A week could be a very long time in Polish politics as progressive forces unite to challenge the eight-year dominance of the conservative Law and Justice Party (PiS) in high-stakes parliamentary elections scheduled for Sunday, October 15th.
While Warsaw has been a thorn in the side of Eurocrats for years, the powers that be are pulling out all the stops to secure victory for Brussels’ favoured candidate Donald Tusk and his Civic Coalition party (KO). This comes as PiS faces an additional challenge from NATO-critical populists in the form of the Konfederacja party, which has gained significant support from the younger generation on the right.
So, is the end nigh for conservative rule in Warsaw, or is PiS just facing a minor speed bump ahead of a wider shift to the right at the European level? To get insight into this and broader issues in Polish politics, The European Conservative spoke to Sébastien Meuwissen, communications director of the conservative Polish think-tank Ordo Iuris, less than a week before polling day.
In the anglophone press, this campaign is being portrayed rather simply as one between an increasingly authoritarian conservative government versus a progressive opposition. What does this narrative miss regarding on-the-ground realities in Poland at the moment?
Talking about authoritarianism in Poland seems contradictory in my opinion. First of all, if we look at authoritarianism from the point of view of freedom of speech, it would imply that this freedom is being restricted or violated.
If you look at the Polish media landscape, for example, similar to that of Hungary, there exists an opposition that is vehemently anti-government yet which has complete freedom of expression. This goes further than in Western Europe—perhaps too far with personal attacks and insults.
For authoritarianism to spread in Poland, it would have to exist here in the first place. People disagreeing with the government are free to do so in an infinite amount of ways over social media. It is true to some extent that public radio and TV have been taken over by government sympathisers, but this is virtually the only mainstream platform that is on the side of the government. The remaining privatised media are against the government or aggressively clash with PiS.
So, if our readers know anything about this election, they would understand it as a race between the ruling conservative party (PiS), the main liberal opposition party (KO), with the right-wing populist Konfederacja party in the mix. Is this the full picture?
In short, you have PiS, a party which has dominated Poland since EU accession and which is broadly Christian Democratic in the traditional sense of the term, with the ‘Christian’ bit still intact. This is not like most equivalents in other European countries, where the Christian element has been forgotten since the 90s. I would not say PiS is simply a Catholic traditionalist party. It still is to a large extent, but it is a party with a large tent. They have conservatives, liberals, and centrists, with pro-EU conservatives being the largest component.
Then you have KO, the largest component of the progressive alliance led by Donald Tusk, the former head of the European Council. This is the traditional rival of PiS, and it is likely to finish second in this election, which could allow it to form an alliance with smaller parties. KO has similar Christian Democratic origins but leans to the left when it comes to social issues (LGBT issues, abortion, etc.) and positions itself on the left side of Polish politics.
Whoever comes third is the most crucial component of this election, deemed by some to be the most important since 1989.
This third place could go to Konfederacja, an association of libertarians, nationalists, and monarchists firmly to the right of PiS. It is expected to get roughly 10% of the vote.
Then you have the Left (Lewica), the easiest to describe, a traditional socialist party with a strong pro-abortion, pro-LGBT message, which should also get 10% of the vote.
Finally, you have the most important actor in this race, the so-called Third Way (Trzecia Droga). This is a coalition of the agrarian party, which ruled with the liberals between 2007 and 2015, and Poland 2050, which was founded by former TV star Szymon Hołownia and which can be classified as centrist.
Whether the Third Way can reach the 8% needed for parliamentary representation remains to be seen, but it may dictate whether PiS secures a new term. With Third Way in the parliament, a third PiS coalition is practically impossible.
An accusation often put forward by PiS is election interference by Brussels in favour of Tusk. Is this a legitimate claim, and could you give examples?
Yes. If we talk about the EU mainstream (EPP, S&D, and Renew), which is a conglomerate of ex-Christian Democratic and left-wing parties who represent the Berlin-Paris axis, there is no doubt that they favour Donald Tusk over PiS.
The main reason they sympathise with Tusk is because of what we witnessed during Tusk’s time in government, where he didn’t go against the will of Germany in geopolitical matters, such as the building of the disastrous NordStream 2 pipeline.
Tusk sees himself as a representative of this political mainstream and not of Poland as a nation-state, and he wishes to go all the way with the federalisation of the EU.
Another thing that could be observed is Tusk’s time leading the European Council, which culminated in Poland being the only country against the renewal of his mandate. Poland—his own country.
From the political right in Poland, PiS is getting hit hard by Konfederacja for being too pro-NATO and pro-migration. Is there much validity to these claims?
Obviously, there is some truth to Konfederacja’s criticisms of the government; otherwise, it wouldn’t have such good ratings at 10% in the polls.
Konfederacja was the only party with an alternative narrative on COVID, Ukraine, and the Polish government’s unconditional support for Ukrainian refugees and geostrategic interests. When the invasion occurred, this initial support for Ukraine transcended party lines, where Poles spoke as one voice beyond divisions to say we were on the side of Ukraine, with the exception of Konfederacja.
From the beginning, Konfederacja was against this one-sided approach and emphasised that the war wasn’t as simple as that, and Ukraine remained a state with its own interests and a potential economic rival to Poland.
Konfederacja also opposed compulsory vaccination and the idea of lockdowns, the only party in the Polish political landscape to do so. They have been vindicated on both issues. The government of Zelensky showed a short-sighted approach recently that was eye-opening to many Poles, leading Konfederacja to say, “I told you so.”
