As France prepares to enter an intense period of elections—municipal in 2026, legislative and presidential in 2027—the way French voters think about politics is starting to change, with opposition to the far-left, particularly La France Insoumise (LFI), now outweighing the long-standing desire to block the right-wing Rassemblement National (RN). Is the so-called ‘republican front’ a thing of the past?
A poll conducted by the regional press reveals that nearly 60% of French people are prepared, in the upcoming municipal elections to be held in spring 2026, to vote for a candidate who is not on their side if it means preventing a victory for Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s LFI. It should be noted that both the Socialist Party and Emmanuel Macron’s Renaissance party are equally unpopular, with 46% of French people willing to block the election of a candidate from their ranks. However, in a new development, only 44% are willing to do the same to block the RN.
During the last legislative elections in July 2024, the ‘Republican front’ reflex was still strong, depriving the RN of a majority in the National Assembly, even though it came out on top in the elections with 11 million voters, making it the leading party in France. The multitude of bizarre alliances formed at the time—between the Left and the centre, but also between the centre-right and the far-left in some constituencies—resulted in an ungovernable Assembly, devoid of any majority, which has plunged the country into stagnation for months. It would seem that the resulting chaos has served as a lesson to voters, who do not intend to repeat the same mistakes in the next elections.
At the local level, blocking LFI is not a merely symbolic choice. In some municipalities, the alliance between the far-left and sectarian Islam has long been an open secret. Lists with a militant Islamist agenda are running with the support of the Left to govern medium-sized towns, particularly in the suburbs around Paris or in northern France, while LFI mayors are openly courting the Muslim vote to gain power. The anti-LFI barrier is therefore akin to a rejection of the Islamisation of the local political landscape.
For the French, the spring 2026 election is seen as a test before the major elections of 2027. Which alliances succeed locally—and which fail—will be closely watched as parties adjust their strategies for the presidential race and, above all, the legislative elections, where local dynamics also matter.
On the Right, polls confirm the erosion of the ‘republican front’: two-thirds of voters surveyed are in favour of an alliance between Les Républicains (LR) and the RN for both the municipal and legislative elections.
On the Left, the situation is more complex. While the tradition of unity is strong, it now tends to be between socialists, greens, and communists, but without LFI, as is the case in Paris, where a joint candidacy is being formed between the three political groups, starting in the first round. The case of Paris should be closely monitored. On Tuesday, December 16th, representatives of the three parties reached an agreement after laborious negotiations on the terms of an alliance. Until now, the greens had always fielded their own candidate.
If the alliance comes to fruition, it could enable the capital to remain in the hands of the Left, despite the disaster of Anne Hidalgo’s two terms in office. The remaining question is who will lead it. If it works, such an alliance is sure to inspire left-wing parties to put forward a single candidate for the presidential elections who is more appealing than Jean-Luc Mélenchon. If he came third in 2022, he is now unanimously considered a turn-off.
