New research conducted in 15 countries by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)—the EU’s oldest and most prestigious foreign policy think tank—revealed deep divisions in public opinion between Europeans and Ukrainians about some of the primary questions related to the war, including the perceived responsibility of the European Union.
The report, published on Wednesday, July 3rd, concludes the findings of detailed opinion polls carried out with the involvement of nearly 20,000 respondents from 12 EU member states (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden), as well as non-EU countries Switzerland, the UK, and Ukraine.
Among the report’s primary conclusions, the authors highlight that “lurking beneath the appearance of unity is a major divide” between Ukraine and Europe on how this war is supposed to end, and what the objective of Western support truly is. As they summarize:
While Ukrainians want more weapons and ammunition to help them win the war, most Europeans want to give Ukraine weapons and ammunition in order to put Kyiv in a better negotiating position to end the war.
‘Disconnected’ from reality
There are two terms the report uses to describe Ukrainians’ prevailing attitude towards the war: “resilience” and “political disconnection.” Ukrainians are not only determined to keep fighting but a clear majority—58% to 70%, depending on increased arms deliveries in the future—firmly believe in the country’s eventual victory, defined as regaining all of the lost territory and holding on to the sovereignty and freedom to fulfill Western integration.
In contrast, Europeans are “strongly skeptical” of Kyiv’s ability to win the war, the report notes. Only 15% of all respondents from the 15 countries (Ukraine included) believe the war would end with Ukraine winning, fewer than those who said we are heading to a Russian victory (17%). However, most respondents (40%) are convinced that the most likely outcome is a “compromise settlement” between Kyiv and Moscow.
Over a third (35%) of Ukrainians also believe that Kyiv’s victory is within grasp and would happen within a year, while most respondents in all the other surveyed countries think a longer timeline of up to 5 years is more likely.
The fact the country held out for so long, as well as the West’s continued political commitment to their cause, underpins Ukrainians’ belief that they can win—which is not necessarily a constructive thing, the report notes. “The flipside of this [belief in eventual victory] may be that they are not yet ready to consider major compromises to bring the war to a conclusion,” the document writes.
To demonstrate, the report points out that 71% of Ukrainian respondents would refuse an offer to give up the occupied territories in exchange for immediate NATO membership. However, when forced to choose between the two, nearly twice as many of them would rather choose Euro-Atlantic integration (45%) than regain their territories at the cost of neutrality (26%).
On the other hand, Europeans not only increasingly believe that a settlement is the only realistic option, but a plurality in most countries (37% on average) also think that Europe’s responsibility is to push Kyiv into negotiations, slightly more than those who think Europe should support Ukraine as long as it takes to win (36%).
It is worth noting that the difference would probably be much higher if all EU countries were surveyed. The last ECFR survey to focus on similar themes back in January included others like Romania, Hungary, and Austria but not the famously anti-Russian Estonia, and found that on average, 41% of Europeans want peace negotiations and only 31% would rather continue supporting Ukraine indefinitely.
Unsurprisingly, European public opinion is against the stated goals of the continent’s political elite both in Brussels and in most capitals—but is in line with what Hungary stands for, currently holding the EU Council’s rotating presidency. Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán traveled to Kyiv on Tuesday to meet with President Zelensky and offered his help in organizing another peace conference before the end of the year, while also suggesting a ceasefire to help “speed up” the negotiations.
The ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ of Europe
Naturally, there are major differences between the surveyed EU countries too, with three separate groups emerging from the data.
There is the so-called “Peace camp” or the “doves” (Italy, Greece, Bulgaria) where citizens are opposed to continued arms deliveries and want Europe to press for peace negotiations as soon as possible. On the other side, you find the “justice camp” or the “hawks” (Poland, Sweden, Portugal, Estonia, and the UK) who want Ukraine to defeat Russia above all. And then, there are the “swing states” or “in-betweeners” (Germany, France, Spain, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) where neither group prevailed.
These camps can also be identified with regard to French President Emanuel Macron’s controversial suggestion that Europe should send fighting troops to Ukraine. 26% of Swedes and 22% of Estonians support the idea in contrast to just 5% of Bulgarians and 4% of Greeks on the lower end of the spectrum, while seven in ten of Macron’s own voters firmly reject it in France.
Public opinion has not changed much in these countries since the January survey: “Hawks are still hawks, doves are still doves, and in-betweeners remain divided,” the report notes. Nonetheless, the researchers did register some change in the “swing states” particularly, which could serve as an indication of an underlying pan-European trend—especially given that the largest EU countries (and therefore drivers of EU policy) belong in this camp—showing a gradual but steady increase of ‘doves’ relative to ‘hawks’ within the population.
In France, for instance, more people wanted Europe to push for negotiations (36%) instead of supporting Ukraine until it wins (30%), which is the opposite of what was found half a year ago (30% and 35%, respectively). In Germany and Italy, the ‘doves’ were the biggest group back in January and have grown since, while Spain’s relative hawkish dominance is on a knife’s edge (31% pro-fight vs 30% pro-negotiations).
EU membership as a ‘reward’
The other major scope of the study was the question of Ukraine’s EU accession process, and the researchers have found glaring differences between Ukrainians and Europeans here as well. While Ukrainians think they should be given membership in the EU and NATO to mark their victory, “as a recognition of their bravery,” most Europeans see the outcome of this discussion as part of the eventual settlement with Russia.
As expected, the plurality in ‘hawkish’ countries as well as the Netherlands and Spain support Ukraine’s EU membership, while the peace camp and in-betweeners, like Germany and Czechia, are more skeptical about whether Ukraine’s EU accession was “a good idea,” as the poll put it. The Germans are the most likely to reject Ukraine’s EU accession (54%) and Portugal was found to be most supportive of it (59%).
In every surveyed country, those who think it is a good idea to admit Kyiv into the EU say that it is because Ukraine culturally belongs to Europe, that it would help put an end to the war, and that it would strengthen the bloc’s global position. In contrast, the other camp argues that Ukraine is too corrupt to be an EU member state, its membership would make Europe less secure, and its integration would be too costly for European taxpayers to bear.
It is not a coincidence that respondents brought up the corruption argument more frequently than anything else. On July 2nd, it was revealed that NATO allies are preparing to include a clause in the upcoming Washington summit’s final resolution requesting “additional steps” from Kyiv in terms of combating corruption before the country’s membership bid can progress any further.
