This year marks the sixtieth anniversary of the Élysée Treaty, a symbol of the reconciliation between the French and German nations. The treaty signed by French President Charles de Gaulle and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in January 1963 was a breakthrough in the cooperation of the two countries. The French-German compromise brought peace and prosperity to the Western part of Europe. It offered a vision for the future that provided new momentum for the continent: it sent the message that Europe, European civilisation had survived the devastation of the war, and is willing and capable of fighting for its own future. The cooperation paved the way for what is referred to as ‘Les Trente Glorieuses,’ that is, thirty glorious years. But how long did this momentum last? How can the French-German reconciliation be evaluated sixty years on? How has the Franco-German leading role changed, what opportunities did the two countries have, have they used them, and what challenges or dangers are they currently facing?
From a historical perspective, French-German cooperation can be divided into two larger stages: the period prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and then the decades after the change of regime. The first period brought unparalleled economic development and prosperity, while successfully laying the foundations for the European cooperation framework.
In a few short decades, Western Europe became the place where it was the best to live, which also gave hope for European countries behind the Iron Curtain. The leading role of the Franco-German partnership was not only unquestionable, but also indispensable in this process.
At the same time, its impact was largely limited to economic cooperation and success, as well as to industrial and agricultural policies. During his visit to Berlin, Charles de Gaulle expressed the optimistic wish that Europe could overcome its divisions and once again become “the focal point of civilisation.” His hope was that the potential alliance of independent states “from the Atlantic to the Urals” could give Europe a place among the world powers.
But this idea, alas, remained wishful thinking for a long time on the old continent that was split into two by the superpowers. Without help from the United States, Western Europe was unable to guarantee its own security, while freedom, independence and the possibility of self-determination were suppressed by the Soviet system in Eastern Europe. The Franco-German partnership—just like the pro-integration elite—did not know much about this division, and over time, it became increasingly resigned to the situation. It seemed that the Iron Curtain had become an accepted part of Europe’s geopolitical map, and the European situation was considered stable and unquestionable.
In light of the above, the American political turnaround, President Ronald Reagan’s memorable remarks made at the Brandenburg Gate in June 1987 (“Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!”), and then the collapse of the Soviet Union offered a historic opportunity for both the Franco-German partnership and Europe. Germany, divided by walls and watchtowers, was reunited, while the withdrawal of Soviet tanks meant that European countries regained control of their own destinies. The countries that had recovered their freedom accepted the leadership of the Franco-German alliance as way of returning to a Europe where diversity and autonomy could be preserved, where common European spiritual roots could be defended, and prosperity could be created.
And the Franco-German alliance, with the Maastricht reforms, embarked on the ambitious deepening of European integration and the extension of its role to other areas beyond the economic dimension. It remains true to this day that what Germany and France decide, most EU member states agree to. Often it has been personal leadership qualities and visions that have determined this leadership, for instance, of the charisma shown by Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s in his insistence on German reunification or Emmanuel Macron’s in his vision of strategic autonomy for Europe, a vision that is widely criticised in his own country.
At the same time, the euphoria surrounding the fall of the Berlin Wall was quickly overshadowed by storm clouds. The first major trauma of Europe after the system change was the outbreak and escalation of the civil war in Yugoslavia. The seriousness of the conflict grew beyond the capabilities and power of Franco-German cooperation, and the war ended with American intervention.
Central European countries were also disappointed compared to their initial rosy expectations. The economic transition proved to be much more difficult than they thought it would be, in some cases even traumatic, while their accession to the EU and the catching up of their economies with those in the West were delayed.
Many in these nations have even come to fear the predominance of the Franco-German alliance, which is creating a divide between the centre of EU power and the periphery. This is understandable, as they have fought to avoid exactly this throughout their history.
The 2008 financial crisis brought to light economic fractures, and the extreme vulnerability of some countries in Europe, questioning the sustainability of the welfare society model.
The different responses to the migration crisis of 2015 cast doubt on the unity regarding the commitment to European identity, intellectual and spiritual roots, and civilisational values, something that was previously thought to be unbreakable.
Although the German economy is strong, European innovation and competitiveness are declining, and it is constantly lagging behind in its role in globalisation. In addition, Europe is behind the rest of the world in terms of demographic indicators and defence spending. The Franco-German joint engagement in 2014 was still able to guarantee the safety of the old continent by facilitating the conclusion of the Minsk agreement, but a few years later, it turned out to be too weak to prevent the outbreak of the Ukrainian conflict. European self-determination, regained three decades earlier, has been threatened by Europe’s return to being a geopolitical collision zone of superpowers.
The European unification defined by the Franco-German alliance is currently nowhere near the successes and achievements of its first three decades. Nor does it offer the same ambition or attractive vision as it did when it began, now that Europe is facing constant and serious geopolitical, economic, and cultural challenges and threats.
It is precisely because of this that voices have emerged in Europe that compete with the direction offered by the Franco-German partnership. Britain’s withdrawal from the EU has made it the best-known independent voice, but the Visegrád cooperation, or even the Hungarian prime minister’s vision for the future of Europe, can also be mentioned here.
Moreover, France and Germany are now themselves on different paths from one another on a number of issues. They think differently about nuclear energy, for example, and about the enlargement of the European Union, but they also approach European integration differently: while the French focus on institutional issues, the Germans take a more pragmatic approach and reap the benefits of economic integration. At the same time, European integration alone can give them weight in the world, but this would require them to become visionary European leaders willing and able to preserve the culture and spiritual roots that bind all European nations together and give European civilisation a future.
