A sense of despair and panic has gripped Germany’s conservative party (CDU/CSU). Recent polls show an unprecedented and rapid decline in approval ratings, positioning the party at roughly 24%—now on par with—or even below—the right-populist AfD. “Never before has a party lost so much approval between the election and the formation of a new government,” said Hermann Blinkert, head of the INSA research institute.
At the time of writing this article, Friedrich Merz, the CDU’s candidate for the chancellorship, is leading coalition talks with the Social Democrats. (The two parties concluded a coalition agreement after this article was published. Ed.) In the meantime, his party’s youth wing (Junge Union) is in open rebellion. Their leadership states bluntly: “We want Friedrich Merz to do what we—the grassroots—made him party chairman to do. Political change must come!” The young conservatives who once championed Merz now accuse him of gambling away the party’s future, perhaps even endangering its very existence.
“The CDU and CSU have been given one last big chance with the 2025 federal elections” a petition launched by the organization declares. The signatories (now numbering around 2,600) fear that Merz’s far-reaching compromises with the SPD, such as on migration, squander this final opportunity. They demand a membership consultation before any coalition agreement is approved by the party leadership.
Betrayal or inevitable compromise?
Their anger is understandable. Within hours of the February election results being announced, Merz began to backtrack on almost everything—from his promise to control borders to his pledge not to increase national debt beyond Germany’s constitutional “debt brake.”
Yet attributing this solely to character flaws or poor negotiation skills is too simplistic. It’s difficult to overstate the CDU’s predicament. Voter mistrust ran deep even before February’s election with many correctly identifying the CDU as the root cause of Germany’s most pressing current problems. This explains why, despite the former SPD-Green-Liberal government’s complete discreditation, the party secured a mere 28.5% of the vote—its second-worst result ever.
In truth, the CDU, Germany’s most successful post-war political creation, which has governed for 52 of the 75 years since 1949, has seen its traditional support collapse for years. Like Merz now, Angela Merkel (CDU), once celebrated as Germany’s most successful politician, needed SPD support in three out of her four terms in office.
The ghost of Merkel still haunts
The poor election result in February, which is forcing Merz into an unpopular coalition with the SPD (the biggest loser in the election), shows that the supposed short memory of voters has proven mythical. Voters haven’t forgotten that during Angela Merkel’s 16-year reign, Germany’s borders were thrown wide open, creating migration numbers that overwhelmed local authorities so completely that even the liberal Guardian spoke of a state that had “lost control.”
These same voters also recognise that the dangerous neglect of Germany’s infrastructure began during these long and stultifying years—resulting in at least 5,000 bridges now declared decrepit. (Witness residents’ shocked reactions after a bridge in Dresden collapsed in September 2024.) And they know Merkel’s era launched Germany’s disastrous pivot to renewables alongside its nuclear phase-out, resulting in electricity costs now the highest in the EU, if not in the world.
Half-hearted reforms
It is true that Merz gave the impression during the election campaign that he would stand up to his party’s most irrational policies. But he did so half-heartedly—retreating whenever he faced stiff opposition, especially from his party’s centrist, pro-Merkel faction.
The CDU remains a divided party, with most of its leadership deeply entrenched in green-left ideology. For them, this ideology represents the “middle ground,” the bourgeois center—and the only sensible position. This explains why the party’s election programme reads like a balancing act. In it, the party promised to “examine” whether the last three shuttered nuclear power plants could be reconnected to the grid. But simultaneously, it avoided any commitment to this course—and carefully sidestepped any discussion of constructing new plants.
The programme promises to end the “ideologically driven politics of the former Government,” yet includes a clear commitment to making Germany “climate neutral by 2045.” As it also calls for strengthening the EU, a new political impetus based on voters’ concerns—rather than Brussels directives—was never to be expected.
The clearest example of the CDU’s fickleness was its refusal to unanimously support its own candidate’s “influx limitation law.” Acting under pressure following a deadly knife attack by a failed asylum seeker, Merz boldly promised a “5-point plan” to curb migration in January. The plan included permanent border controls and a rejection of all illegal immigrants. Yet when he brought his “influx limitation law” to parliament—a law intended to limit migration, yet much weaker than his 5-point plan—several MPs from his own party refused to support it.
