Small families, economic growth, ethnic continuity. We can have two of these, but not three.
This is what Paul Morland calls the demographic trilemma, whose specifics he explores in a paper with economist Philip Pilkington, “‘Migration, Stagnation, or Procreation: Quantifying the Demographic Trilemma.”
For an example of the first and third of these—going without economic growth—they cite Japan, and for an example of the first two—losing out on populational replacement—they point to the UK, whereas Israel would be a case of the last two, having larger families than Europeans.
As Pilkington pointed out, the lessons derived from the UK are more or less generalizable to the rest of Europe, seeing the situation developing towards a South Korea-like demographic implosion.
The authors’ prognoses concerning the growing percentage of foreign-born persons in the UK (projected into the 2080s) is dire, but it gets worse: Their “foreign-born” category does not include second and third generation persons, whose identity and culture would, in large part, be inherited from their foreign-born parents and grandparents. The capacity of the local population to integrate newcomers into anything resembling the previous cultural framework would, therefore, be vanishingly weak.
I would add that the authors present the political willingness to sacrifice demographic continuity simply as the result of a desire to enjoy economic growth, while not wanting (or knowing how) to incentivize larger families. They do not grapple with the possibility that the political class may think of social diversity and fragmentation as a means for increasing control over society.
Leaving that aside, however, we may suggest that, to the degree that natalist policies have so far failed to significantly raise birth rates in any First World country, and given that these policies would take some time to bear fruit, Europeans who favour demographic continuity will need to be willing to take an economic hit in the short and medium term.
Apart from winning elections and implementing pro-natalism, presumably an attempt should be made at quickly promoting domestic modes of production that do not lead to Europe becoming even more dependent on long, international supply chains and subordinated to foreign interests during a hypothetical economic contraction.
The good news, as the authors point out, is that:
While the prospects are grave if fertility rates are not fixed, the fertility rate required to fix the problem is not high by historic standards. The choice of couples to have two or three children on average—ideally at the higher end of the range— should not be beyond the imaginable possibilities of modern societies if they are prepared to prioritize procreation and put front and center of their lives the greatest joy there is: to bring new life into the world, to cherish and rear it with a sense of wonder and awe.
We may add that Westerners have been under enormous pressure from mainstream media and education, following a quite thorough cultural change traceable at least to the 1960s. The magnitude and artificiality of this state of affairs bodes well for the speed and thoroughness of change should it be removed. And conditions for such a removal seem to be in place, with rampant disillusionment and a plausible rebellion by what Arnold Toynbee called the “internal proletariat” edging nearer.
