Ever since beefing up its foreign policy prerogatives with the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, the EU has accustomed the China hawks among its critics to regular bursts of dismay laced with disbelief. Among this group, both euro-Atlanticists and euro-Gaullists—factions respectively concerned with deeper transatlantic cooperation and independence from NATO—have decried the EU’s tendency to subordinate human rights and geostrategic concerns to the interests of European companies (particularly German ones) doing business in China. Yet as it deals with the country’s aggressive posturing in the context of Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine, fairness demands that both sides cut the bloc some slack. Caught between the imperative of not pushing Xi Jinping into the hands of a desperate Vladimir Putin and that of responding to his regime’s economic abuse and political browbeating, Brussels has no good options on the cards. It must choose between bad and worse.
On 30 March 2023, in a speech in Brussels hosted by a local think-tank, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen outlined the EU’s vision to subject its ties to China to a strategy of “de-risking.” The term contrasts with ‘decoupling’, the American strategy that U.S. President Joe Biden has been pressuring EU leaders to emulate. Von der Leyen and French President Emmanuel Macron begin their China visit today, and the hope is that the two leaders will manage to convey a coherent, unified European posture vis-à-vis Beijing. The EU’s latest strategy on the subject dates to 2018, when the bloc divided its dealings with the country into three roles: a partner to combat climate change, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival. As China progressively abandoned the reformism of the 2000s for a more authoritarian, heavy-handed approach to governance, the second area has crept into the third, leaving the EU’s strategy in need of a reset.
Von der Leyen began her speech with the usual bromides celebrating China’s meteoric rise of the past two decades, yet this time the tone had clearly changed from previous occasions. She went on to highlight that the strategy of reform and opening pursued by Xi Jinping’s predecessors has given way to a more authoritarian form of rule, a more heavy-handed control of the economy, and a worrying military build-up. On China’s relations with Russia, she reflected that the power balance between the two had reversed since the days of the Cold War, with Russia now being clearly the weaker party, desperately seeking to enlist China in its quest to annex Ukraine. On this score, and according to recent reporting, European leaders have joined Joe Biden in warning Chinese officials behind closed doors that a move to supply Russia with weapons would severely damage the West’s ties with Beijing. Next week, von der Leyen is widely expected to discuss China’s peace proposal for the conflict.
There are further reasons to move the EU’s stance vis-à-vis Beijing in a hawkish direction. Although von der Leyen stressed the EU’s ties to China are “the most intricate” they have been in 100 years and left the door open for enhanced cooperation tackling climate change and upholding the principles of the United Nations (UN) charter, the European Commission president quickly moved to spotlight the many strains in the relationship. In 2021, the so-called Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), an accord that would have given European investors in China more legal tools to guard themselves against state abuse, was put on hold by the European Parliament over concerns about the fate of the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang. EU lawmakers, scholars, and journalists have been sanctioned as a result. When it was made public that Vilnius would play host to a de facto Taiwanese embassy, China retaliated ferociously with a battery of sanctions against the host country, Lithuania.
Yet whilst the COVID-19 pandemic proved a catalyst for the EU and its member states to beef up their postures vis-à-vis China, the 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia has somewhat diminished the urgency of that move and even created incentives for the opposite, with EU leaders now frightful that a strategy of cornering China would end up strengthening Sino-Russian common resolve against the West. China has been reportedly eschewing Western sanctions against the sale of military equipment to Russia by playing the grey zone between civilian and military technology, with sales it hopes will dodge scrutiny of high-tech equipment that can also be used on the battlefield. It has also stepped up its purchases of oil and gas from Russia, helping the isolated country make up part of the shortfall in exports caused by Western sanctions. Whilst all EU countries have markedly diminished their dependence on oil and gas from Russia, the latter has grown its trade with China by about 30% over the past year.
How exactly von der Leyen’s new language will pan out in the EU’s posture in the months to come remains to be seen. Whilst a new screening mechanism for foreign investments, including from China, has been operating in the bloc since 2015, the EU is currently working on a updated one to screen outbound investment as a tool to keep technologies sensitive to national security from ending up in the hands of Chinese decisionmakers. Whilst she stressed the necessity to equip the bloc with tools needed to handle an ever-more threatening strategic rival, she made room for the areas in which the two are expected to cooperate. “The story of our relationship,” she stressed, “is not yet written, and it need not be defensive.” Whilst China has deployed a strategy of dividing and conquering in Europe in the past, the opportunity for setting European states against one another could be preempted by hashing out a common posture in statements like this one—if they’re followed by the right policies.
