What happens if “as long as it takes” takes too long? It’s an honest and perfectly legitimate strategic question that should be asked by decision-makers who care about the fate of Ukrainians, stability in Europe, and American global leadership. It’s a question of adjusting and adapting strategy as the war drags on, and Western leaders have hitherto been reluctant to do so.
“As long as it takes,” the slogan often repeated by Western leaders, is now a Russian strategy, and a successful one at that. Since Ukraine has not collapsed and Western support has been pouring in, Russia has had to adjust its strategy. For example, at a very early stage, it abandoned the objective of taking Kyiv and other territories that were difficult to hold. After Western sanctions, it sought to boost trade relations with alternative trading partners. It commissioned a shadow fleet of old oil tankers to trade its oil despite sanctions. As Western tanks were being delivered to Ukraine, Russian forces entrenched themselves. Russia recognized that it wouldn’t have its way, so it has set things up to make this war last as long as it takes. From Russia’s perspective, the second best option, next to placing Ukraine back under Russian influence, is a perpetual war that will delay Ukraine’s NATO and EU integration for as long as it takes. The Ukrainian leadership has so persistently repeated its intention to reconquer all occupied land that it cannot back down. It had to go on the offensive.
What is the Western strategy in Ukraine? “As long as it takes” is the one-liner usually parroted by politicians. This was meant as a deterrent, a ploy to break Russia’s hopes of a quick victory. Not only did it sound heroic, it also made sense when the war began. The problem now is that, because Russia has made this its own strategy, it no longer makes sense as a deterrence strategy against Russia. While he was still on Fox News, Tucker Carlson emphasized this in one of his shows when he asked, “As long as it takes … to do what?” His question went to the very core of the strategy, and it remains unanswered.
The deadline to answer this question is fast approaching. Domestic support for the governments in several major Western powers has collapsed. For example, as of January 2024, UK conservatives are down to 25%. Moreover, EU countries will go to the polls this June for the European elections, and changes among top EU bureaucrats should also be expected. In France, President Macron’s party is polling at 19% for the European elections. The German government coalition is down to 33% and that figure represents the combined support of all three parties. Looking at the parties individually shows that both opposition parties, CDU and AfD, are ahead of Chancellor Scholz’s SPD. In Spain, the government majority is so thin after last summer’s elections that foreign policy is hardly the concern of anyone.
The only stable government is in Italy, which is more preoccupied with the massive migration crisis than with Ukraine. In Poland, one of Ukraine’s staunchest supporters, the new liberal coalition is still trying to consolidate its power. In Slovakia, another neighbour of Ukraine, the socialist, anti-war stance of Robert Fico propelled him to victory at the general elections last September. European citizens have grown tired of the ‘blank check’ approach of their governments towards Ukraine, and their number one concern is economic hardship, not the war. Although this was a silent frustration for months, the ongoing phenomenon of farmers’ protests, which have taken and are taking place in several countries, highlight the stress on European economies and households—a stress that is being caused by the EU’s policies regarding the Ukraine war and its climate agenda.
Last but not least, there is the U.S., where Donald Trump has promised to stop the war if he takes office after the 2024 elections. Ukraine was already “freaking out” in early fall. Campaigning ahead of the November elections on further support for Ukraine will hardly be an issue that resonates with voters. Before the Hamas attack on October 7, CNN poll showed that the “majority of Americans oppose more aid for Ukraine.” A poll by McLaughlin and Associates showed that, similar to Europeans, Americans’ number one concern is the economic situation, with 67% thinking that the economic situation is going to worsen. The language in the United States regarding Ukraine is beyond what any politician or media in the EU would risk saying out loud. In Europe, we cannot have an honest public debate about the war. When Prime Minister Orbán dared to suggest that perhaps the EU shouldn’t sign a €50 billion check to Ukraine, based on debt and including no oversight, the EU decided to blackmail him with plans to destroy Hungary’s economy.
Looking at the political deadlock in the U.S. Congress over funding Ukraine, European leaders need to prepare for a scenario similar to the withdrawal from Afghanistan: if the U.S. were to leave suddenly, will European allies go all-in or let Ukraine collapse? There were still many uncertainties in 2022 when the war began. Would sanctions break the Russian economy and paralyse the Russian war effort? Could Western powers keep up with weapons, finances, and trade? Would non-Western countries join the effort to isolate Russia economically and politically? We now know the answers. The sanctions adopted by the West have been embarrassingly ineffective. China, India, and many other countries categorically refuse to isolate Russia. During his visit to the EU headquarters, the foreign affairs minister of India lectured European journalists about how sanctions do not apply to Russian oil refined in India.
This leaves us with the question of what strategy to pursue instead of ‘as long as it takes.’ The answer is a strategy of ‘as soon as possible.’ The Ukrainian military does not have the time to recruit and train its soldiers to use Western equipment as competently and effectively as possible. Zelenskyy’s popularity has fallen significantly and trust in his government is at -18%. This leaves two options to end this war as soon as possible: escalation or diplomacy.
The first option would entail a ‘surge’ similar to the 2009 surge orchestrated by the Obama administration in Afghanistan, in the hopes of changing the dynamics of the conflict. In part, that was the idea and expectation behind the delivery of Western heavy weaponry last year, and the much-anticipated Ukrainian counter-offensive. But this is a high-risk option, and Ukraine’s military sponsors have so far avoided the riskier extremes of escalation. The provision of additional weapons systems has so far always been undertaken with caution and this has allowed Russia to take countermeasures.
The other option is diplomacy—hopefully before Western backing collapses domestically, and not after. Otherwise, Western countries will no longer be able to make credible commitments.
This is where the ‘as long as it takes’ strategy no longer works for Ukraine and its allies, but rather for Russia. ‘As soon as possible’ is merely a hypothetical at this stage because it requires concessions (political, territorial, or other) to Russia—something that Zelenskyy and Western leaders categorically refuse to consider, at least in public. However, European citizens think very differently. The European Council of Foreign Relations’ latest survey of 12 countries showed that 41% would have the EU “push Ukraine towards negotiating a peace deal with Russia” and only 31% wants the EU to “support Ukraine in taking back territories occupied by Russia.”
In the U.S., Donald Trump, who currently seems to have a good chance of winning a second term as U.S. president, has proposed a mix of the two approaches. He claims both that he would cut U.S. support for Ukraine and that he would threaten Russia with a surge.
NATO’s Secretary General (and others before him) has acknowledged that NATO expansion and Russia’s security concerns could lead to Russian hostility and an attack on Ukraine. Although the official Western narrative labels this as Russian propaganda, that is hardly true. Peace in Europe requires the negotiation of a deal, with long-term security guarantees for both Ukraine and Russia. Neither a Russian, nor a Ukrainian military victory will get us there. Either military outcome would be just another episode in an enduring strategic conflict in which Ukraine, and potentially a large part of Eastern and Central Europe, become the battleground for great power rivalry. Although conflicts may stay frozen for decades, they carry a permanent threat of renewed tension and war. A long-term deal will be extremely difficult to achieve in any case, but it will be impossible if Western powers do not adapt their strategy to the reality on the ground—both at home and on the frontlines. Electing the new European Parliament and choosing a new Commission president will have a major impact on whether EU institutions will be agents of peace, stability, and prosperity in Europe, or whether they will double down on a failed Ukraine strategy.
