On Monday night, it became clear to a sizeable Westminster audience that the case for mass immigration is dead. The venue was the Emmanuel Centre, the occasion a public debate put on by Touchpoint Politics: “Is Immigration Good for Britain?” Moderated by The Spectator’s Katy Balls, anyone willing to cough up £20 or so was entitled to watch the comedian Konstantin Kisin and the political scientist Matthew Goodwin, both opposing the motion, go up against co-founder of Novara Media Aaron Bastani and Polly Toynbee of the Guardian.
Neither side said anything new, ground-breaking, or particularly radioactive. But while this created no hiccups so far as Kisin and Goodwin were concerned, for Bastani and Toynbee the lack of novelty was quite fatal.
Kisin and Goodwin pointed to all of the most conventional pillars in the restrictionist case, from the demands on housing and wage pressures to suggestive—if not entirely adequate—talk of ‘British values.’ Despite the hopes of purists that they would go a little further, it was hardly necessary to sway the audience: what observations they did wheel out have aged well enough on their own. Meanwhile, the case for diversity and multiculturalism has never been in such low water. Bastani and Toynbee spluttered on empty, except in the few surreal moments when they made implicit concessions to the restrictionist side without realising it.
Toynbee in particular epitomised the agonising trajectory of the Left on this topic over the last two decades. They have given up hailing mass immigration in the idealistic terms that were once in vogue. We were treated to no platitudes about multicultural ‘vibrancy’ or the richness of the ‘melting pot.’ Instead, Toynbee launched to the defence of the fact that net immigration is now running at around 750,000 a year with talking points indistinguishable from those of a hard-headed economic realist. At best, she and Bastani did us the favour of establishing that Britain has developed a crippling dependency on certain kinds of foreign labour. This is quite distinct from proving that this is ‘good’ for us.
Plus, if that dependency stops us from succeeding along the necessary (if insufficient) lines that Kisin invoked in his opening remarks—consent, scale, cohesion, and legality—then it is hardly a cause for celebration. Everything Toynbee said about the UK in relation to mass demographic change might just as easily have been said about a junkie in relation to his happy powder. “We need these people,” she concluded at one point, “because we’ve failed to invest in our own.” This was quite the gift to arch-restrictionists, who have been demanding for decades—at the risk of being jeered as ‘xenophobes’ by self-appointed prefects like Toynbee in fact—that we must embrace a principle of national preference.
She also reverted to type in arguing that the demonisation of immigrants is the main problem. If only we were nicer, more welcoming, and open to giving illegal immigrants the right to work, these people would cease being “they” and become “us.” Apart from the fact that this will strengthen the incentives for fighting-age males to try their luck paying people-smugglers to get them across the English Channel, the idea that male foreigners whose first act in relation to Britain is to break our laws and violate our sovereignty can be trusted to respect us, let alone “become” part of us, is demented. It also denies the significance of tribalism to human beings, in comparison to which ‘niceness’ is a very feeble reed.
Goodwin brought a full arsenal of facts and figures. “Immigration,” he said, “is going to represent 92% of all population growth over the next decade.” At present, we need to build 515,00 homes a year just to keep up with annual inflows. In 2023, he went on, we managed just over 100,000. He also pointed to Robert Putnam’s landmark studies, replicated multiple times over, that diversity erodes social trust and solidarity.
Most satisfyingly of all, he identified Boris Johnson as “the chief architect” of the great betrayal on replacement migration. Far from the radically reduced, high-skilled, high-wage immigration promised in the wake of leaving the European Union, we have instead been involuntarily subjected to the exact opposite: mass uncontrolled, low-skilled, low-wage immigration, along with a staggering collapse of trust in our political institutions to match. Johnson was in no sense a conservative, any more than his fellow Tories—whether personally hostile to him or otherwise, it does not matter—in the parliamentary Conservative Party.
Bastani’s case—interesting in parts, if not always relevant to the debate in question—revolved around the idea that our economic system, not immigration as such, is the cause of our present discontents. Our low-wage economy, in hock to big business, simply necessitates high numbers. Always be wary of people who invite you to treat political choices like random weather events, particularly if they also believe that the weather can be controlled by the wit of man. While it is true that satisfying the urge for cheap labour entails eye-watering levels of low-skilled immigration, there is no economic law requiring us—while we pluck up the courage to go cold turkey on such an atrocious model altogether at least—to make temporary guest workers into settled citizens. The only factor making us do so is a fear of being called racist if we refuse to indulge the fiction that identity does not matter.
At best, Bastani made a case for importing foreigners on highly conditional, short-term work permits, revocable if necessary, while we set about solving the more chronic problem. The point was best put by Goodwin: high rates of immigration enable cynical operatives, whether in the care sector or second- and third-tier universities, to plug otherwise failing business models.
So much more could have been enlisted to reinforce the restrictionist case. We heard nothing about the insidious dynamics of chain migration, the risk of irreversible statelessness, or the thorny matter of Islam. The fact that Kisin and Goodwin strolled to victory without having to call in any of these big guns is proof in itself that the debate is effectively over. All Britain needs, at some point in the next decade, is a political vehicle with the courage and conviction to transform this Socratic triumph into a wholesale national renewal.
