The European Union is once again turning to public money to prop up its energy transition strategy—this time beyond its borders. With €1.5 million allocated from the Horizon Europe programme, Brussels will fund the two-year EnergyTran project, an initiative aimed at strengthening collaboration between researchers from Europe and Latin America in the field of energy.
The stated goal is to develop academic and scientific networks to jointly analyze technologies, environmental impacts, and the social consequences of the green energy model.
EnergyTran is promoted by the Organization of Ibero-American States (OEI) and brings together eleven universities and research centers from six countries—Spain, Portugal, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Costa Rica—around an apparently noble idea: that Europe and Latin America are “complementary regions” in this process.
Ana Capilla, OEI’s Director General for Higher Education and Science, puts it this way: The Old Continent possesses the technology, while Latin America has the resources—from the lithium triangle formed by Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile to the region’s potential for green hydrogen production.
But this alleged complementarity raises questions that the project does not fully address. Is Europe genuinely interested in equitable development with Latin American countries, or is it simply seeking to secure access to strategic raw materials for an energy transition that continues to deliver unclear results at home?
If we look at repeated statements from the Commission about the need to secure supply chains—a logical concern—but applied to the climate agenda, this may be one strategy to achieve control over them: expanding the agenda to convince others of the need to access and control certain resources that might otherwise be harder to reach (especially in competition with China or the United States).
The idea that the energy transition will be a driver of social justice and mutual prosperity faces a harsher reality. The EU itself is struggling to sustain the model it promotes, with clear signs of fatigue: high costs for families, supply issues, and growing social resistance in member states. Nevertheless, rather than rethinking its priorities, Brussels continues to push the internationalization of its green agenda.
The project includes indicators to assess environmental impacts, especially in sensitive areas such as the Andean salt flats, where lithium extraction may threaten aquifers and fragile ecosystems. It also aims to address the social dimension of the transition, paying attention to local communities and the “gender gap” in the energy sector.
The OEI insists that one of its aims is to prevent Latin America from once again being relegated to the role of mere raw material provider. But historical patterns of dependence and extraction remain very much alive. The creation of processing plants and the sale of finished products like batteries are mentioned as aspirations, though without guarantees that this part of the value chain will actually remain in the region. Especially at a time when the United States is pushing to resume domestic production and Europe is calling for industrial sovereignty, now that the danger is at its doorstep.
Perhaps the biggest beneficiary here is China, since Beijing is the only country that can invest in Latin America to implement production systems for the various green technology supply chains, from batteries to solar panels.
The upcoming COP in Belém (Brazil) symbolizes environmental awareness, but in practice, none of its champions apply it. Once again, Europe is betting on financing abroad what it has yet to resolve at home.
