Strong ethnic identities are often portrayed as a holdover from an older, irrational, pre-modern era. This is probably why contemporary international conflicts are framed as civilizational or ideological struggles. On this reading, the conflict between, say, Russia and Ukraine cannot be seen for what it really is: a bloody stand-off between Ukrainian nationalism and Russian imperialism. On the contrary, it becomes just one localized instance among many of a global struggle of democracy against authoritarianism, another example being the conflict between Hamas and Israel.
Such moralizing language is not always ill-founded. However, the undeniable ethnic inflections in these conflicts—also evident in the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan—testify to the fact that clashes of zero-sum nationalisms remain the primary cause of interstate wars. Every nation state that has collapsed since the 1990s (Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia) has disintegrated along ethnic lines.
However, the strength of ethnic identities is also indicated by conflicts within states. I will draw on two examples to illustrate how two contemporary civil wars in different parts of the world attest to the continued potency of ethnic identities in the 21st century, despite the fact that the prevailing liberal ethos of our time instructs us to transcend—or, put another way, to ignore—the evident importance of ethnic identity in collective human psychology.
The first example is the bloodiest conflict in the 21st century, which is the war in Tigray, a northern Ethiopian province. Second is the rebellion against Myanmar’s military junta, against which various guerillas, organized along ethnic lines, rose up. After just two years of war in Tigray, more than half a million people lost their lives. Even once the war was over, clashes between the various ethnic groups in that country continued to flare up, this time between the Amhara people and the central government, which they deem dominated by the Oromo people. According to the UN, at least 183 people died in the first month of the conflict. As during the Tigray War, the internet is down, so it is difficult to discern the current situation. By early August, the Amharan militia Fano controlled several cities (including the Amhara capital Bahir Dar) and major airports in the region, according to an analysis by the Wilson Center.
Earlier in the 21st century, the central government was perceived to be dominated by Tigrayans. What is interesting is that the dissatisfaction is expressed by an ethnic group that forms the backbone of Ethiopian statehood and imperial traditions. After all, the state acquired its current territorial form through expansion from the Amharic heartland. To add to this, the centuries-old Solomonic dynasty (of which Haile Selassie, the last Ethiopian emperor, was a member) is Amharic, and the state myths are of Amharic origin. Probably the greatest expert on nationalism, the late Anthony D. Smith, clearly explains this genesis in Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity:
Central Ethiopian national myth, which seeks to demonstrate genealogical and cultural continuity with Judaism and the Jews, and at the same time to explain their divine supersession both by a Hebraic form of Christianity and by the Tigrean-Amharic peoples of Ethiopia.
Ethiopia is not a recent state that coincides with colonial borders, but a centuries-old formation. In fact, it is the only African country that successfully resisted the European colonialists in the 19th century. Since 1991 and the victory in the civil war of the coalition of ethnic guerrilla groups against the centralist communist dictatorship, an ethno-federal structure has been established. According to the constitution, nine ethnic regions have the right to self-determination. Despite such a structure, ethnic conflicts have not vanished. An imperial tradition also exists, primarily associated with the Abyssinian ethnic groups (Amharas and Tigrayans), yet it is precisely these ethnic groups who are now rebelling against the central government. This fact confirms the conclusion of sociologist and anthropologist Pierre Van den Berghe in his book The Ethnic Phenomenon that “even centuries of centralized despotism cannot suppress ethnic sentiment.”
Since there is no ethnic group with a pronounced majority (in fact, none has an overwhelming majority), there is no possibility of smaller ethnic groups being assimilated. In The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism, Israeli historians Azar Gat and Alexander Yakobson write about the destabilizing implications of the absence of any ethnic majority across many African states. One of them is indeed Ethiopia:
In some African countries, there is a dominant people or ethnos that pretty much dominates the state. These include the Amhara and Tigre in Ethiopia (around one-third of the population), the Kikuyu in Kenya (about one-fifth), and the Hausa-Fulani in Nigeria (perhaps one-eighth). Still, none of these dominant ethne comprises a majority of the population (some are not even the largest group), and none is powerful enough to generate processes of ethnic assimilation. On the other hand, their superior position arouses resentment among the other ethnicities within the state. Times have changed since the French state managed to enforce ethnic leveling throughout France, and even then, the French case was unique.
