Just over a week after Germany’s general election, the shock of the populists’ strong showing remains raw. Under pressure from his own party, Friedrich Merz, the likely next chancellor, has promised a thorough review of the results. “We have won the election, we won them with a clear margin, but our expectations weren’t met,” he admitted after his party won 28.5% of the vote—its second-worst result ever.
One glaring problem is that workers have abandoned the CDU.
“When the previous government loses twenty percentage points and the CDU/CSU only gains four, we must question why people with low incomes, who work hard yet struggle, are hardly found in our electorate,” conceded Dennis Radtke, chair of the CDU‘s Employees’ Association (CDA).
The AfD’s emergence as Germany’s new “workers’ party”—capturing 38% support among laborers—has rattled the establishment for good reasons. Together with the populists’ remarkable performance among younger voters, this represents a seismic shift. For the SPD, which historically emerged as a workers’ party, it is merely the final chapter in a long story of decline. With a dismal 16.4% of votes, it is even unclear whether the party will survive or follow in the footsteps of other social democratic parties that, as in France, have been reduced to insignificance.
The consequences for the CDU are equally severe, particularly in southwest Germany—the engine of the German economy. In Baden-Württemberg, home to German industrial giants like Mercedes and Bosch, the AfD has surged to become the second strongest party. In some regions of this former CDU stronghold, the AfD now dominates, winning significantly more votes than the CDU. In Rastatt, for instance, the AfD captured 39.7% of votes, and in Pforzheim, 29.3%. The magnitude of the CDU’s decline becomes evident when recalling that this is the region where the CDU used to win absolute majorities, and still gained well above 45% in the 2000s. Back in 1976, when it still received nearly 57% of the votes, party leaders didn’t need to analyze voter sentiment—they understood it intuitively and shaped policies accordingly.
Merz’s promise to analyse the result only highlights the party’s disconnection from voters. Voter desires aren’t mysterious. It’s clear that German voters—particularly the 10 million (a quarter of the electorate) who supported the AfD—want change. It’s also the case that the era when established parties could simply swap power between themselves is irrevocably over. Only by clinging together can these two fading parties maintain their grip on power. By pursuing a coalition with the floundering SPD, Merz however demonstrates how trapped he is in the past.
It now appears almost ironic that when he first sought the CDU leadership in 2018, he vowed to cut the AfD’s support in half. After Angela Merkel’s leaden years, Merz was perceived as a rebel and reformer. Having left politics in the late 2000s over differences with Merkel to pursue a private sector career, he was actually supposed to represent a break from past mistakes. That the AfD’s support has doubled rather than halved however demonstrates the spectacular failure of this strategy.
In reality, Merz remains firmly anchored in the establishment. During the election campaign, he promised to close borders upon becoming chancellor, knowing full well that most voters wanted an end to uncontrolled mass migration. He also talked about necessary economic reforms, addressing many voters’ concerns about Germany’s decline—an understandable concern in Baden-Württemberg: Following VW’s radical cuts, Mercedes announced 16,000 job losses, with Bosch shedding thousands more. And despite demographic aging, official unemployment already exceeds 3 million.
Yet, regrettably, a Merz government is unlikely to implement the changes many yearn for. While claiming to want to reduce bureaucracy, Merz paradoxically embraces the EU with its expansive regulatory framework, including its demanding sustainability reporting requirements. His promise of effective border controls already faces credibility challenges, particularly given their inevitable conflict with EU regulations.
“The CDU will continue to pursue green politics” was the aptly titled recent piece in the FAZ newspaper. Indeed, the party appears committed to maintaining Germany’s contentious climate policy, steadfastly pursuing net-zero emissions by 2045. It will further advance the multi-billion euro transition to wind and solar energy sources. A meaningful reassessment of Germany’s nuclear exit, however, remains improbable—despite Germany already shouldering the EU’s highest electricity prices, which constitute a significant competitive disadvantage for the nation.
Working-class scepticism of Merz was well-founded. With net-zero policies, the average German household will pay at least €1,000 for heating by 2027, FAZ has calculated. Is it any surprise workers are abandoning the party?
Populism advances across Germany—not just in eastern states but in its “deep,” western industrial heartland too—because the establishment lacks the courage to implement necessary reforms in economic and migration policies. Merz has highlighted the 1.7 million votes he gained from the SPD and pointed to polls suggesting most Germans prefer a CDU-SPD coalition to other government configurations (and certainly over a CDU coalition with the AfD). But this represents only half the story.
The other half comprises the 10 million citizens who voted for the AfD, arguably representing the future trajectory of German politics, as they exert the essential pressure for change while mainstream politics remains ensnared in conventional groupthink. Yet on critical issues—migration, energy costs, and nuclear power—majority public opinion aligns closely with the AfD’s positions. Most Germans want controlled borders. A majority also thinks Germany’s nuclear phase-out was a mistake. And most voters also want a reform of the Citizen’s Income (“Bürgergeld”) introduced by the old SPD government—the increasingly unsustainable cash payments for people who do not work, seen by many as a disincentive to looking for work.
By demonizing the AfD and maintaining the cordon sanitaire—effectively attempting to permanently exclude populist voters—mainstream parties have not weakened the populists, but rather themselves. But they won’t be able to do politics against a majority forever. It is the establishment’s profound fear of change that has granted the AfD its greatest momentum. If, as Marx famously observed, revolutions are the locomotives of history, then populism has become today’s driving force of disruption. It demands precisely the transformation that the establishment so deeply dreads—yet which society increasingly requires.
