Without a degree in political philosophy, the subject matter Conservative Critique of Liberal Conservative Obligations by Daniel Pitt could be hard going. I am such a person, one without such training, but nevertheless I found this an engaging and stimulating read.
The author, who specialises in understanding the Conservative Party, the relationship and tensions between conservatism and liberalism, and the British constitution, teaches in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Sheffield and is an associate fellow at the University of Hull where his doctoral work was supervised by Conservative peer Lord Norton of Louth. Previously, he was supervised for his MA in political philosophy at Buckingham University by Sir Roger Scruton and Dr. Samuel Hughes. As such, he has been well formed in conservative thought. Before delving into his writing, I find these facts alone intriguing and marvel at his survival, to date, in the socialist cesspit into which British higher education has sunk.
My interpretation of this short book is that it explores what it is that makes a state, in terms of why the people who live within the boundaries of that jurisdiction feel any obligations towards it. The question posed by the author is: ‘Why do people accept to be bound by the results of a democratic election, or by the state and its laws, or by the limitations embodied within a public office?’
Towards that end, the first chapter covers consent theory and investigates the notion of political authority. With reference to the United Kingdom, Pitt nicely juxtaposes the concepts of power and authority by explaining that, while the monarch has ultimate authority, he lacks the power that resides with the prime minister, whose ability to exercise that power comes from the monarch’s authority. While not one of the author’s intentions, this is surely a point worth pondering by aspiring republicans who would like to see an American style presidential system, where both power and authority rest in a single figure. The people of a country mainly respond to those in power because they have authority to exercise that power. But we do not have to do much searching to find examples of modern states in which power is exercised by power holders regardless of the extent to which the people recognise their authority.
The contractarian view of obligations towards the state is explored by Pitt. The two main protagonists are Hobbes and Locke, who view the social contract between state and citizen as a voluntary agreement. It was Hobbes who coined the phrase ‘nasty, brutish, and short’ to describe what life would be like without such a contract. Locke’s variation on the social contract was that it existed through some elements that were explicit, but also identifiable through some less tangible features for which Pitt gives examples.
Objections to the contractarian view of Hobbes and Locke were expressed by Burke and Hume. The former expressed the notion of a ‘primordial contract,’ which is really a partnership between the members who form the body of the state, a partnership across generations which includes ancestors, those living, and those yet to be born. Hume considered the notion of a social contract based on explicit consent to be absurd, as the vast majority of citizens never formally express such consent. Ironically, in present day British society, the only people who expressly offer their consent are immigrants who seek citizenship through the Oath of Allegiance to the monarch. However, the fact that most British citizens never express such consent does not lessen their legal obligations.
Of course, such obligations to a state are not evenly distributed across the population. People with the means to do so can choose, easily, to leave one state and reside in another. Poorer people find this less easy. Some states prevent their citizens from leaving to pursue their dreams elsewhere such as was the case in former East Germany. I am extrapolating beyond the arguments raised by Pitt, but these considerations are relevant to Goodhart’s arguments about ‘somewheres’ and ‘anywheres.’ They surely, also, have relevance to the mass migration we see, legal and illegal, from less developed to more developed areas of the world. Obligations to states, then, may be maintained or eroded by standards of living.
Pitt too briefly covers anarchist objections to the idea of the social contract. Anarchists believe in constructing a society without a state. I suppose I was disappointed that the author did not do a demolition job on anarchy, which appears quite incompatible with the reality of human nature. Anarchy, it seems to me, is perfect until someone breaks into your shed and steals your tools.
The theory of just institutions, usually attributed to Rawls, offers another explanation for the relationship between states and citizens. Under the auspices of this theory, citizens consent to the laws and constraints of the state because the state and its components are just. But many states are relatively just, so the question arises as to what makes citizens identify more with one state than another, as is mostly the case. Pitt addresses this nicely by asking why the citizens of, for example, Canada identify more with other Canadian citizens living thousands of miles from them rather than citizens of the United States, to whom they may live in closer proximity, separated only by a political border.
Finally, Pitt considers the distinction between nation and state, the former being based on social identity and the latter being based on laws. The thorny subject of nationalism comes to mind immediately upon embarking on this section and, indeed, the author offers a distinction between patriotism and nationalism. The former is an expression of loyalty by citizens while the latter is based on hostility to strangers. Again, I would dearly like to have seen the author take a swipe at Scottish Nationalism. He does not, but it seems to me (a non-nationalist Scot) that ‘hostility to strangers’ perfectly sums up the narrow-minded attitude and aims of the Scottish nationalist movement.
I cannot do justice here to this densely packed and well-written book. Pitt’s conclusion is that the relationship between citizen and state is best described in terms of political obligations arising as a result of our associations with others who are born in the same place. He modestly acknowledges the limitations to his conclusions and one such limitation that I identify is any consideration of the extent to which others coming to a country and claiming citizenship are ever truly part of that relationship.
Whether you agree with Pitt’s conclusion or have any interest in the philosophical arguments underpinning his case, if you have never considered before what makes us who we are as a country—whatever country that may be—then this book is to be highly recommended.