The Case for Mass Immigration is Dead
On Monday night, it became clear to a sizeable Westminster audience that the case for mass immigration is dead. The venue was the Emmanuel Centre, the occasion a public debate put on by Touchpoint Politics: “Is Immigration Good for Britain?” Moderated by The Spectator’s Katy Balls, anyone willing to cough up £20 or so was entitled to watch the comedian Konstantin Kisin and the political scientist Matthew Goodwin, both opposing the motion, go up against co-founder of Novara Media Aaron Bastani and Polly Toynbee of the Guardian.
Neither side said anything new, ground-breaking, or particularly radioactive. But while this created no hiccups so far as Kisin and Goodwin were concerned, for Bastani and Toynbee the lack of novelty was quite fatal.
Kisin and Goodwin pointed to all of the most conventional pillars in the restrictionist case, from the demands on housing and wage pressures to suggestive—if not entirely adequate—talk of ‘British values.’ Despite the hopes of purists that they would go a little further, it was hardly necessary to sway the audience: what observations they did wheel out have aged well enough on their own. Meanwhile, the case for diversity and multiculturalism has never been in such low water. Bastani and Toynbee spluttered on empty, except in the few surreal moments when they made implicit concessions to the restrictionist side without realising it.
Toynbee in particular epitomised the agonising trajectory of the Left on this topic over the last two decades. They have given up hailing mass immigration in the idealistic terms that were once in vogue. We were treated to no platitudes about multicultural ‘vibrancy’ or the richness of the ‘melting pot.’ Instead, Toynbee launched to the defence of the fact that net immigration is now running at around 750,000 a year with talking points indistinguishable from those of a hard-headed economic realist. At best, she and Bastani did us the favour of establishing that Britain has developed a crippling dependency on certain kinds of foreign labour. This is quite distinct from proving that this is ‘good’ for us.
Plus, if that dependency stops us from succeeding along the necessary (if insufficient) lines that Kisin invoked in his opening remarks—consent, scale, cohesion, and legality—then it is hardly a cause for celebration. Everything Toynbee said about the UK in relation to mass demographic change might just as easily have been said about a junkie in relation to his happy powder. “We need these people,” she concluded at one point, “because we’ve failed to invest in our own.” This was quite the gift to arch-restrictionists, who have been demanding for decades—at the risk of being jeered as ‘xenophobes’ by self-appointed prefects like Toynbee in fact—that we must embrace a principle of national preference.
She also reverted to type in arguing that the demonisation of immigrants is the main problem. If only we were nicer, more welcoming, and open to giving illegal immigrants the right to work, these people would cease being “they” and become “us.” Apart from the fact that this will strengthen the incentives for fighting-age males to try their luck paying people-smugglers to get them across the English Channel, the idea that male foreigners whose first act in relation to Britain is to break our laws and violate our sovereignty can be trusted to respect us, let alone “become” part of us, is demented. It also denies the significance of tribalism to human beings, in comparison to which ‘niceness’ is a very feeble reed.
Goodwin brought a full arsenal of facts and figures. “Immigration,” he said, “is going to represent 92% of all population growth over the next decade.” At present, we need to build 515,00 homes a year just to keep up with annual inflows. In 2023, he went on, we managed just over 100,000. He also pointed to Robert Putnam’s landmark studies, replicated multiple times over, that diversity erodes social trust and solidarity.
Most satisfyingly of all, he identified Boris Johnson as “the chief architect” of the great betrayal on replacement migration. Far from the radically reduced, high-skilled, high-wage immigration promised in the wake of leaving the European Union, we have instead been involuntarily subjected to the exact opposite: mass uncontrolled, low-skilled, low-wage immigration, along with a staggering collapse of trust in our political institutions to match. Johnson was in no sense a conservative, any more than his fellow Tories—whether personally hostile to him or otherwise, it does not matter—in the parliamentary Conservative Party.
Bastani’s case—interesting in parts, if not always relevant to the debate in question—revolved around the idea that our economic system, not immigration as such, is the cause of our present discontents. Our low-wage economy, in hock to big business, simply necessitates high numbers. Always be wary of people who invite you to treat political choices like random weather events, particularly if they also believe that the weather can be controlled by the wit of man. While it is true that satisfying the urge for cheap labour entails eye-watering levels of low-skilled immigration, there is no economic law requiring us—while we pluck up the courage to go cold turkey on such an atrocious model altogether at least—to make temporary guest workers into settled citizens. The only factor making us do so is a fear of being called racist if we refuse to indulge the fiction that identity does not matter.
At best, Bastani made a case for importing foreigners on highly conditional, short-term work permits, revocable if necessary, while we set about solving the more chronic problem. The point was best put by Goodwin: high rates of immigration enable cynical operatives, whether in the care sector or second- and third-tier universities, to plug otherwise failing business models.
So much more could have been enlisted to reinforce the restrictionist case. We heard nothing about the insidious dynamics of chain migration, the risk of irreversible statelessness, or the thorny matter of Islam. The fact that Kisin and Goodwin strolled to victory without having to call in any of these big guns is proof in itself that the debate is effectively over. All Britain needs, at some point in the next decade, is a political vehicle with the courage and conviction to transform this Socratic triumph into a wholesale national renewal.
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