When, at the height of the election campaign, thousands of government supporters took to the streets to denounce Merz and accuse him of making common cause with the right (because only the AfD voted unanimously for his law), many in the party leadership panicked. Merz’s determination vanished. The candidate instead emphasised strengthening the middle ground and rejected any cooperation with the AfD post-election.
A mountain to climb
If the Junge Union really wants to change the direction of its party, it faces a monumental challenge. First, it would have to address the ideological void at the party’s centre. Often referred to as a “Chancellor’s Election Association” (Kanzlerwahlverein), especially during the Merkel era, the marginalisation of internal critics goes back a long way.
Many who wanted genuine conservative representation have long since left the party. Indeed, when the AfD was founded in February 2013, it was essentially a CDU spin-off, and its leadership consisted almost entirely of disillusioned CDU members.
There are legitimate reasons why the CDU/CSU refuses to form a coalition with the AfD (including the AfD’s troubling historical relativism). But the haste with which party leadership has subordinated itself to SPD positions makes a mockery of Merz’s pre-election promise that he would do the right thing, no matter who supports it.
Many conservative CDU members viewed Merz as a beacon of hope because of his criticism of Merkel; he, too, was marginalized within the party for years. These hopes have proven futile.
Instead of seriously working to win back disappointed voters (Merz once promised wholeheartedly to halve the AfD’s support, and bring the CDU back to over 40%), he has joined those who view populists and their voters as the greatest danger. He describes the coalition with the SPD as being without alternative, and a failure of the negotiations as out of the question. However, the CDU has pursued a politics of “no alternatives” for far too long already. Must anyone seeking genuine change, like the Junge Union, look for a new political home? The battle over immigration, culture, and state structure remains wide open.
CDU in Crisis: It Is More Than Just Poor Leadership
CDU leader and top candidate for chancellor Friedrich Merz addresses a press conference after a CDU leadership meeting at the Konrad Adenauer Haus, headquarters of Germany’s conservative Christian Democratic Union, in Berlin on March 3, 2025.
Photo: Ralf Hirschberger / AFP
A sense of despair and panic has gripped Germany’s conservative party (CDU/CSU). Recent polls show an unprecedented and rapid decline in approval ratings, positioning the party at roughly 24%—now on par with—or even below—the right-populist AfD. “Never before has a party lost so much approval between the election and the formation of a new government,” said Hermann Blinkert, head of the INSA research institute.
At the time of writing this article, Friedrich Merz, the CDU’s candidate for the chancellorship, is leading coalition talks with the Social Democrats. (The two parties concluded a coalition agreement after this article was published. Ed.) In the meantime, his party’s youth wing (Junge Union) is in open rebellion. Their leadership states bluntly: “We want Friedrich Merz to do what we—the grassroots—made him party chairman to do. Political change must come!” The young conservatives who once championed Merz now accuse him of gambling away the party’s future, perhaps even endangering its very existence.
“The CDU and CSU have been given one last big chance with the 2025 federal elections” a petition launched by the organization declares. The signatories (now numbering around 2,600) fear that Merz’s far-reaching compromises with the SPD, such as on migration, squander this final opportunity. They demand a membership consultation before any coalition agreement is approved by the party leadership.
Betrayal or inevitable compromise?
Their anger is understandable. Within hours of the February election results being announced, Merz began to backtrack on almost everything—from his promise to control borders to his pledge not to increase national debt beyond Germany’s constitutional “debt brake.”
Yet attributing this solely to character flaws or poor negotiation skills is too simplistic. It’s difficult to overstate the CDU’s predicament. Voter mistrust ran deep even before February’s election with many correctly identifying the CDU as the root cause of Germany’s most pressing current problems. This explains why, despite the former SPD-Green-Liberal government’s complete discreditation, the party secured a mere 28.5% of the vote—its second-worst result ever.
