RMDSZ (the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania) is the main political force representing the country’s one million-strong ethnic Hungarian community. Against all odds, the party managed to retain its two seats in Brussels. Its MEPs, sitting in the centrist European People’s Party, now find themselves preparing for even harder battles with the MEPs of the anti-Hungarian AUR (Alliance for the Union of Romanians) which enters the European Parliament for the first time. We sat down with Loránt Vincze, one of the two MEPs to ask him about the implications of the election and how he sees the future of minority representation in Brussels.
First of all, let me congratulate you on your two seats. The last polls, however, showed that the RMDSZ could have fallen out of the Parliament, fortunately, this did not happen. Were you afraid of this possibility? What was it that mobilized the voters in the end?
RMDSZ is the political representation of the Hungarian community in Romania, and as such, the 5% threshold is practically the border between political existence and non-existence. On this threshold depends the community’s representation at local, national, and European level. Hungarians are 6.3% of Romania’s total population, so getting a corresponding share of the vote is obviously a major challenge every time.
Opinion polls, however, must always be treated in their proper place. That’s because the 6% Hungarian share is not usually reflected in a separate, appropriate sample, so the results we see from opinion polls are usually not in line with reality. Moreover, a margin of error of 2 or 3% can easily affect the results of a party of 5%. It makes all the difference whether we are above or below the threshold.
But on the other hand, the election campaign really managed to reach out to Hungarians in Romania. They understood the stakes of the elections and, as always, they have chosen wisely and soberly. In fact, RMDSZ received more than 100,000 more votes than five years ago. The national turnout was only 1% higher this year than in 2019, so in contrast, a much higher proportion of Hungarians voted for the RMDSZ-led joint Hungarian list. This proves the legitimacy and the need to appeal to an ethnic community through a political entity with its distinct, specific identity.
Besides ‘political existence,’ what is the biggest political challenge facing the Hungarian community?
Most people are interested in two things, and this is also the case for Hungarians in Romania. On the one hand, every election is about improving living standards, that is, making decisions that improve the economic conditions of families, communities, and municipalities. The other element, which is strongly linked to identity, is the preservation of the mother tongue and culture, which has a significant political dimension.
There is also no question that belonging to the European Union is vital. There is no alternative. I used to say that Hungarians in Transylvania belonged to Europe even when they were on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The fact that we have become part of the EU is a technical, legal, and economic matter, but our Europeanism is even more significant and valuable for us.
It is also clear that not everything has gone right with EU decisions in recent years, and that these need to change. We need to do more for families, communities, traditional values, European culture, and competitiveness. Decisions cannot be taken in the way that has happened in recent years, where a progressive-liberal-green majority has been able to virtually determine the discourse on the EU agenda. And I think that the composition of the European Parliament has changed in the sense that this former majority is no longer so clear-cut.
Talking about minority protection, does the EU provide enough support for preserving your language and culture?
Unfortunately not. Two years ago the European Commission simply swept the Minority SafePack initiative off the table, which called for protection and support for indigenous ethnic minority communities as part of Europe’s linguistic and cultural diversity. These communities—and we are talking about 40-50 million people—now feel cheated and betrayed by the EU, which has so far refused to take them into account. Not the entire EU is at fault, to be frank, because there was a three-quarters majority in Parliament in support of it. And yet, the Commission still rejected the initiative, despite the fact that Ursula von der Leyen herself promised five years ago that she would support it. This still leaves the EU with a heavy debt to indigenous linguistic minorities.
What about the other citizens’ initiative, aiming to extend the EU’s cohesion policy to ethnic minority areas?
Having seen the fate of the Minority SafePack, the organizers have not yet submitted the signatures and are currently waiting for the new Commission to be formed. I assume they will submit theirs early next year and then it’s up to the Commission to decide. In the meantime, our own, the Minority SafePack is still before the European Court of Justice, from which we await the final decision on whether the Commission’s refusal was right or wrong.
Romania has two more high-stakes elections this year, parliamentary and presidential. Many fear the surge of the controversial AUR party, whose campaign also uses explicitly anti-Hungarian rhetoric. Is there a chance that the AUR might be elected to government, and if so, what would be the consequences for the community?
I would never underestimate the uncertainty of Romanian politics. For the moment, all political formations rule out the possibility of entering into a coalition with the AUR, but there have been examples of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) entering into a coalition with similar extremists. So I think it is up to the ballot box to prove that Romanian society completely rejects this. Unfortunately, the current EP elections show that almost 20% of the country’s population is buying this rhetoric, because the combined votes of the AUR and SOS Romania are roughly there, and they ended up winning eight seats in the European Parliament.
Therefore, every effort should be made to show that the AUR is an anti-democratic, anti-European, and xenophobic party that has no interest in promoting the common good. And this must also be said here in Europe, because I fear that the AUR could acquire a more presentable image back home if it were to join a more moderate group here, such as the ECR. If it were to join with government parties, such as Meloni’s party, who is now an accepted European leader even for the center, what would be the obstacle to it becoming a governing factor in Romania? So these scenarios must be prevented because they are very difficult to manage in hindsight.
What impact do you expect from AUR’s presence in the European Parliament?
It depends on which group they will join and how much weight they will have in the Parliament. If they remain non-attached, they would have a very limited position and resources. If they will be members of a political group, the question is which group and who else is willing to collaborate with them.
One thing is for sure, though, eight people can be pretty loud in the European Parliament. They are, for example, notorious in this country for disrupting parliamentary sittings, abusing other MPs, and openly inciting hatred against Hungarians. They have talked about driving Hungarians from their homeland, and about Romanian soldiers trampling on the steps of the Hungarian Parliament, for instance, and they have said these things openly in the Romanian Parliament. I think we can expect similar things in the European Parliament. Thank God, the house rules are stricter here, and we will also be working to respond to these attacks. But, again, it is bad enough that 20% of the population in Romania responded positively to this inciting, hateful discourse.
In Romania, the AUR’s explicit anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian expressions are well known. I’m talking about, for example, Senator Șoșoacă’s draft bill on the annexation of five Ukrainian territories. Yet the ECR is considering the party, despite claiming to be one of the most pro-Ukrainian groups in Brussels. How can these two things be compatible?
Well, I wish the ECR group a lot of wisdom and common sense to recognize in time who are the people they are thinking about admitting. A few years ago, this party regularly made openly anti-Semitic statements. Since then it has tried to whitewash itself with Israeli relations, but we know that it has not been enough time for this party to completely shed that kind of attitude. Meanwhile, its massive hatred of Hungarians has only grown. And their support for Russia is not just in statements, but also in frequent participation in events at the Russian Embassy in Bucharest. Last week, Senator Șoșoacă was merrily having his photo taken with the Russian envoy, and there are all sorts of reports about the party’s Russian funding.
So that is why I say that I would be very careful if I were in the shoes of my colleagues in ECR. I hope that they do not invite trouble into their group, because these people are certainly not interested in making Europe stronger. Legitimizing the AUR in Brussels wouldn’t do any good for Romania, Ukraine, or Europe.
