The South African parliamentary elections on 29 May—in which the African National Congress (ANC), the historic party of Nelson Mandela and the end of apartheid, fell short of an absolute majority for the first time with 40% of the vote—have opened up a crisis in South Africa, precisely on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the change of regime.
The ANC, with its 159 MPs in the 400-strong parliament, was far from the majority it needed not only to govern but also to elect the president of the Republic. The ANC had 14 days to elect the president, otherwise the system would be in crisis and new elections would have to be held.
Alliances
The ANC could have made an alliance on the Left, with the far-left Marxist EFF (Economic Freedom Fighters) led by the ANC dissident Julius Malema. The EFF had 44 MPs, which all together would total 203, enough for a majority. However, this would mean more risk for an economy already weakened in recent years, given fears of the withdrawal of European investors in the face of the socialist programme of Malema and his party. He could instead have opted for an agreement with MK (the “Spear of the Nation”) and former president Jacob Nzuma’s 58 MPs; but Nzuma and President Ramaphosa have become radical enemies in political and personal terms, in years of conflict within the ANC itself.
Faced with this double impossibility, and despite some resistance from the cadres and militants of both parties, the ANC and the DA (Democratic Alliance) came to an agreement on the last day of the deadline. DA president John Steenhuisen announced in a long speech that his party would support the re-election of Cyril Ramaphosa for a second term as the fourth president (after Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Nzuma) of post-apartheid South Africa. The agreement for the Government of National Unity (GNU), which enabled the election, was signed by Hellen Zille for the DA and Fikile Mbalula for the ANC.
Ramaphosa can thus be quietly elected in a secret ballot by 283 votes out of 400. The coalition and the future Government of National Unity are led by the ANC (159 seats), the DA (87), and the Inkatha Freedom Party (17). But seven other small parties—out of the eighteen parties with seats in Parliament—have joined the platform in support of the GNU.
In addition to the ANC, DA, and IFP, the Patriotic Alliance, GOOD, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, Vryheidsfront Plus / Freedom Front Plus, United Democratic Movement, Rise Mzansi and Jama-ah—all of which have parliamentary seats—joined the agreement.
At the last minute, Julius Malema presented his candidacy against Ramaphosa, but he only had his party’s 44 votes. Nzuma’s party, uMkhonto weSizwe (MK), did not take part in the debates or the vote.
Challenges
The new government faces several challenges. First, there is a very grim economic and social situation. A third of the labour force is unemployed, crime rates are very high, and the nation is experiencing a progressive loss of economic capacity. Between 2012 and 2023, the country’s GNP fell from $434.4 billion (U.S.) to $377.6 billion. Between 2010 and 2024, per capita income fell from $8,500 to around $6,000.
The causes of these crises are not entirely unique; think of the impact the COVID-19 pandemic had around the world. But the more important pieces are particular to South Africa. The most notable of these has been the progressive divorce between the population and the political-bureaucratic class, causing a general mistrust between citizens and institutions, with almost 80% of those questioned in public opinion surveys saying that the country was heading in the wrong direction.
Above all, after the expectations caused by the end of apartheid, there is a persistence of economic and social inequality, despite the political equality achieved in 1994. On the one hand, the wealth disparity between ethnic groups persists; on the other, there are complaints against a political and techno-bureaucratic class accused of conquering and occupying the state apparatus (‘state capture’) and using it for private interests and lobbying. This was mainly a reflection of the Zuma years, but it has persisted and is what explains the vote, both on the Left and on the Right.
But with all its problems, South Africa remains the continent’s third largest economy (after Egypt and Nigeria): it is the only African country in the G20, and it is a founding member of the BRICS. In 2021, the European Union was the biggest investor in South Africa (around 50%), followed by the United Kingdom with 28% of investments.
In southern Africa, the countries that came out of Portuguese decolonisation, such as Angola and Mozambique, experienced a total socialisation of the means of production and a mass exodus of settlers, followed by long civil wars. In South Africa and Namibia, there were negotiations between the ‘national liberation movements’ and the ‘settlers’ or their descendants, most of whom remained there. There was also continuity in the economic system, with all that entails.
South Africa’s first governments were of ‘national unity,’ the ANC and Mandela sharing power with the De Klerk’s National Party. Now, as a result of the popular vote, there has to be a return to the original 1994 system, which at the time was very important in preventing panic or revenge movements. This is because, despite its flaws, the system has managed to avoid the worst over the last thirty years.