The second example is the Southeast Asian state of Myanmar. Since gaining independence from the British Empire, Myanmar (also known by its colonial name Burma) has been dominated by the majority Bamar people, who make up about two-thirds of the population. Despite the fact that the Bamars make up a fairly large majority, the dispersion of ethnic groups, which form the majority in compact areas and obviously have the possibility of coordinating their actions, makes the stability of the central government hard to attain.
Resistance to the Bamar majority rule especially intensified after the 2021 military coup that overthrew democracy. According to the Council on Foreign Relations from late June 2023, “The junta has already lost large swathes of territory to ethnic militias that have fought longstanding insurgencies in the borderlands as well as to new groups of fighters organized under the People’s Defense Militias that sprung up after the coup.” Brookings estimated in February that the rebels control 40-50% of the country’s territory. It is difficult to get more recent data and analysis on the conflict itself due to the persistent information blockade. However, in late October, an alliance of ethnic militias announced a coordinated attack on a dozen military outposts in the northern Shan State.
Critics might object that neither Ethiopia nor Myanmar are democracies. However, it was democratization that led to the collapse of European multi-ethnic states. The idea that democracy will somehow reconcile ethnic differences seems unfounded in reality. This phenomenon persists regardless of the political system, and different frameworks (consociational or unitary) can exist in both democratic and non-democratic systems. As Van Den Berghe concluded, “attempts to accommodate ethnic diversity within the framework of the ‘modern’ Western-style, liberal democracy have been notably unstable, unsuccessful and costly even when well-intentioned and democratically negotiated.” It is equally difficult to maintain it within a decentralized authoritarian framework. Order and stability are maintained only by a large amount of violence and/or very charismatic personalities, but in the long run, the order is unstable.
The influential American political scientist Ted Robert Gurr, in Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945, specifically refers to, among others, Myanmar and Burma, in the context of the possibility of democratization of multi-ethnic states. Gurr draws the following conclusion:
Democratization of multi-ethnic authoritarian states has more problematic outcomes. The Soviet and Eastern European regimes relaxed coercive restraints on nationalism and intergroup hostilities in circumstances where institutionalized means for their expression and accommodation did not yet exist or were fragile and distrusted. The result is an explosion of communal activism. Similar consequences can be expected to follow from democratization in multi-ethnic Third World autocracies. The most dubious expectation of all is that authoritarian states like Ethiopia, Sudan, Iraq, and Burma might be able to defuse ethnopolitical wars by moving toward democracy.
Far from being a thing of the past or an anachronism in light of ‘the end of history,’ ethnic identities still play an important role in the stability or otherwise of states and orders and remain one of the key sources, whether we like it or not, of perceived legitimacy.
The Power of Ethnic Identity
Members of the ethnic rebel group Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) patrol near Namhsan Township in Myanmar’s northern Shan State on March 9, 2023.
Photo: AFP
Strong ethnic identities are often portrayed as a holdover from an older, irrational, pre-modern era. This is probably why contemporary international conflicts are framed as civilizational or ideological struggles. On this reading, the conflict between, say, Russia and Ukraine cannot be seen for what it really is: a bloody stand-off between Ukrainian nationalism and Russian imperialism. On the contrary, it becomes just one localized instance among many of a global struggle of democracy against authoritarianism, another example being the conflict between Hamas and Israel.
Such moralizing language is not always ill-founded. However, the undeniable ethnic inflections in these conflicts—also evident in the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan—testify to the fact that clashes of zero-sum nationalisms remain the primary cause of interstate wars. Every nation state that has collapsed since the 1990s (Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia) has disintegrated along ethnic lines.
However, the strength of ethnic identities is also indicated by conflicts within states. I will draw on two examples to illustrate how two contemporary civil wars in different parts of the world attest to the continued potency of ethnic identities in the 21st century, despite the fact that the prevailing liberal ethos of our time instructs us to transcend—or, put another way, to ignore—the evident importance of ethnic identity in collective human psychology.