In truth, the CDU, Germany’s most successful post-war political creation, which has governed for 52 of the 75 years since 1949, has seen its traditional support collapse for years. Like Merz now, Angela Merkel (CDU), once celebrated as Germany’s most successful politician, needed SPD support in three out of her four terms in office.
The ghost of Merkel still haunts
The poor election result in February, which is forcing Merz into an unpopular coalition with the SPD (the biggest loser in the election), shows that the supposed short memory of voters has proven mythical. Voters haven’t forgotten that during Angela Merkel’s 16-year reign, Germany’s borders were thrown wide open, creating migration numbers that overwhelmed local authorities so completely that even the liberal Guardian spoke of a state that had “lost control.”
These same voters also recognise that the dangerous neglect of Germany’s infrastructure began during these long and stultifying years—resulting in at least 5,000 bridges now declared decrepit. (Witness residents’ shocked reactions after a bridge in Dresden collapsed in September 2024.) And they know Merkel’s era launched Germany’s disastrous pivot to renewables alongside its nuclear phase-out, resulting in electricity costs now the highest in the EU, if not in the world.
Half-hearted reforms
It is true that Merz gave the impression during the election campaign that he would stand up to his party’s most irrational policies. But he did so half-heartedly—retreating whenever he faced stiff opposition, especially from his party’s centrist, pro-Merkel faction.
The CDU remains a divided party, with most of its leadership deeply entrenched in green-left ideology. For them, this ideology represents the “middle ground,” the bourgeois center—and the only sensible position. This explains why the party’s election programme reads like a balancing act. In it, the party promised to “examine” whether the last three shuttered nuclear power plants could be reconnected to the grid. But simultaneously, it avoided any commitment to this course—and carefully sidestepped any discussion of constructing new plants.
The programme promises to end the “ideologically driven politics of the former Government,” yet includes a clear commitment to making Germany “climate neutral by 2045.” As it also calls for strengthening the EU, a new political impetus based on voters’ concerns—rather than Brussels directives—was never to be expected.
The clearest example of the CDU’s fickleness was its refusal to unanimously support its own candidate’s “influx limitation law.” Acting under pressure following a deadly knife attack by a failed asylum seeker, Merz boldly promised a “5-point plan” to curb migration in January. The plan included permanent border controls and a rejection of all illegal immigrants. Yet when he brought his “influx limitation law” to parliament—a law intended to limit migration, yet much weaker than his 5-point plan—several MPs from his own party refused to support it.
When, at the height of the election campaign, thousands of government supporters took to the streets to denounce Merz and accuse him of making common cause with the right (because only the AfD voted unanimously for his law), many in the party leadership panicked. Merz’s determination vanished. The candidate instead emphasised strengthening the middle ground and rejected any cooperation with the AfD post-election.
A mountain to climb
If the Junge Union really wants to change the direction of its party, it faces a monumental challenge. First, it would have to address the ideological void at the party’s centre. Often referred to as a “Chancellor’s Election Association” (Kanzlerwahlverein), especially during the Merkel era, the marginalisation of internal critics goes back a long way.
Many who wanted genuine conservative representation have long since left the party. Indeed, when the AfD was founded in February 2013, it was essentially a CDU spin-off, and its leadership consisted almost entirely of disillusioned CDU members.
There are legitimate reasons why the CDU/CSU refuses to form a coalition with the AfD (including the AfD’s troubling historical relativism). But the haste with which party leadership has subordinated itself to SPD positions makes a mockery of Merz’s pre-election promise that he would do the right thing, no matter who supports it.
Many conservative CDU members viewed Merz as a beacon of hope because of his criticism of Merkel; he, too, was marginalized within the party for years. These hopes have proven futile.
Instead of seriously working to win back disappointed voters (Merz once promised wholeheartedly to halve the AfD’s support, and bring the CDU back to over 40%), he has joined those who view populists and their voters as the greatest danger. He describes the coalition with the SPD as being without alternative, and a failure of the negotiations as out of the question. However, the CDU has pursued a politics of “no alternatives” for far too long already. Must anyone seeking genuine change, like the Junge Union, look for a new political home? The battle over immigration, culture, and state structure remains wide open.
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