French media outlet Atlantico recently discussed the European Union’s Asylum and Migration Pact wtih Rodrigo Ballester, head of the Centre for European Affairs at Mathias Corvinus Collegium in Budapest and Ministerial Commissioner for Higher Education, and Philippe Moreau Defarges, professor at the Paris Institute of Political Studies and specialist in geopolitics. They provided an analysis about how the situations in the Netherlands and Poland are a prelude to a larger debate on migration that will take place in the new European Parliament after the elections.
Brussels has shown itself to be intractable in the face of requests for migration exemptions in the Dutch coalition agreement. Poland is very pro-EU, but Donald Tusk has categorically ruled out adopting the Asylum and Migration Pact. What is the situation in the Netherlands and Poland regarding migration policies? What are the reactions from Brussels?
Rodrigo Ballester: It is surprising that the Commission, just a few weeks before the European elections, takes such a clear and determined position regarding the intentions of the Dutch government. Legally, the Commission is within its rights; the Dutch coalition’s wish not to apply European policies is legally not possible.It is surprising that a Commission should take such a clear and determined stance on the Dutch government’s intentions just a few weeks before the European elections. Legally, the Commission is within its rights. The Dutch coalition’s wish not to apply European policies is legally impossible.
The only two countries that had decided to distance themselves from these issues in the past were Denmark and Ireland, following referendums on the Maastricht and Nice Treaties that were not ultimately ratified.
Denmark obtained this flexibility in 1992. Since then, Denmark has not applied European migration policies, which allows them to have their own asylum policy. The Dutch would like to benefit from the same system today, but legally this is not possible.
The spokesperson for the European Commission recalled the legal evidence regarding Poland.
The Asylum and Migration Pact, which includes this solidarity mechanism, has been adopted by the European Union. In principle, it is legally binding on Poland too. But Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who is also a close political ally of Ursula von der Leyen, is also adamant that it should not be applied. This is quite surprising. What was the reaction of the European Commission? So far, there has been no reaction.
The situations in the Netherlands and Poland are only the opening salvoes of a major debate on migration which will take place after the European elections with the new European Parliament.
Philippe Moreau Defarges: This is a serious crisis. This is doubly a serious crisis because it results in the rejection of a common immigration policy which had been gradually built up since the Schengen agreements in 1995. The second worrying factor is that this rejection comes from Donald Tusk. It should be remembered that he was President of the Council of the European Union. He is pro-European Union and his victory in the Polish elections this year was a victory for the Europeans. But there, he puts himself at odds with the Eurocrats.
Why is this convergence between the Netherlands and Poland interesting, given that Donald Tusk and Wilders’ coalition have nothing to do with each other politically?
Ballester: This coalition is much larger. A group of 19 of the 27 Member States has taken the initiative to outsource European asylum policy, following Giorgia Meloni’s lead with Albania. So there is a real groundswell of support for effectively preventing migratory flows rather than having to manage them. This coalition goes well beyond national interests and even the political colours of each government. These 19 Member States, who want to move in a different direction, are ultimately calling for a kind of migration revolution. The very concept of relocating and outsourcing migration policy was still a huge taboo a few years ago. And yet things are changing. The debate on migration is changing. As you point out, it is a debate that goes well beyond political families and even national situations and national interests, hence the interest of this debate.
The position that Hungary took in 2015 after the migration crisis, a position for which the country was pilloried, has finally become the majority position among the Member States. We still need to convince the Commission and, above all, the European Parliament.
With the European elections, the European Parliament will be renewed in a few weeks. A major turning point may begin after the European elections. Are we going to have a European Parliament which will be closer to the positions of the member states, to the vast majority of European public opinion? Or will we continue to have a European Parliament stuck to principles and refusing to change migration policy? This is one of the questions that will need to be answered over the next five years.
Defarges: Beyond national, demographic and geopolitical factors, there is a more fundamental factor which is this kind of inability to control the question of immigration. This does not only concern knowing what immigration policy it will be possible to pursue within the European Union, but knowing what diagnosis we make? Aging Europe needs immigration. But how? The central question is how can the European Union reconcile a common immigration policy with taking into account the fact that public opinion within it is very worried about the arrival of immigrants?
What balance of power is likely to emerge between Brussels and these countries before and after the European elections? What will be the balance of power between the countries which support the asylum and migration pact and those which reject it or which more broadly reject the entire European Union vision on immigration (including at the level of the ICJ)?
Defarges: Everything will depend on the results of the European elections. If the European elections give victory to the populists, particularly in the Netherlands, Poland and elsewhere, Donald Tusk and Geert Wilders will be in an extremely strong position. The question of the results of the European Parliament elections will be decisive. The second big question that arises concerns the role of the European Commission. It is likely that the European Commission will have no other choices or alternatives than to file appeals to be heard by the Court of Justice of the European Union. This will lead to a fairly serious crisis, with a permanent tension between European law taking precedence over national law.
Ballester: It is necessary to question the future of the pact on migration and asylum. Will it be stillborn? Is it viable? It was adopted just a few months before a political change that will be structural for the next European elections. Will this migration pact survive or will it be completely overhauled? That is the question. Some countries are attached to it. Some of the heavyweights among the 19 member states are ready to take these initiatives.
