Following the 1992 Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union, the expectation might have been that such a Union would prioritise defence as part of its bid to protect the continent. Yet it took seven years before a common defence policy ever saw the light of day. This was the 1999 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which subsequently deployed forces all over the world, from the DRC to Georgia. And it was only in 2016—the year of Brexit—that the updated version—European Union Global Strategy (EUGS)—was launched. This was the first attempt to move Europe away from a reliance on American arms, so that it could become geopolitically independent in the event of a major war.
Despite this, defence budgets have continued to tumble, with the German air force now shockingly low on both jets and personnel. Modern politicians, on both the left and the right, have not prioritised defence spending. Donald Trump’s brash complaint about this issue may have been undiplomatic, but he was nonetheless correct, and recent inflation has made the problem even worse. His comments came in relation to NATO and the (non-mandatory) goal that requires member states to spend 2% on defence annually. A legally enforceable stipulation would be more appropriate, considering how often this target goes unmet. Even among member states who spend well above 2%, the decline has been shocking, especially in Britain which spent 5% as late as 2018.
Since 2012, the British Army has shrunk to its lowest level in over 400 years, from around 100,000 to barely 70,000. The claims by top brass, that the same operational capabilities are available, is laughable, especially when considering the current situation in Ukraine. The conflict there has shown that large numbers of troops are still needed to hold frontlines, and this is despite the rise of drone and satellite technology. It is now also clear—as was demonstrated in Armenia—that large artillery stockpiles and production lines are still needed, as well. Experts have estimated that Russia is using anywhere between 5,000 to 10,000 shells per day during periods of heavy fighting. And it has also been admitted that Britain would last no longer than a few days in a war before running out of ammunition.
This underlines the magnitude of the difference between Russia and many European states, especially when taking into account that many countries have given their stockpiles to Ukraine. The problem is that, in many ways, the ethos of war has deserted the political class; or, more accurately, they willingly deserted it. A politically correct elite simply cannot fathom what our ancestors knew by instinct—that the world is a very dangerous place in which to live. Currently, there is one example that underlines this point: the Houthis in Yemen are successfully diverting the world’s ocean traffic away from the Suez Canal. The reason for the West’s difficulty in suppressing them is that Europe can deploy only a limited number of ships. As a result, the Americans are having to carry the can—and cost—for most of the campaign, despite being based much further away.
This makes a mockery of both the EU’s drive for strategic autonomy and Britain’s defence cuts. When a proxy of Iran that only occupies a third of Yemen cannot be beaten by the West, it doesn’t particularly bode well for any future threat lurking around the corner. The mistake may be relying on Brussels to be the centre of any defence strategy in the first place, because surely nation states have to train, mobilise, and deploy their personnel. It is not surprising that a bloc that cannot stop mass illegal migration is also struggling with military affairs, although it is perhaps not too much to expect that some lessons might have been learnt.
Despite what technocrats like Emmanuel Macron may say, the reality is that sovereign states—not the EU—will have to take pragmatic action to expand their militaries into forces worthy of the global stage. As was evident during the migrant crisis of 2015, it was left to individual members like Hungary to save themselves when Brussels seemed paralysed by liberal dogma. As the decade progresses, a similar situation will occur relative to defence. This has already been seen in Poland, where an increasingly unstable world has vindicated their drive to train and maintain a larger military. Warsaw’s current target is to have over 300,000 troops by 2035, which makes Britain’s mere 70,000 look ridiculous.
This in itself proves the importance of individual European states—not necessarily the European Commission—in shaping Europe’s future security. The reality is that part of the reason for mass illegal immigration to Europe is not just the lax security on the external borders, but simply the unwillingness to turn people back. The latter is caused by the belief in defence simply disappearing from the thought process of the political class. It has been replaced by universalism—a very naive perception of reality which does not recognise differences or threats—which has left Europe unprepared for the future.
Those who listen to speeches by defence ministers in the West certainly wouldn’t think so, because the ministers always promise future capabilities and renewed vigour. Yet every defence review leaves our forces smaller than they were before, and leaves citizens less protected as a result. The need for defence spending to be kept up with inflation is ever present, and the problem is that many politicians are unwilling to commit to it. It’s a large disservice to veterans that the militaries in which they served are continuously downgraded, even though the world is becoming a more dangerous place. One need not be an expert in military history to know that Europe has always been at war and has always faced both internal and external threats.
Yet it’s a common mistake to think the EU will be the lone force that guarantees strategic autonomy in the future. As France and Britain recently demonstrated, when Iran attacked Israel, it was nation states that stepped up to the plate during the difficult night of April 13-14. Brussels simply works too slowly to react to any sudden crisis, and its left-leaning bias means their sympathies may often support the wrong side anyway. There would be a genuine liability for EU citizens if their territory were plunged into conflict, with the commission bogged down in interminable wrangling over any military course of action. The handling of both the European sovereign debt crisis and migrant wave of 2015 proved that expediency is not amongst their strengths.
Hence, even with NATO as a continuing entity in the West, it must be national governments that remain primarily responsible for any reaction to global threats. This can only be sustained if Western European nations stop cutting their troop numbers, as they have consistently done in the post-war period, and take a leaf out of Poland’s book to reverse the decline. There is simply no evidence that war will disappear from this world anytime soon; and, if anything, the last decade has proved the opposite. There are a few glimmers of hope, like Britain’s new Tempest jet fighter program, which is being produced in conjunction with Italy, Sweden, and Japan. But troops remain the key to any land war that may occur in the future. The political class must wake up to this reality, and stop pretending that boots on the ground are defunct and expendable.
