NATO 3.0: America’s Bold Reset

The Trump administration is delivering exactly what America needs: a no-nonsense reset of NATO that puts the interests of the United States first and forces Europe to grow up. 

Elbridge Colby, U.S. Under Secretary of War for Policy and a no-nonsense realist, presented a restructuring of the military alliance at a meeting in Brussels under the banner of NATO 3.0. His remarks, released by the Department of War, called for a return to the alliance’s original Cold War focus (NATO 1.0) of clear, mutual deterrence against real threats, minus the post-Cold War bloat (NATO 2.0) of endless out-of-area adventures and U.S. taxpayers footing the bill for Europe’s complacency.

Colby nailed it: Europe must take primary responsibility for its own conventional defense. The U.S. will keep the nuclear umbrella extended and provide top-tier capabilities where it counts, but Washington is done being the default conventional heavyweight in Europe. This isn’t abandonment—it’s a partnership rooted in realism. As Colby put it, alliances should be “partnerships, not dependencies.” President Trump’s late-2025 National Security Strategy backs this up, assigning Europe the job of handling its own defenses while pursuing diplomatic outreach—like negotiating an end to the Ukraine mess. The U.S. shifts focus to homeland security, the Western Hemisphere (Monroe Doctrine revival), and countering China in the Indo-Pacific.

The transformation means that Greenland and Iceland will not have NATO defense but American defense. For Iceland, this shift is a golden opportunity—if Icelanders play it smart. Iceland’s strategic perch in the North Atlantic makes it indispensable for transatlantic security and Arctic monitoring. But relying on fading EU defense fantasies? That’s a recipe for irrelevance. 

During Trump’s first presidential term from 2017–2021, demands were made for Europe to take responsibility for its own defense. Throughout the entire Cold War from 1946–1991, the United States handled the defense of Europe against the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. Europe saved on its military expenditures. Trump succeeded in getting Europe to increase its contributions to national defense during his first term.

Last year, Trump presented a new national security strategy that assigns Europe the task of handling its own defenses and making peace with Russia. NATO 3.0 implements the national security strategy in such a way that the United States provides Europe with nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterrence. Europe, on the other hand, shall be responsible for conventional national defenses.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Colby said in his speech that NATO 3.0 resembles the alliance’s original version, 1.0: joint defenses and mutual commitments focused on a defined objective—to deter the Soviet Union from invading Western Europe. The intermediate version of NATO, 2.0, went on expeditions outside of NATO. That was a mistake.

Colby does not mention Greenland even once—Greenland, over which the United States on one hand, and Denmark and EU-Europe on the other, are disputing control. But he said the core area of U.S. national security interests is the Western Hemisphere. Greenland is in the Western Hemisphere. The message that Europeans should focus on their own continent and not go on expeditions far from home is diplomatic but clear. When the deputy secretary speaks of defending “American interests in the Western Hemisphere,” he is referring to both Greenland and Iceland.

Colby’s speech pulls the rug out from under Iceland’s Foreign Minister Þorgerður Katrín Gunnarsdóttir’s advocacy, as she imagines that a “defense agreement with the EU” is an option for Iceland in security and defense matters. 

There are two reasons—two crushing realities—why there will be no military buildup by EU-Europe in Greenland and Iceland. First, the EU can’t deliver. It is militarily lightweight and financially strained—incapable of serious High North buildup without massive U.S. subsidies it won’t get anymore. Second, and decisively, Washington won’t allow it. The U.S. views the Western Hemisphere (including Greenland and adjacent Arctic zones) as core turf. Colby’s speech avoided naming Greenland explicitly, but his repeated emphasis on defending “American interests in our hemisphere” sends a crystal-clear signal. Greenland is in that hemisphere; Iceland’s proximity ties it in. Any EU military footprint up there would be seen as encroachment on U.S. priorities.

Trump’s team isn’t bluffing. The 2025 NSS elevates the Western Hemisphere as top priority, with a ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine asserting U.S. preeminence. Greenland tensions with Denmark (and by extension EU-Europe) aren’t going away—Trump’s past interest in greater control there was no joke. In this context, U.S. dominance in the High North is non-negotiable. EU retreat will be politely diplomatic, but inevitable.

This echoes Trump’s first term (2017–2021), when he rightly hammered Europe on defense spending. During the Cold War, the U.S. shielded the continent from the Soviets while Europeans skimped on militaries. Trump flipped the script, forcing increases. Now, with NATO’s Hague commitments pushing toward 5% GDP on defense, the pressure is real—and working. Colby’s Brussels tone was conciliatory—no threats, praise for progress—but the message is unmistakable: adapt or get left behind.

Iceland’s position is unique: no standing army, heavy reliance on the 1951 U.S.-Iceland Defense Agreement, and NATO membership without the full burdens others carry. That’s a sweet deal, but it only lasts if Iceland aligns with the dominant player—America. Chasing EU alternatives risks sidelining Iceland when U.S. priorities harden. 

NATO 3.0 strengthens the alliance by making it sustainable. Europe steps up conventionally; the U.S. provides nuclear backbone and focuses on bigger threats. No more U.S. subsidizing European welfare states while America handles global heavy lifting. For pro-U.S. voices, this is refreshing: America First means stronger deterrence overall, not isolation. The EU’s bureaucratic empire-building? It’s exposed as the overreach it always was—incapable of real security without Uncle Sam.

Iceland should double down on its bilateral U.S. ties, perhaps pushing for enhanced Arctic cooperation under American leadership. The High North is heating up strategically, with Russia, China eyeing routes, and U.S. primacy there protects Icelandic interests better than any Brussels bureaucrats ever could.

In short: NATO endures, but on America’s terms—realistic, balanced, and effective. Europe whining about “abandonment” misses the point: the free ride is over. Time for sovereign nations to act like it. The United States intends to claim control over Greenland. It is likely that this will happen, even if the EU-Europe’s retreat is dressed up in diplomatic garb.

For Iceland, hitching firmly to the U.S. star is the smart, secure play. Anything else is EU nostalgia. Iceland’s foreign minister Gunnarsdóttir was at the Brussels meeting, but she doesn’t seem to understand what happened there. That she intends to defy the United States’ new national security strategy is an astonishing lack of judgment.