Fear of the Domestic Mujahideen Is Suffocating Britain’s Foreign Policy

Activists from the Islamic Human Rights Commission hold a banner and placards showing the face of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on Downing Street in central London, on July 19, 2025, as they join a ‘National March for Palestine’ organised by the Palestine Solidarity Campaign.

CARLOS JASSO / AFP

 

If hostile states believe Britain can be deterred by the threat of domestic unrest, they will exploit that perception, utilising communities which have failed to fully integrate into British society.

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Whatever one’s view of the so-called ‘special relationship’ between the United Kingdom and the United States (and I, for one, think it’s non-existent and embarrassing), the UK’s refusal to support American action against Iran marks a troubling moment in British foreign policy. The decision to prevent the United States from using joint UK-U.S. bases while simultaneously (and endlessly) stressing Britain’s non-involvement signals a government more concerned with internal community relations than strategic reality.

Close Commonwealth allies such as Australia and Canada, not natural bedfellows of the Trump administration, recognised the necessity of confronting Iran’s aggression. Britain and its Labour government, yet again, chose hesitation. The government has suggested that legal constraints made participation impossible. That claim does not withstand scrutiny.

Lord Wolfson, the shadow attorney general, has outlined a clear legal basis for action. He stated that the right of self-defence exists against an imminent threat from a hostile state with a consistent record of aggression. Also, there have been Iran’s sustained campaigns against British interests, including assassination plots, cyber-attacks, and threats to UK forces—not least the six-year insurgency against the British military in southern Iraq by Iran-backed Shia militias. There is also the moral obligation to assist allies acting in self-defence, particularly where Iran’s nuclear ambitions pose an existential threat to Israel.

On any reasonable interpretation, Britain could have supported its allies within the framework of international law. Instead, the government chose inaction. This was an explicitly political decision; one rooted in caution and risk aversion rather than national interest.

The graver concern is that Britain’s foreign policy is increasingly shaped by domestic vulnerability. Successive governments have allowed hostile regimes and extremist networks to establish influence inside the United Kingdom. Organisations which proclaim to be NGOs standing for such noble ideals as justice and human rights turn out to have links with nefarious international players. The Islamic Human Rights Commission, for example, has explicit associations with the Iranian regime. The result is a country that must now calculate foreign policy decisions in light of potential reprisals at home.

Iranian state activity on British soil has become a persistent reality. Plots targeting dissidents, journalists and political figures have been repeatedly uncovered. Islamist extremism remains the single largest terrorism threat facing the country by some way, yet the UK still refuses to designate Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation—despite its direct involvement in hostile operations against British interests. This reluctance signals yet further weakness to adversaries who already view the West as lacking resolve. 

Britain’s Muslim population has grown to around 6-7% of the total, and in some areas forms a decisive voting bloc. This was seen only last week, in the Gorton and Denton parliamentary by-election being won by the Green Party, which unashamedly leveraged sectarian prejudice in order to do so.

This emergence of sectarian political campaigning in certain British constituencies is a worrying development. Recent campaigns have appealed explicitly to religious and ethnic identity, urging voters to ‘punish Labour for Gaza’ and portraying political opponents as enemies of Muslim communities. This kind of politics fragments the electorate and undermines the principle of national citizenship. It risks importing the conflicts of the Middle East directly into British democracy, and this Labour government (always running scared of its politically infantile backbenchers) is looking at UK foreign policy through this prism, rather than confronting it.  

Electoral fraud scandals in Birmingham and east London exposed serious weaknesses in Britain’s voting system, particularly around postal ballots and community pressure. More recent reports of coercive family voting and organised turnout in heavily Muslim constituencies suggest these vulnerabilities have not been addressed. These issues need to be confronted head-on. Public confidence in elections depends on the perception, as well as the reality, of integrity. That confidence is being rapidly eroded.

Mass demonstrations across Britain since 2023 have revealed a disturbing shift in public culture. Large-scale protests have celebrated organisations openly hostile to the West while condemning democratic allies such as Israel. Marches in London have featured open displays of support for the Iranian regime and its proxies. Political figures have attended such demonstrations without apparent concern for the message being sent. At the same time, communities opposed to authoritarian regimes in the Middle East have found themselves overshadowed by louder and more organised pro-regime activism. The scale and intensity of these demonstrations suggest a country increasingly uncertain of its own values.

The government’s refusal to support action against Iran reflects a broader failure of political leadership. Britain once understood that strength deters aggression. Today it too often signals hesitation instead. By dishonestly emphasising legal technicalities and fears of escalation, ministers risk creating the impression that Britain lacks the confidence to defend its own interests. Strategic caution has become strategic paralysis. If hostile states believe Britain can be deterred by the threat of domestic unrest, they will exploit that perception, utilising communities (covertly or otherwise) which have failed to fully integrate into British society—due to institutional disdain for the country or just plain cowardice.

Britain faces a clear choice. It can continue down a path where international law is treated as an end in itself, where domestic sensitivities constrain national policy and where hostile regimes operate with increasing confidence. Or it can reassert the principle that law exists to defend nations, not to weaken them. International law should serve the security and sovereignty of democratic states. When it fails to do so, it must be reinterpreted or reformed—not blindly obeyed.

A country unwilling to defend its interests will eventually lose the ability to do so. Britain must decide whether it still intends to act like a serious nation or whether it will remain trapped by a legal framework designed for a world that no longer exists and by fear of challenging bellicose domestic Islamism. 

Paul Birch is a former police officer and counter-terrorism specialist. You can read his Substack here.

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