Zbigniew Kuźmiuk
Eric Vidal © European Union 2023 – Source : EP
Zbigniew Kuźmiuk is a Polish economist and politician currently serving as an MP for the Law and Justice party (PiS). He previously served as a member of the European Parliament, where he sat on the Budget and Agriculture Committees.
The assessment has already been rendered—and in no uncertain terms—by Members of the European Parliament. At a recent meeting of the Budget Committee, MEPs from across the political spectrum, including members of the European People’s Party, excoriated the draft. Meanwhile, at the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, Commissioner Christophe Hansen was met with boos—a most unusual display in the European Parliament.
The enthusiasm currently emanating from the Polish government and its affiliates is entirely misplaced. When two principal pillars of EU support for Poland—cohesion policy and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)—are set to be drastically reduced, to the tune of some 200 billion euros in total, any claim that we stand to gain more than under the present framework is, frankly, absurd. There exists no such possibility. The remaining funds are discretionary in nature and designed in such a way that they will, inevitably and disproportionately, benefit the most advanced economies—those of Western Europe. That, of course, was always their intention. But the fact that this arrangement is now being extolled as a success by the Polish Budget Commissioner, Piotr Serafin, and by the Polish government itself, is a masterclass in propaganda.
I suspect negotiations will stretch right up to 2027. It is entirely conceivable that this budget will not be adopted at all. Should there be a change of president in France—as is expected in the spring of 2027—I am quite certain a veto will emanate from Paris. And there ought to be one from Warsaw as well. That said, I regret to report that the fundamental structure of the budget will remain unchanged. Cohesion and agricultural funds have now been pooled, which means that the battle over allocations will shift to the national level. In practical terms, local officials will be fighting to build opera houses while farmers demand funding for barns. The conflict is inevitable. This is nothing less than the nationalisation of the Common Agricultural Policy—and I must confess, I did not see it coming.
Quite. The core issue is that the lion’s share of the EU budget—contributed overwhelmingly by the Member States—is now to be distributed at the discretion of the Commission. This is a bold and rather alarming development. The Commission, selected as it is, seeks plenary control. We have already had a taste of this in the management of the Recovery and Resilience Facility. Now the intention is for all funds to be subjected to what is euphemistically termed “conditionality.” Some member states may acquiesce, but in my view, no sovereign nation ought to accept such an arrangement. To compound matters, the Commission now seeks a foothold in taxation: a share of tobacco taxes, a new corporate levy—greater fiscal participation overall. Yet every such measure amounts to a relinquishment of sovereignty to Brussels. I did not expect this process to proceed at such speed. And none of it bodes well.
In the private sector, senior executives are evaluated on the basis of key performance indicators. Depending on outcomes, they are promoted, dismissed, or retained. There is nothing controversial about this—they are, after all, hired to do a specific job and are held to account for it. The Commission, by contrast, now seeks an expanded budget and authority over it, without being subject to either democratic scrutiny or, just as troublingly, substantive review. No one evaluates whether it is, in fact, fulfilling the obligations conferred upon it by the Treaties.
Let us take three uncontroversial performance criteria, drawn directly from the Treaties, by which the Commission’s record may be judged: effectiveness in external trade, efficiency in the redistribution of budgetary resources, and transparency. The performance of both the current and previous commissions under these headings is, to be charitable, debatable.
On trade: the Commission has negotiated agreements with Mercosur and Ukraine that are manifestly harmful to European farmers, to food security, and—though temporarily advantageous to German and French industry—strategically short-sighted. Conversely, the Commission has proven entirely unable to reach any meaningful understanding with Donald Trump on tariffs.
On budgetary allocation: it is indisputable that the Commission behaved in a politicised, prejudicial, and opaque manner in its disbursement of funds under the Recovery and Resilience Facility. Hungary and, under its previous government, Poland, were denied their rightful share, not due to any procedural failure, but because Brussels disapproved of the democratic choices made by their electorates. In Poland’s case, the funds were unlocked without a single legislative change [after Donald Tusk’s left-liberal Civic Platform formed a coalition government]; it was sufficient that the Commission’s preferred party won the 2023 elections.
And most egregiously: transparency. Despite a ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union, President von der Leyen continues to withhold the text messages she exchanged with the CEO of Pfizer regarding the COVID-19 vaccines. She will likely never release them—because she feels entirely unaccountable.
In summary, were this Commission subject to the disciplines of the market, it would not be entrusted with a larger budget, let alone greater autonomy.