The protest vote against the ANC on the Left, has two expressions: a more ideological line, that of Julius Malema and the EFF, which got close to 10% of the vote; and the line that some call ‘ethno-populist,’ of the Zulus in Natal with Nzuma.
A Troubled Negotiation
As is the case in other African countries—and nowadays in Europe and America, too—the big question for political power is to balance the political equality of universal suffrage with the expectation of greater economic and social equality and equity. If this is difficult in developed areas, where discontent stems from deindustrialisation and uncontrolled immigration—such as Western Europe and parts of the United States—it is even more difficult in a country as unequal, not just in terms of income, but regionally, as South Africa, where around 70% of the population is at or below the poverty line.
Negotiating the composition of the government that President Ramaphosa announced on June 30 was not easy. The understanding of the agreements, signed in a marathon to get Ramaphosa re-elected, was a government based on the proportionality of the major parties—ANC and DA. From what we know of the negotiations, the controversy concerned certain ministries that were considered economically decisive, such as the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Competitivity. According to Johannesburg’s Business Day on 27 June, Ramaphosa offered it to the DA; but, due to internal pressures within the ANC, he withdrew the offer. The ANC is made up of factions and the president has given in to pressure from allied interests and parties. The South African Communist Party (SACP) has also accused the DA of trying to minimise the ANC. Very significantly, the DA wanted economic ministries where it could put its ideas of liberalisation and privatisation into practice.
In an ambiguously friendly letter to Steenhuisen on 25 June, Ramaphosa accused the DA of having compromised the constitution of the GNU:
I believe the DA has jeopardized the foundation of setting up a Government of National Unity by moving the goalposts in your letter of 24 June 2024 to me. I am truly taken aback by how you now want two more portfolios to bring the DA’s portfolios to 8.
The president’s letter went on to accuse the DA of seeming “to want to set up a parallel government that would operate outside the framework and parameters of the Constitution-based method and protocols of running the government of the Republic of South Africa.”
Ramaphosa ended by reaffirming the idea of the proportionality of government seats as part of the popular vote, and reiterated “the need to advance the national interest as operational criteria for the formation of the coalition government.” Finally an agreement was reached. One month after the election, Ramaphosa announced the composition of the new coalition government.
The announced proportionality has apparently not been respected, as in a cabinet of 32 ministers and 43 deputy ministers, 20 went to the ANC, and only six to the DA. Considering the ANC got 40% of the popular vote and the DA 22%, the proportion is far from equitably applicable. The several parties of the coalition received the other six ministries.
Looking at the portfolios, we can see that the critical, political state ministries—like Defence, Foreign Affairs and Finance—stay in the hands of the ANC. But, for example, in Finance, the ANC’s Enoch Godongwana, a man who has good relations both with the business community and trade unions, will have a deputy from DA.
The strategic Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Competition, that increased tension between Ramaphosa and Steenhuisen, was kept by the ANC. Steenhuisen himself assumed the Ministry of Agriculture, a sensitive department in a country where ownership of land is much more than a simple economic issue. According to The Spectator, in 2022 there were 300 attacks on farmers, and 50 white farmers were assassinated, some of them with sadistic violence. At the time, Elon Musk referred to “the slaughter of South African farmers” as a “prelude to genocide.”
The DA also got the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and more jobs for deputy ministers. At the same time, the repartition with small parties gave Cabinet jobs to people as different as Pieter Groenewald, leader of the Afrikaans Freedom Front Plus, who has been described as a “right-wing radical,” and Gayton McKensie of the Patriotic Alliance, a former gang leader who was condemned to 17 years in prison. McKenzie took the Ministry of Sports, Arts and Culture; Groenewald took the Ministry of Correctional Services, responsible for running the South African prison system, with 240 prisons and close to 190,000 inmates.
It is hard to imagine a more inclusive Cabinet, in ideological terms. Also, the Government includes all the ethnic groups of the Rainbow Country. There were, of course, optimistic comments from the business community, describing the new team as a “business-friendly outcome”; but the unions were less sympathetic. And other important questions remain, like foreign policy: until now, the ANC Government has been taking sides with the Palestinians; and it has shown sympathy for Russia’s President Putin. Will the partnership with the DA, clearly more pro-Israel and pro-Ukraine, change this mood? Only time will answer this and the many other questions surrounding the new government.
