largest party, and achieved a small increase from 21% in 2019 to 21.8% in 2024.
Other than the ANC, the biggest loser is the radical leftist Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) of Julius Malema. The EFF had become known as the ‘Kill the Boer’ party, since their brand is largely built around populism and anti-white hatred. Now a single digit party, the EFF has declined from 11% to 9.5%.
There is lots of speculation about potential coalitions and what the new government might look like. Ideologically, the ANC—still the biggest party—is much closer to MK and the EFF, but a joint ANC/MK/EFF coalition will create the risk for the ANC of a reverse takeover. Allying with MK seems highly improbable due to the dismal relationship between Zuma and Ramaphosa, and allying with the EFF would not suffice, as the two parties together do not have enough support. So, there are multiple options, including getting the smaller parties on board. However, the outcome most people seem to prefer—and certainly the one that the markets would prefer—is an ANC/DA coalition. This seems more probable than one would initially think, given that ANC leaders have announced that now is the time to put pragmatism above ideology.
Nonetheless, the parties have 14 days to decide what they are going to do before the first sitting of the new Assembly will take place, where a president will be elected (in South Africa the president is both head of government and head of state). It is most likely that Ramaphosa will be re-elected. The question is how.
There are some important lessons that we ought to take from this election—lessons that are not only relevant to people living in South Africa, but also to the international conservative movement.
The first is that social media is not real life. If the election was to take place on X, the EFF would have won, since they are by far the most vocal on social media. South Africa also has had multiple examples of groups obtaining significant support on social media and then deciding to register as a party and run for the elections, only to fail dismally. South African politics has shown that you can have hundreds of thousands of likes on Facebook, only to get less than 5,000 votes in an election.
Another important lesson is that it is not sufficient to look at party political support without considering what people actually vote for. Even though the ANC has dropped from its two-thirds majority, the fact remains that two thirds of people who voted, voted for parties that regard socialism as the solution. In that sense, a decline in ANC power is not necessarily the good news people would like it to be. Its rivals—especially MK and the EFF—seem to argue that they would be more efficient at implementing the ANC’s leftist policies.
Finally, the South African election has made it quite clear that there has been a shift from national allegiance to cultural and regional allegiances. The parties that campaigned on identity generally did better than those who did not. Advocating for the interest of, for example, the Zulu people is much more promising and yields better results than merely advocating for the rights of all South Africans. This is because the former is tangible, while the latter is much more abstract. The lesson herein lies in the fact that people still—and probably always will—attach value to their cultural and regional identities over and above national identities. Theories to the contrary, such as open borders, the end of history, and the proliferation of new and artificial identities might look good on paper, but it simply doesn’t resonate with people outside Hollywood and the media establishment.
The decline in public trust in the political system is phenomenal. Back in 1994, 86.9% of voters participated in the election. In 1999 the number went up to 89.3%. In the 2024 election, voter turnout was a mere 58.8%. Of the roughly 40 million South African citizens eligible to vote, of which about 27 million actually registered to vote, only 16 million did in fact cast their votes. If we consider votes as percentage of the voting-age population, the ANC only got 16.1% support, the DA 8.8%, MK 5.9% and the EFF 3.8%. This effectively means that 60% of South African citizens have lost faith in the system and are not buying in.
This is extraordinary considering the extent to which the South African political dispensation with its ‘best’ and ‘most modern’ constitution in the world was celebrated back in the 1990s. It turns out the South African dream never materialised, and that constitutional change is at its doorstep. This does not necessarily imply that the constitution as a written document would change significantly. In fact, this is highly unlikely in the short term.
It does mean—without a shadow of a doubt—that the South African constitution in the Aristotelian sense of the word has already changed and will continue to change. With this, I refer to the political arrangement, the de facto reality, which is no longer comparable to South Africa in 1994. Little similarities that still exist are becoming increasingly insignificant.
South Africa has developed a political vacuum. This vacuum is already being filled by forces outside politics. On the one hand we can already witness the rise of dark forces such as organized crime, gangs, and mafias taking control of certain areas and certain spheres of society. On the other hand, well-organized communities are filling the void by simply taking ownership of what is important to them by building community-based institutions to do the work that the government was supposed to have done in the first place. In this sense, the Solidarity Movement with its network of institutions is a fantastic example.
This is just one more reason why South Africa is not behind much of the Western world, but way ahead of it.
READ NEXT
The Enterprise State
Play the Ball, not the Man: Cancel Culture’s Attempt To Capture Hungarian Academia
Starmer’s War on Farmers: a New Low for Client Politics