The Tusk Government’s Assault on Poland’s Electoral Administration

In September 2025, Poland witnessed a grave attempt by Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s government to unlawfully interfere with the independence of institutions responsible for organizing elections. The case concerned a politically motivated plan to dismiss almost half of the country’s electoral commissioners—a move clearly inconsistent with the Electoral Code and lacking any statutory justification. This episode represents yet another example of the Tusk administration’s assault on independent bodies and disregard for the rule of law.

The Minister of Justice, Waldemar Żurek, and the Minister of Interior, Marcin Kierwiński, demanded the removal of 43 out of 100 electoral commissioners—key officials supervising the conduct and counting of votes at the local level under the supervision of the independent central electoral body established by statute, the National Electoral Commission (Państwowa Komiaja Wyborcza, PKW).

The ministers justified their initiative by invoking alleged violations of “constitutional guarantees of judicial independence” and supposed risks to the “impartiality” of the electoral process. In reality, their accusations rested solely on the fact that the targeted commissioners—most of them judges—had lawfully participated in nomination or promotion procedures before the National Council of the Judiciary (Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa, KRS)—the constitutional body responsible for safeguarding the independence of courts and judges—following the reforms introduced after 2017, or had endorsed candidates to this body. Such actions, fully consistent with the law and representing the legitimate exercise of statutory rights before a constitutional institution, were arbitrarily reinterpreted by the ministries as alleged evidence of “politicization.”

Under the Electoral Code, commissioners are appointed by the National Electoral Commission for five-year terms and may be dismissed only in specific, enumerated cases—notably, failure to perform duties or gross negligence. The ministers’ request cited none of these conditions, revealing purely political motives. These motives were further underlined by a government-aligned media campaign and public threats of “alternative measures” should the Commission refuse to comply—a clear attempt to exert unlawful pressure on a constitutional body. Such ‘alternatives’ had already included administrative and disciplinary intimidation targeting judges and prosecutors serving as commissioners to coerce resignations.

The scale, timing, and clearly unlawful nature of the plan—covering nearly half the positions, launched shortly after the government’s defeat in the 2025 presidential election and two years ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled for 2027—point to a deliberate attempt to seize control of the electoral administration. Replacing independent officials with loyal appointees would create conditions for manipulation and, in an extreme scenario, falsification of results.

On September 22, 2025, the National Electoral Commission considered the ministers’ request and unanimously rejected it. Commission Chairman Judge Sylwester Marciniak emphasized that the law provided no grounds for such dismissals. The decision, supported even by members nominated by the ruling coalition, confirmed that the proposal was unlawful.

From a legal standpoint, the ministers’ actions meet the elements of abuse of power under Article 231 of the Criminal Code: knowingly exceeding official authority and acting beyond competence, thereby creating a real danger to the public interest—in this case, free and fair elections. A formal offense of this nature does not require proof of material damage. A formal criminal complaint has been filed with the prosecution service. However, given that the prosecution service has been unlawfully subordinated to the government since its illegal takeover in January 2024, the prospects for any effective and impartial investigation remain severely limited at present. Still, it is essential that those in power are aware that their actions are being closely monitored. It cannot be ruled out that this awareness was in fact one of the reasons why members of the National Electoral Commission appointed from within Tusk’s political camp ultimately refrained from participating in an unlawful act.

This episode forms part of a wider pattern of rule-of-law erosion under the Tusk government since December 2023. Among other unconstitutional actions, the administration forcibly seized public media, unlawfully removed National Prosecutor Dariusz Barski, and since 2024 has shortened the terms of court presidents and vice-presidents in defiance of statutory provisions and Constitutional Tribunal rulings, installing politically compliant judges in their place.

Several of these actions directly undermine electoral fairness. One of the most serious examples is the unlawful deprivation of public funding for the opposition party Law and Justice (PiS). In Poland’s tightly regulated system of party financing, public subsidies cover around 80% of operational costs. Finance Minister Andrzej Domański, ignoring binding Supreme Court judgments, suspended these payments, effectively crippling the main opposition party. This blatant violation of political pluralism and equality of parties constitutes an office-related criminal offense of abuse of power, motivated by Prime Minister Tusk’s open declaration that “in my view, there is no money and there won’t be.”

Equally alarming are suspicions of illegal foreign interference in the 2025 presidential campaign through the liberal candidate Rafał Trzaskowski’s network, allegedly financed via entities linked to the company Estratos (formerly DatAdat), a company associated with Hungarian left-liberal groups and with U.S. liberal circles affiliated with the Democratic Party. Social media campaigns orchestrated outside official electoral committees disseminated manipulative and disinformative content, in clear violation of transparency standards, the principle of equal opportunity, and the binding criminal provisions of the Electoral Code.

The government also exploited the unlawfully subordinated prosecution service and security agencies to carry out politically motivated repression of opposition figures, timed and coordinated with the electoral calendar, including the fabrication of charges against President Karol Nawrocki through the manipulative use of selectively declassified personal files from his tenure as head of the Institute of National Remembrance.

In parallel, the government restricted media freedom and public debate by seizing public broadcasters, drafting legislation enabling administrative blocking of online content under the pretext of combating ‘disinformation,’ and exerting coordinated pressure on independent media outlets and individual journalists critical of the regime, aimed at silencing dissenting voices and limiting public scrutiny.

Moreover, the Tusk coalition sought to undermine the legitimacy of the Supreme Court, preparing laws that would allow annulment of presidential election results in the event of defeat, and publicly threatening to disregard judicial rulings. After Nawrocki’s victory, the government attempted to prevent him from assuming office by proposing an unconstitutional transfer of authority to the Speaker of the Sejm—actions bearing the hallmarks of a constitutional coup d’état under Articles 127 and 128 of the Criminal Code. The Speaker himself later publicly admitted that he had been urged by the Prime Minister to take part in such efforts.

The attempted dismissal of electoral commissioners thus epitomizes the government’s broader strategy: subordinating independent institutions under the guise of “reform” and “depoliticization.” The National Electoral Commission’s refusal temporarily safeguarded systemic integrity, but the initiative demonstrates the ruling coalition’s determination to interfere in the electoral process.

Equally concerning is the tacit approval—and, at times, open encouragement—of these actions by EU institutions. The European Commission’s selective application of “rule of law” mechanisms reveals striking hypocrisy: lacking competence to supervise member states in this area, it nevertheless praises Tusk for “restoring” legality while ignoring blatant autocratic abuses that, elsewhere, would provoke immediate condemnation.

The independence of electoral authorities is a cornerstone of constitutional democracy. Any attempt to politically subordinate them violates both international democratic standards and Poland’s constitutional order. The case of the Polish commissioners should thus be understood as a warning: behind the rhetoric of “rule of law” and “depoliticization,” the Tusk government is systematically dismantling institutional safeguards, threatening the transparency and integrity of the 2027 parliamentary elections and the legal order itself.