In early February, comments by Donald Trump, the Republican front-runner for the U.S. presidency, caused much debate and unrest in Europe. Trump quoted from a past conversation that he said he’d had with the “president of a big country.”
”Well sir, if we don’t pay, and we’re attacked by Russia, will you protect us?” Trump quoted the unnamed leader as saying, characterising the rest of the conversation as follows: “I said: ‘You didn’t pay? You’re delinquent?’ He said: ‘Yes, let’s say that happened.’ No, I would not protect you. In fact, I would encourage them (Russia) to do whatever the hell they want. You gotta pay.”
In response, the governments of Poland, France, and Germany condemned Trump’s comments, with French President Macron also promising to “make from Europe a security and defence power that is both complementary to NATO and a pillar of the Atlantic alliance.”
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk added that he wanted to “revitalise” his country’s relations with its main European partners, arguing that the EU should become “a military power” in its own right. For his part, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz called for the urgent ”mass production” of European weapons.
Tom Cotton, a leading U.S. Republican senator, argued that Trump was “simply ringing the warning bell,” while Czech European Affairs Minister Martin Dvořák also dismissed Trump’s comments as a potential ‘bluff’ ahead of the elections. When it comes to strengthening military cooperation in Europe, Dvořák stated that “unification of weapons and equipment would make much more sense than unifying command under a newly emerging European army. I would still bet more on the European wing of NATO.”
Some, such as former Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, do advocate a genuine EU army. According to a recent poll by EUpinions, as many as 87% of Europeans polled answered “yes” to the question, “Does the EU need a common defence policy?” If one were to ask whether a French EU commissioner should be given power over a military force consisting of Swedish, Greek, or Dutch soldiers, those polled would surely be less enthusiastic. Yet that is what an EU army ultimately means.
Professor Herman Matthijs, a member of the Belgian government’s highest financial advisory body, made a calculation of what such an EU army would cost. He estimates, “If one then calculates a European defence budget at €300 billion, Belgium would pay €9.9 billion, €10.3 billion (without the British), or €11.4 billion (without the British and neutral European countries) respectively.” In doing so, he thus makes an important distinction between scenarios where the British and neutral European countries would or would not participate.
Matthijs stresses, “These are all scenarios that are more expensive than the agreed NATO norm,” which asks NATO allies to spend at least 2% of GDP on defence. It is doubtful whether the politicians who honk about the need for an EU army have thoroughly considered this. Matthijs further observes that, “In addition, the question then arises whether such a budget is sufficient to play in the first world row. After all, a dedicated European defence territorially has not only Europe to defend, but also areas in the Atlantic and Pacific and also in the Caribbean.”
The NATO norm is, of course, arbitrary, and it is not just about spending more money but also how. In Belgium, for example, a large part of defence spending consists of soldiers’ pensions, which is why the Belgian army is sometimes jokingly referred to by NATO partners as ‘the world’s most well-armed pension fund’—which does not detract from the fact that some aspects of the Belgian army are top-notch.
In May 2023, the UN secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg, said, “If you are afraid that the U.S. will elect a president who isn’t as affectionate for NATO as the current president, you should be careful not to create a rhetoric, a perception that Europe can manage on its own.” After Trump’s statements once again sparked debate about an EU army, he reiterated: “The European Union cannot defend Europe. 80% of NATO’s defence expenditures come from non-EU NATO allies.”
The incitements to an EU army that were already in place—beyond dressing up multinational, often UK- or France-led missions as ‘EU missions’—do not inspire much confidence. The “European Peace Facility,” for example, was created in 2021, and was used just a year later to get EU taxpayers to fund arms for Ukraine. Leaving aside this questionable change in its mission, it can still be defended as long as it does not put us in conflict with Russia. But a few months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the so-called ‘EU Foreign Ministry,’ the European External Action Service (EEAS), suddenly came up with the idea of using money from the fund to prop up Rwanda’s defence force in Mozambique. This shows that this EU body is absolutely not worthy of trust to decide on such important matters.
However, that does not stop figures like European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen from calling for more European defence spending. She recently stated, “We have to spend more, we have to spend better, we have to spend European. … We did this for vaccines and gas.” EU officials confide that the EU Commission’s plan is to use the EU budget to increase financing to supplement joint contracts for weapons signed by member states, as well as guaranteeing that production will be bought.
One can certainly argue that the government has a role in encouraging ammunition production, given that this is currently happening on a large scale in Russia. Better cooperation within NATO is also an excellent idea, with the UK being a prominent participant in the first place. For example, there is the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a UK-led multinational military alliance that can act independently and deploy to support NATO or other alliances. Participants include the Nordic countries, the Baltic states, and the Netherlands. In the UK, given Trump’s statements, there are voices calling for this cooperation to be expanded, through, for example, burden-sharing the cost of munition production and standardisation of equipment.
In any case, it would be a big mistake to tolerate duplication between NATO and the European Union in terms of defence cooperation. Apart from the waste of resources, this would also be the dreamt-of excuse for Donald Trump or a kindred spirit in the U.S. to no longer help protect Europe—although such a decision would also require a two-thirds majority in the U.S. Senate. After years of neglecting defence spending—especially in Germany, Denmark, and Sweden—European countries simply cannot do without the defence provided by the United States; so any call for an EU army is a direct threat to our security.
