“Brussels has lost control of the narrative and now wants to control the platforms”—MEP Virginie Joron

Virginie Joron is no newcomer to the debate on digital platforms and freedom of expression in Europe. A French Member of the European Parliament for Rassemblement National and a member of the special committee on the Digital Services Act (DSA), she has become one of the voices most critical of what she sees as the drift taken by the European Commission in the application of this legislation.

From her position in the European Parliament, Joron denounces a “political, biased and expansive” reading of the DSA, which, in her view, no longer serves to protect consumers or combat illegal content, but rather to control public debate and discipline platforms that do not fit Brussels’ official narrative.

In an interview with europeanconservative.com, the MEP also warns of a climate of growing tension with the United States, caused—according to her—by the European Union’s determination to impose its rules on American companies and to project its regulation beyond its own territory. A strategy which, far from strengthening European sovereignty, would be weakening innovation, freedom of expression, and the democratic legitimacy of EU institutions.

You are a member of the special committee on the DSA. Where would you say the European Commission’s strategy stands today?

We are clearly in a new phase. During Ursula von der Leyen’s first term, the Commission focused on creating legislation: the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), and the entire regulatory arsenal. In the second term, what we are seeing is a shift in approach: it is no longer just about regulating but about sanctioning. And that transition is being carried out in a profoundly opaque manner.

The Commission has investigative powers under the DSA, but it exercises them without any transparency whatsoever. As MEPs, we do not know how many investigators there are, what procedures they follow, what evidence they rely on, or which specific articles are applied in each case. We learn about the details through press releases, not through the normal institutional channels.

One of the most controversial cases is the procedure against platform X. What does this file reveal?

It reveals to what extent the DSA is being used politically. The Commission announced a possible sanction of up to 6% of global turnover, and suddenly we discovered that it was relying on Article 25 of the DSA to challenge the account verification system—the so-called “blue checks”—on the grounds of a lack of transparency.

The problem is that this article is being used incorrectly. There is a clear legal misinterpretation, and I say this with full knowledge of the facts because I participate directly in this committee. It is not a technical reading of the text; it is an ideological one. The meaning of the law is being stretched to justify a political offensive against a specific platform.

The Commission justifies these measures in the name of the fight against ‘disinformation.’ Do you agree with that diagnosis?

No. The DSA was initially conceived to protect consumers from illegal products, clearly unlawful content, criminal networks, or obvious external interference. That was the spirit of the text. But since Elon Musk acquired Twitter, we have seen a radical change in approach.

Today, the DSA is being used as an instrument to control freedom of expression, relying on an ecosystem of ‘fact-checkers’ and ‘certifiers’ that are not neutral. In many cases, these are activist journalists or NGOs aligned with the Commission, who receive a kind of official seal allowing them to decide what is true and what is not.

What role does the so-called Democracy Shield play in this context?

The Democracy Shield is extremely worrying. It is a new framework that allows the DSA to be integrated into an even broader ecosystem of control, directly overseen by the European Commission. Its stated objective is not only to fight disinformation but to combat any discourse that questions the “values of the European Union.”

This is written in black and white in official documents. It is no longer about false facts but about narratives that do not fit Brussels’ political project. If tomorrow an MEP, a journalist, or a citizen questions that ideological framework, they become a problem. That is a very serious qualitative leap.

You have spoken of a contradiction between the Commission’s demands for transparency and its own behaviour.

It is a monumental irony. X is accused of a lack of transparency, while the Commission itself has been condemned for maladministration in the PfizerGate case, for refusing to make public the messages exchanged between Ursula von der Leyen and the CEO of Pfizer. They lost the case, did not appeal the ruling, and yet they continue to lecture others.

We have hidden contracts, secret vaccine prices, opaque procedures at the European Public Prosecutor’s Office … and yet the Commission presents itself as the moral arbiter of digital transparency. It is a double standard that completely undermines its credibility.

From Brussels, American platforms are accused of interfering in European processes. How do you interpret this conflict with the United States?

It is a complete inversion of reality. When an American uses an American platform to debate with another American, where is the problem? No one forces Europeans to use X, Meta, or TikTok. These are free services, accessed voluntarily.

The reality is that it was the European Commission that attacked first, trying to impose its regulation beyond its own territory. That extraterritoriality was not foreseen when the DSA was drafted. By doing so, Brussels has ignited an unnecessary geopolitical conflict and damaged the transatlantic relationship.

Do you think there is also a fear of losing political control behind this strategy?

Without any doubt. The Commission has lost control of the narrative. For decades, it dominated the information space through major media outlets and subsidised NGOs. But today, citizens—especially young people—get their information from social networks. My 19-year-old daughter does not watch television; she gets her information online.

Platforms have facilitated access to information, and this has had electoral consequences. Patriotic and sovereigntist parties are gaining ground precisely because they no longer depend on traditional media. The DSA is, to a large extent, a reaction to that loss of control.

National elections have even been called into question. Is this a real risk?

Yes, and we have already seen it. The case of Romania is an alarming precedent. A candidate who did not go through traditional media, who relied solely on social networks, won the first round. The reaction was panic, and suddenly there was talk of algorithms and interference, without clear evidence.

The Commission has no competence to intervene in national elections, but it is creating structures—resilience centres, monitoring mechanisms—that could tomorrow be used to invalidate electoral processes. That is a direct violation of the sovereignty of member states and of the rule of law.

Finally, what alternative do you propose from the Patriots group?

To defend the original spirit of the DSA without allowing its political instrumentalisation. To defend freedom of expression, innovation, and national sovereignty. Europe needs a reasonable regulatory framework, not a flood of rules that destroy industry, suffocate startups, and control citizens.

The Commission has become a political tool at the service of a federalist project that no longer enjoys popular support. Our task is to stop it and to return the European Union to its democratic foundations.