It is very likely that the next European Parliament will be more inclined to tighten the screws and be stricter on migration matters. According to polls, a breakthrough by more right-wing parties, conservative, sovereignist and patriotic parties is expected. If there is one subject that concerns the vast majority of European public opinion, it is precisely irregular migration, illegal migration.
In my opinion, this will be the big subject of the elections and probably also the big subject of the next legislature in which, for the first time, you risk having a stricter, more severe Parliament. Everything will depend on the position of the European People’s Party (EPP), which will really be the pivotal party. This centre-right party has ultimately always behaved like a very consensual centre-left party, including on migration issues. But after the elections, the situation could change, knowing that on their right there is anger brewing and that their voters are very unhappy. When you see the migration situation in Sweden, Germany, and France, will this centre-right party continue to behave, at least on the subject of migration, like a centre-left party, like a party of this migration consensus of socialists, liberals, greens and communists?
I do think that the [European] People’s Party will be divided on these questions and that over the next five years, for the first time, Parliament will vote more for policies of immigration restriction than for policies of openness. This is very likely to happen.
Can we imagine a major shift in Europe on these subjects? A possible change to the treaties? Or fractures such as to shatter the EU in its current structure?
Defarges: A revision of the Treaties seems to me to be out of the question. The experience of the draft European Union Treaty in the 2000s was a failure and a very bad memory. Revising the Treaties is therefore absolutely impossible.
The real question is whether, without changing the treaties, is it possible to achieve a common immigration policy? This is a political question.
Even if the states of the European Union are on the brink of collapse, they will remain united. They have very bad memories of Brexit. They do not want another Brexit. If there were ever another Brexit, the future of the European Union would be extremely uncertain. This would refer to Emmanuel Macron’s comments at La Sorbonne.
Ballester: I doubt it will shatter the EU. On the other hand, it is likely that we will see structural changes in migration. There is already an immense majority of member states which are ready to break the taboo of delocalisation and subcontracting of migration policies. The vast majority of public opinion is up in arms. 70% of Europeans believe that there is too much illegal immigration in Europe. Will this bring changes? Everything will depend on the new Parliament. MEPs will probably be more receptive to these messages.
Everything will also depend on the European Commission. Let us remember, the European Commission has a virtual monopoly on the legislative initiative of the European Union, including on these subjects. Will the Commission, after spending years negotiating a new migration pact, want to call this pact into question? Will it want to propose new rules? It would be well advised to do so because otherwise we risk seeing a breakdown in European migration policy. Let us not forget, however, that this is a policy that has not borne fruit since Maastricht.
For 30 years, the European Union has been trying to implement this migration policy, to control its borders, to accommodate different national interests. The EU is also trying to curb illegal migration. It is clear that it is a failure.
Take, for example, the case of Frontex and the controversy that arose during the term of office of Commissioner Ylva Johansson, who effectively participated in the scuttling of Frontex, in collusion with the European Parliament and civil society, in order to transform Frontex not into an agency that helps control their borders but into an agency that controls them when they control their borders. This was a change of nature that favoured the presence of human rights NGOs but did absolutely nothing to solve the problems of migration.
If the Commission or the Parliament persists, this risks leading to a migration revolt by the member states. The situation would then be quite serious.
Will the European elections have a role to play on the migration issue and on this balance of power linked to immigration between the Commission and the member states?
Ballester: For the moment, the European Union institution which pushes the most towards an open migration policy and which is the most pro-migration is by far the European Parliament. This European Parliament will probably change its nature and position on these subjects. This will lead to systemic change which will necessarily have an influence in the decision-making process on migration. This will also be a change which will bring other revolutions such as that of the outsourcing of asylum rights.#
One of the questions that member states risk putting on the table is that of repatriating certain competencies in matters of migration so that everything is not decided at a European level after 30 years of failure. This would allow member states to recover certain national powers, for example in terms of processing the right to asylum. This is exactly what the Dutch coalition proposed. They themselves admitted that it would take time. There will perhaps be an unravelling of European migration policy, starting with asylum.
In view of the very important and decisive electoral deadline of June 9, could this situation and this fairly tense balance of power between certain EU countries and Brussels accelerate if the European Parliament shifts to the right?
Defarges: This phenomenon could accelerate with the elections next June. The European Union is at a real turning point at the moment. As you say, could this phenomenon accelerate? Let’s hope not. As a pro-European, I can only hope that the European Union maintains its unity. But I could absolutely be wrong. It is true that the European Union is going through a very difficult time with immigration problems. The question of Russia and Ukraine is also major, as is the situation in the Middle East.
Could certain countries use diplomacy and renew dialogue with EU members who intend to be very firm on immigration and who want to provide solutions? Could European diplomacy make it possible to find common ground on migration issues?
Defarges: We must hope that European diplomacy finds common ground. But already, the member states are practising their own policies. See Viktor Orban’s Hungary in dialogue with Russia. The situation in the European Union is very uncertain. If the European Union ever embarked on the path of bilateral dialogues and the cessation of certain policies, what would be the future of the European continent itself?
This interview was published by Atlantico in French on May 20, 2024. It has been translated into English and appears here with kind permission.