Europe’s China Dilemma
President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen delivers a keynote address on EU-China relations dubbed “De-risking, not de-coupling Europe and China at this watershed moment” at the European Policy Centre (EPC) in Brussels, Belgium, on March 30, 2023. (Photo by Valeria Mongelli / AFP)
Ever since beefing up its foreign policy prerogatives with the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, the EU has accustomed the China hawks among its critics to regular bursts of dismay laced with disbelief. Among this group, both euro-Atlanticists and euro-Gaullists—factions respectively concerned with deeper transatlantic cooperation and independence from NATO—have decried the EU’s tendency to subordinate human rights and geostrategic concerns to the interests of European companies (particularly German ones) doing business in China. Yet as it deals with the country’s aggressive posturing in the context of Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine, fairness demands that both sides cut the bloc some slack. Caught between the imperative of not pushing Xi Jinping into the hands of a desperate Vladimir Putin and that of responding to his regime’s economic abuse and political browbeating, Brussels has no good options on the cards. It must choose between bad and worse.
On 30 March 2023, in a speech in Brussels hosted by a local think-tank, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen outlined the EU’s vision to subject its ties to China to a strategy of “de-risking.” The term contrasts with ‘decoupling’, the American strategy that U.S. President Joe Biden has been pressuring EU leaders to emulate. Von der Leyen and French President Emmanuel Macron begin their China visit today, and the hope is that the two leaders will manage to convey a coherent, unified European posture vis-à-vis Beijing. The EU’s latest strategy on the subject dates to 2018, when the bloc divided its dealings with the country into three roles: a partner to combat climate change, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival. As China progressively abandoned the reformism of the 2000s for a more authoritarian, heavy-handed approach to governance, the second area has crept into the third, leaving the EU’s strategy in need of a reset.
Von der Leyen began her speech with the usual bromides celebrating China’s meteoric rise of the past two decades, yet this time the tone had clearly changed from previous occasions. She went on to highlight that the strategy of reform and opening pursued by Xi Jinping’s predecessors has given way to a more authoritarian form of rule, a more heavy-handed control of the economy, and a worrying military build-up. On China’s relations with Russia, she reflected that the power balance between the two had reversed since the days of the Cold War, with Russia now being clearly the weaker party, desperately seeking to enlist China in its quest to annex Ukraine. On this score, and according to recent reporting, European leaders have joined Joe Biden in warning Chinese officials behind closed doors that a move to supply Russia with weapons would severely damage the West’s ties with Beijing. Next week, von der Leyen is widely expected to discuss China’s peace proposal for the conflict.
There are further reasons to move the EU’s stance vis-à-vis Beijing in a hawkish direction. Although von der Leyen stressed the EU’s ties to China are “the most intricate” they have been in 100 years and left the door open for enhanced cooperation tackling climate change and upholding the principles of the United Nations (UN) charter, the European Commission president quickly moved to spotlight the many strains in the relationship. In 2021, the so-called Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), an accord that would have given European investors in China more legal tools to guard themselves against state abuse, was put on hold by the European Parliament over concerns about the fate of the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang. EU lawmakers, scholars, and journalists have been sanctioned as a result. When it was made public that Vilnius would play host to a de facto Taiwanese embassy, China retaliated ferociously with a battery of sanctions against the host country, Lithuania.
Yet whilst the COVID-19 pandemic proved a catalyst for the EU and its member states to beef up their postures vis-à-vis China, the 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia has somewhat diminished the urgency of that move and even created incentives for the opposite, with EU leaders now frightful that a strategy of cornering China would end up strengthening Sino-Russian common resolve against the West. China has been reportedly eschewing Western sanctions against the sale of military equipment to Russia by playing the grey zone between civilian and military technology, with sales it hopes will dodge scrutiny of high-tech equipment that can also be used on the battlefield. It has also stepped up its purchases of oil and gas from Russia, helping the isolated country make up part of the shortfall in exports caused by Western sanctions. Whilst all EU countries have markedly diminished their dependence on oil and gas from Russia, the latter has grown its trade with China by about 30% over the past year.
How exactly von der Leyen’s new language will pan out in the EU’s posture in the months to come remains to be seen. Whilst a new screening mechanism for foreign investments, including from China, has been operating in the bloc since 2015, the EU is currently working on a updated one to screen outbound investment as a tool to keep technologies sensitive to national security from ending up in the hands of Chinese decisionmakers. Whilst she stressed the necessity to equip the bloc with tools needed to handle an ever-more threatening strategic rival, she made room for the areas in which the two are expected to cooperate. “The story of our relationship,” she stressed, “is not yet written, and it need not be defensive.” Whilst China has deployed a strategy of dividing and conquering in Europe in the past, the opportunity for setting European states against one another could be preempted by hashing out a common posture in statements like this one—if they’re followed by the right policies.
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