The New Challenges of European Integration
A crowd gathers on the West German side of the Berlin Wall at Potsdamer Platz to watch as the structure is dismantled, November 1989.
This year marks the sixtieth anniversary of the Élysée Treaty, a symbol of the reconciliation between the French and German nations. The treaty signed by French President Charles de Gaulle and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in January 1963 was a breakthrough in the cooperation of the two countries. The French-German compromise brought peace and prosperity to the Western part of Europe. It offered a vision for the future that provided new momentum for the continent: it sent the message that Europe, European civilisation had survived the devastation of the war, and is willing and capable of fighting for its own future. The cooperation paved the way for what is referred to as ‘Les Trente Glorieuses,’ that is, thirty glorious years. But how long did this momentum last? How can the French-German reconciliation be evaluated sixty years on? How has the Franco-German leading role changed, what opportunities did the two countries have, have they used them, and what challenges or dangers are they currently facing?
From a historical perspective, French-German cooperation can be divided into two larger stages: the period prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and then the decades after the change of regime. The first period brought unparalleled economic development and prosperity, while successfully laying the foundations for the European cooperation framework.
In a few short decades, Western Europe became the place where it was the best to live, which also gave hope for European countries behind the Iron Curtain. The leading role of the Franco-German partnership was not only unquestionable, but also indispensable in this process.
At the same time, its impact was largely limited to economic cooperation and success, as well as to industrial and agricultural policies. During his visit to Berlin, Charles de Gaulle expressed the optimistic wish that Europe could overcome its divisions and once again become “the focal point of civilisation.” His hope was that the potential alliance of independent states “from the Atlantic to the Urals” could give Europe a place among the world powers.
But this idea, alas, remained wishful thinking for a long time on the old continent that was split into two by the superpowers. Without help from the United States, Western Europe was unable to guarantee its own security, while freedom, independence and the possibility of self-determination were suppressed by the Soviet system in Eastern Europe. The Franco-German partnership—just like the pro-integration elite—did not know much about this division, and over time, it became increasingly resigned to the situation. It seemed that the Iron Curtain had become an accepted part of Europe’s geopolitical map, and the European situation was considered stable and unquestionable.
In light of the above, the American political turnaround, President Ronald Reagan’s memorable remarks made at the Brandenburg Gate in June 1987 (“Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!”), and then the collapse of the Soviet Union offered a historic opportunity for both the Franco-German partnership and Europe. Germany, divided by walls and watchtowers, was reunited, while the withdrawal of Soviet tanks meant that European countries regained control of their own destinies. The countries that had recovered their freedom accepted the leadership of the Franco-German alliance as way of returning to a Europe where diversity and autonomy could be preserved, where common European spiritual roots could be defended, and prosperity could be created.
And the Franco-German alliance, with the Maastricht reforms, embarked on the ambitious deepening of European integration and the extension of its role to other areas beyond the economic dimension. It remains true to this day that what Germany and France decide, most EU member states agree to. Often it has been personal leadership qualities and visions that have determined this leadership, for instance, of the charisma shown by Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s in his insistence on German reunification or Emmanuel Macron’s in his vision of strategic autonomy for Europe, a vision that is widely criticised in his own country.
At the same time, the euphoria surrounding the fall of the Berlin Wall was quickly overshadowed by storm clouds. The first major trauma of Europe after the system change was the outbreak and escalation of the civil war in Yugoslavia. The seriousness of the conflict grew beyond the capabilities and power of Franco-German cooperation, and the war ended with American intervention.
Central European countries were also disappointed compared to their initial rosy expectations. The economic transition proved to be much more difficult than they thought it would be, in some cases even traumatic, while their accession to the EU and the catching up of their economies with those in the West were delayed.
Many in these nations have even come to fear the predominance of the Franco-German alliance, which is creating a divide between the centre of EU power and the periphery. This is understandable, as they have fought to avoid exactly this throughout their history.
The 2008 financial crisis brought to light economic fractures, and the extreme vulnerability of some countries in Europe, questioning the sustainability of the welfare society model.
The different responses to the migration crisis of 2015 cast doubt on the unity regarding the commitment to European identity, intellectual and spiritual roots, and civilisational values, something that was previously thought to be unbreakable.
Although the German economy is strong, European innovation and competitiveness are declining, and it is constantly lagging behind in its role in globalisation. In addition, Europe is behind the rest of the world in terms of demographic indicators and defence spending. The Franco-German joint engagement in 2014 was still able to guarantee the safety of the old continent by facilitating the conclusion of the Minsk agreement, but a few years later, it turned out to be too weak to prevent the outbreak of the Ukrainian conflict. European self-determination, regained three decades earlier, has been threatened by Europe’s return to being a geopolitical collision zone of superpowers.
The European unification defined by the Franco-German alliance is currently nowhere near the successes and achievements of its first three decades. Nor does it offer the same ambition or attractive vision as it did when it began, now that Europe is facing constant and serious geopolitical, economic, and cultural challenges and threats.
It is precisely because of this that voices have emerged in Europe that compete with the direction offered by the Franco-German partnership. Britain’s withdrawal from the EU has made it the best-known independent voice, but the Visegrád cooperation, or even the Hungarian prime minister’s vision for the future of Europe, can also be mentioned here.
Moreover, France and Germany are now themselves on different paths from one another on a number of issues. They think differently about nuclear energy, for example, and about the enlargement of the European Union, but they also approach European integration differently: while the French focus on institutional issues, the Germans take a more pragmatic approach and reap the benefits of economic integration. At the same time, European integration alone can give them weight in the world, but this would require them to become visionary European leaders willing and able to preserve the culture and spiritual roots that bind all European nations together and give European civilisation a future.
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