I think many people were shocked by how soon this turn in public opinion with regards to Ukraine came about.
Let’s imagine the next few weeks, months, years after Sunday’s elections. What happens in the event of a PiS defeat and a KO-led progressive government? Will this be chaotic, and will PiS’s institutional control of the state exist beyond losing the election?
Chaotic is a good word for it, as (in that scenario) we would have a scenario of a PiS president and a government from a rival party. It would remain that way until the next presidential election, which could then see the election of the current Warsaw mayor, Rafał Trzaskowski, famous for his LGBT activism.
With regards to the institutional control by PiS, my personal opinion is that the bigger threat is a civilisational one. The KO coalition will almost certainly radicalise its narrative on social issues such as abortion. For example, Tusk has said those who oppose abortion up until 12 weeks cannot be on his party’s ticket.
KO is far from homogenous but previously had a conservative pro-life wing. Now, Tusk and his team have a tendency to go with the radical left on social issues such as transgenderism, which KO hopes to make easier for underage children.
So, long story short, what remains of normality, preserved by Poland against questionable trends in Europe, could be overturned by this election. This would follow the Irish example, where a traditional Catholic, relatively conservative society in the course of two decades changed dramatically, and the establishment even repeated referenda to get the ‘right’ result.
A win for the opposition, especially along with victory in the presidential election, could lead to an Ireland-like scenario where Poland, one of the few countries with a relatively healthy approach to the family, is toppled.
So let’s imagine something perhaps more positive: a right-wing victory. Many conservatives would like to hope that Poland could follow along the Hungarian model, i.e., an institutionally strong conservative state. Is that realistic, and what would be the realistic policies that could be taken to achieve this?
This election is impossible to predict, but let’s say the KO coalition fails and PiS does better than expected, leading to another absolute majority. This is still very possible, in my opinion. The first thing the opposition would claim is that the election was stolen on the grounds of media propaganda or through miscounting.
If this situation stabilises, there are two main scenarios. The first is that PiS goes easier and makes concessions to the EU, like it has on debt agreements, leading to the Commission potentially even greenlighting post-COVID recovery funding to Poland on account of the victory.
The other option is that PiS goes all the way in its slow takeover of the institutions, such as business, media, and the judiciary. However we are not even close to what has occurred in Hungary, where Fidesz is a lot more popular. Fidesz took over more layers of Hungarian society than PiS could even dream of in Poland. I don’t believe for a second that Budapest in Warsaw is in the cards, even if PiS and Fidesz have similar worldviews.
If PiS does win, however, the Visegrád alliance, which has been dormant since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, could revive to the benefit of conservatives in Central Europe.
One of the issues PiS is apparently facing is a lack of younger voters. Is that true, and does that reflect a negative future reality for Polish conservatism?
It is a well-known fact that voters between 18 and 30 don’t vote massively for PiS. I believe that this is driven by cultural factors, with younger voters getting their news from influencers such as YouTubers, which largely explains their voting tendencies.
PiS is widely considered to be an old-fashioned party which brings plusses and minuses. A plus in the sense of being seen as responsible, a minus in the sense of being disconnected from society. Every vote counts the same, regardless of age.
PiS is also mainstream and not seen as fresh as eight years ago, with young voters always thinking of them as a government party. This contributes to Konfederacja’s and the Left’s popularity.
We are told outside of Poland that this election is dominated by migration, Ukraine, and the role of EU/Germany in Polish affairs. What other issues are weighing on the minds of voters?
All of these are important matters, with PiS’ approach rather ambiguous on each of them. Until recently, PiS was totally in support of Ukraine, with any questioning of Poland’s role in the war the equivalent of thoughtcrime.
In the space of a few weeks, this situation has changed quite a lot, driven by Kyiv’s recent actions.
On the EU, PiS is against federalisation but has made decisions similar to most western European nations, such as on European debt plans.
It is a similar story with migration. PiS is in its rhetoric strongly against illegal migration, something that it has had success in preventing, but at the same time, it has increased legal migration. There are more and more non-European economic migrants in Poland, something for which the right is criticising PiS, saying that Poland should oppose migration, legal or otherwise.
According to Konfederacja, PiS is playing a double game: it is rhetorically against migration while welcoming economic migrants. In defence of PiS, these migrants are simply doing the jobs Poles are not willing to do.
Where does Polish conservatism see itself in a Europe of rising populism and national conservatism?
In the ears of Western Europeans, populism and national conservatism are bad words. Not so in Poland. I would even say PiS voters embrace the terms as a source of pride, indicating a possibility that there is a way of doing politics differently. Poland is a free European country with people from any background walking freely, and the idea that Poland is crippled by its communist legacy is fading away.
A significant part of PiS is happy with Western living standards but not willing to make the same mistake when it comes to migration. If the price to pay for not having the same level of street crime as Paris is having a populist government, then Poland should go for it.
Poland wants to be like the West, but not at any price. We don’t want no-go zones, which don’t yet exist in Warsaw but could very easily occur if a passive government comes in.
Do Polish conservatives view Western liberalism as failing?
Definitely. I gave the example of migration, but it goes beyond that. From Spain to Sweden, there are many red-flag issues for us—non-European migration and sexualisation of children in particular.
Most Poles, and especially us at Ordo Iuris, oppose the sexualisation of children, such as in some German or Belgian textbooks, not to mention the transgender madness, which is still not accepted within Polish society. These topics are perceived as evidence to Polish conservatives that western liberalism is failing.