The first example is the bloodiest conflict in the 21st century, which is the war in Tigray, a northern Ethiopian province. Second is the rebellion against Myanmar’s military junta, against which various guerillas, organized along ethnic lines, rose up. After just two years of war in Tigray, more than half a million people lost their lives. Even once the war was over, clashes between the various ethnic groups in that country continued to flare up, this time between the Amhara people and the central government, which they deem dominated by the Oromo people. According to the UN, at least 183 people died in the first month of the conflict. As during the Tigray War, the internet is down, so it is difficult to discern the current situation. By early August, the Amharan militia Fano controlled several cities (including the Amhara capital Bahir Dar) and major airports in the region, according to an analysis by the Wilson Center.
Earlier in the 21st century, the central government was perceived to be dominated by Tigrayans. What is interesting is that the dissatisfaction is expressed by an ethnic group that forms the backbone of Ethiopian statehood and imperial traditions. After all, the state acquired its current territorial form through expansion from the Amharic heartland. To add to this, the centuries-old Solomonic dynasty (of which Haile Selassie, the last Ethiopian emperor, was a member) is Amharic, and the state myths are of Amharic origin. Probably the greatest expert on nationalism, the late Anthony D. Smith, clearly explains this genesis in Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity:
Ethiopia is not a recent state that coincides with colonial borders, but a centuries-old formation. In fact, it is the only African country that successfully resisted the European colonialists in the 19th century. Since 1991 and the victory in the civil war of the coalition of ethnic guerrilla groups against the centralist communist dictatorship, an ethno-federal structure has been established. According to the constitution, nine ethnic regions have the right to self-determination. Despite such a structure, ethnic conflicts have not vanished. An imperial tradition also exists, primarily associated with the Abyssinian ethnic groups (Amharas and Tigrayans), yet it is precisely these ethnic groups who are now rebelling against the central government. This fact confirms the conclusion of sociologist and anthropologist Pierre Van den Berghe in his book The Ethnic Phenomenon that “even centuries of centralized despotism cannot suppress ethnic sentiment.”
Since there is no ethnic group with a pronounced majority (in fact, none has an overwhelming majority), there is no possibility of smaller ethnic groups being assimilated. In The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism, Israeli historians Azar Gat and Alexander Yakobson write about the destabilizing implications of the absence of any ethnic majority across many African states. One of them is indeed Ethiopia:
The second example is the Southeast Asian state of Myanmar. Since gaining independence from the British Empire, Myanmar (also known by its colonial name Burma) has been dominated by the majority Bamar people, who make up about two-thirds of the population. Despite the fact that the Bamars make up a fairly large majority, the dispersion of ethnic groups, which form the majority in compact areas and obviously have the possibility of coordinating their actions, makes the stability of the central government hard to attain.
Resistance to the Bamar majority rule especially intensified after the 2021 military coup that overthrew democracy. According to the Council on Foreign Relations from late June 2023, “The junta has already lost large swathes of territory to ethnic militias that have fought longstanding insurgencies in the borderlands as well as to new groups of fighters organized under the People’s Defense Militias that sprung up after the coup.” Brookings estimated in February that the rebels control 40-50% of the country’s territory. It is difficult to get more recent data and analysis on the conflict itself due to the persistent information blockade. However, in late October, an alliance of ethnic militias announced a coordinated attack on a dozen military outposts in the northern Shan State.
Critics might object that neither Ethiopia nor Myanmar are democracies. However, it was democratization that led to the collapse of European multi-ethnic states. The idea that democracy will somehow reconcile ethnic differences seems unfounded in reality. This phenomenon persists regardless of the political system, and different frameworks (consociational or unitary) can exist in both democratic and non-democratic systems. As Van Den Berghe concluded, “attempts to accommodate ethnic diversity within the framework of the ‘modern’ Western-style, liberal democracy have been notably unstable, unsuccessful and costly even when well-intentioned and democratically negotiated.” It is equally difficult to maintain it within a decentralized authoritarian framework. Order and stability are maintained only by a large amount of violence and/or very charismatic personalities, but in the long run, the order is unstable.
The influential American political scientist Ted Robert Gurr, in Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945, specifically refers to, among others, Myanmar and Burma, in the context of the possibility of democratization of multi-ethnic states. Gurr draws the following conclusion:
Far from being a thing of the past or an anachronism in light of ‘the end of history,’ ethnic identities still play an important role in the stability or otherwise of states and orders and remain one of the key sources, whether we like it or not, of perceived legitimacy.
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