An EU Army Threatens European Security
Photo from the U.S. government, CCO. 1.0 Deed
In early February, comments by Donald Trump, the Republican front-runner for the U.S. presidency, caused much debate and unrest in Europe. Trump quoted from a past conversation that he said he’d had with the “president of a big country.”
”Well sir, if we don’t pay, and we’re attacked by Russia, will you protect us?” Trump quoted the unnamed leader as saying, characterising the rest of the conversation as follows: “I said: ‘You didn’t pay? You’re delinquent?’ He said: ‘Yes, let’s say that happened.’ No, I would not protect you. In fact, I would encourage them (Russia) to do whatever the hell they want. You gotta pay.”
In response, the governments of Poland, France, and Germany condemned Trump’s comments, with French President Macron also promising to “make from Europe a security and defence power that is both complementary to NATO and a pillar of the Atlantic alliance.”
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk added that he wanted to “revitalise” his country’s relations with its main European partners, arguing that the EU should become “a military power” in its own right. For his part, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz called for the urgent ”mass production” of European weapons.
Tom Cotton, a leading U.S. Republican senator, argued that Trump was “simply ringing the warning bell,” while Czech European Affairs Minister Martin Dvořák also dismissed Trump’s comments as a potential ‘bluff’ ahead of the elections. When it comes to strengthening military cooperation in Europe, Dvořák stated that “unification of weapons and equipment would make much more sense than unifying command under a newly emerging European army. I would still bet more on the European wing of NATO.”
Some, such as former Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, do advocate a genuine EU army. According to a recent poll by EUpinions, as many as 87% of Europeans polled answered “yes” to the question, “Does the EU need a common defence policy?” If one were to ask whether a French EU commissioner should be given power over a military force consisting of Swedish, Greek, or Dutch soldiers, those polled would surely be less enthusiastic. Yet that is what an EU army ultimately means.
Professor Herman Matthijs, a member of the Belgian government’s highest financial advisory body, made a calculation of what such an EU army would cost. He estimates, “If one then calculates a European defence budget at €300 billion, Belgium would pay €9.9 billion, €10.3 billion (without the British), or €11.4 billion (without the British and neutral European countries) respectively.” In doing so, he thus makes an important distinction between scenarios where the British and neutral European countries would or would not participate.
Matthijs stresses, “These are all scenarios that are more expensive than the agreed NATO norm,” which asks NATO allies to spend at least 2% of GDP on defence. It is doubtful whether the politicians who honk about the need for an EU army have thoroughly considered this. Matthijs further observes that, “In addition, the question then arises whether such a budget is sufficient to play in the first world row. After all, a dedicated European defence territorially has not only Europe to defend, but also areas in the Atlantic and Pacific and also in the Caribbean.”
The NATO norm is, of course, arbitrary, and it is not just about spending more money but also how. In Belgium, for example, a large part of defence spending consists of soldiers’ pensions, which is why the Belgian army is sometimes jokingly referred to by NATO partners as ‘the world’s most well-armed pension fund’—which does not detract from the fact that some aspects of the Belgian army are top-notch.
In May 2023, the UN secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg, said, “If you are afraid that the U.S. will elect a president who isn’t as affectionate for NATO as the current president, you should be careful not to create a rhetoric, a perception that Europe can manage on its own.” After Trump’s statements once again sparked debate about an EU army, he reiterated: “The European Union cannot defend Europe. 80% of NATO’s defence expenditures come from non-EU NATO allies.”
The incitements to an EU army that were already in place—beyond dressing up multinational, often UK- or France-led missions as ‘EU missions’—do not inspire much confidence. The “European Peace Facility,” for example, was created in 2021, and was used just a year later to get EU taxpayers to fund arms for Ukraine. Leaving aside this questionable change in its mission, it can still be defended as long as it does not put us in conflict with Russia. But a few months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the so-called ‘EU Foreign Ministry,’ the European External Action Service (EEAS), suddenly came up with the idea of using money from the fund to prop up Rwanda’s defence force in Mozambique. This shows that this EU body is absolutely not worthy of trust to decide on such important matters.
However, that does not stop figures like European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen from calling for more European defence spending. She recently stated, “We have to spend more, we have to spend better, we have to spend European. … We did this for vaccines and gas.” EU officials confide that the EU Commission’s plan is to use the EU budget to increase financing to supplement joint contracts for weapons signed by member states, as well as guaranteeing that production will be bought.
One can certainly argue that the government has a role in encouraging ammunition production, given that this is currently happening on a large scale in Russia. Better cooperation within NATO is also an excellent idea, with the UK being a prominent participant in the first place. For example, there is the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a UK-led multinational military alliance that can act independently and deploy to support NATO or other alliances. Participants include the Nordic countries, the Baltic states, and the Netherlands. In the UK, given Trump’s statements, there are voices calling for this cooperation to be expanded, through, for example, burden-sharing the cost of munition production and standardisation of equipment.
In any case, it would be a big mistake to tolerate duplication between NATO and the European Union in terms of defence cooperation. Apart from the waste of resources, this would also be the dreamt-of excuse for Donald Trump or a kindred spirit in the U.S. to no longer help protect Europe—although such a decision would also require a two-thirds majority in the U.S. Senate. After years of neglecting defence spending—especially in Germany, Denmark, and Sweden—European countries simply cannot do without the defence provided by the United States; so any call for an EU army is a direct threat to our security.
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