Why the Workers Have Abandoned the Establishment
Photo: RALF HIRSCHBERGER / AFP
Just over a week after Germany’s general election, the shock of the populists’ strong showing remains raw. Under pressure from his own party, Friedrich Merz, the likely next chancellor, has promised a thorough review of the results. “We have won the election, we won them with a clear margin, but our expectations weren’t met,” he admitted after his party won 28.5% of the vote—its second-worst result ever.
One glaring problem is that workers have abandoned the CDU.
“When the previous government loses twenty percentage points and the CDU/CSU only gains four, we must question why people with low incomes, who work hard yet struggle, are hardly found in our electorate,” conceded Dennis Radtke, chair of the CDU‘s Employees’ Association (CDA).
The AfD’s emergence as Germany’s new “workers’ party”—capturing 38% support among laborers—has rattled the establishment for good reasons. Together with the populists’ remarkable performance among younger voters, this represents a seismic shift. For the SPD, which historically emerged as a workers’ party, it is merely the final chapter in a long story of decline. With a dismal 16.4% of votes, it is even unclear whether the party will survive or follow in the footsteps of other social democratic parties that, as in France, have been reduced to insignificance.
The consequences for the CDU are equally severe, particularly in southwest Germany—the engine of the German economy. In Baden-Württemberg, home to German industrial giants like Mercedes and Bosch, the AfD has surged to become the second strongest party. In some regions of this former CDU stronghold, the AfD now dominates, winning significantly more votes than the CDU. In Rastatt, for instance, the AfD captured 39.7% of votes, and in Pforzheim, 29.3%. The magnitude of the CDU’s decline becomes evident when recalling that this is the region where the CDU used to win absolute majorities, and still gained well above 45% in the 2000s. Back in 1976, when it still received nearly 57% of the votes, party leaders didn’t need to analyze voter sentiment—they understood it intuitively and shaped policies accordingly.
Merz’s promise to analyse the result only highlights the party’s disconnection from voters. Voter desires aren’t mysterious. It’s clear that German voters—particularly the 10 million (a quarter of the electorate) who supported the AfD—want change. It’s also the case that the era when established parties could simply swap power between themselves is irrevocably over. Only by clinging together can these two fading parties maintain their grip on power. By pursuing a coalition with the floundering SPD, Merz however demonstrates how trapped he is in the past.
It now appears almost ironic that when he first sought the CDU leadership in 2018, he vowed to cut the AfD’s support in half. After Angela Merkel’s leaden years, Merz was perceived as a rebel and reformer. Having left politics in the late 2000s over differences with Merkel to pursue a private sector career, he was actually supposed to represent a break from past mistakes. That the AfD’s support has doubled rather than halved however demonstrates the spectacular failure of this strategy.
In reality, Merz remains firmly anchored in the establishment. During the election campaign, he promised to close borders upon becoming chancellor, knowing full well that most voters wanted an end to uncontrolled mass migration. He also talked about necessary economic reforms, addressing many voters’ concerns about Germany’s decline—an understandable concern in Baden-Württemberg: Following VW’s radical cuts, Mercedes announced 16,000 job losses, with Bosch shedding thousands more. And despite demographic aging, official unemployment already exceeds 3 million.
Yet, regrettably, a Merz government is unlikely to implement the changes many yearn for. While claiming to want to reduce bureaucracy, Merz paradoxically embraces the EU with its expansive regulatory framework, including its demanding sustainability reporting requirements. His promise of effective border controls already faces credibility challenges, particularly given their inevitable conflict with EU regulations.
“The CDU will continue to pursue green politics” was the aptly titled recent piece in the FAZ newspaper. Indeed, the party appears committed to maintaining Germany’s contentious climate policy, steadfastly pursuing net-zero emissions by 2045. It will further advance the multi-billion euro transition to wind and solar energy sources. A meaningful reassessment of Germany’s nuclear exit, however, remains improbable—despite Germany already shouldering the EU’s highest electricity prices, which constitute a significant competitive disadvantage for the nation.
Working-class scepticism of Merz was well-founded. With net-zero policies, the average German household will pay at least €1,000 for heating by 2027, FAZ has calculated. Is it any surprise workers are abandoning the party?
Populism advances across Germany—not just in eastern states but in its “deep,” western industrial heartland too—because the establishment lacks the courage to implement necessary reforms in economic and migration policies. Merz has highlighted the 1.7 million votes he gained from the SPD and pointed to polls suggesting most Germans prefer a CDU-SPD coalition to other government configurations (and certainly over a CDU coalition with the AfD). But this represents only half the story.
The other half comprises the 10 million citizens who voted for the AfD, arguably representing the future trajectory of German politics, as they exert the essential pressure for change while mainstream politics remains ensnared in conventional groupthink. Yet on critical issues—migration, energy costs, and nuclear power—majority public opinion aligns closely with the AfD’s positions. Most Germans want controlled borders. A majority also thinks Germany’s nuclear phase-out was a mistake. And most voters also want a reform of the Citizen’s Income (“Bürgergeld”) introduced by the old SPD government—the increasingly unsustainable cash payments for people who do not work, seen by many as a disincentive to looking for work.
By demonizing the AfD and maintaining the cordon sanitaire—effectively attempting to permanently exclude populist voters—mainstream parties have not weakened the populists, but rather themselves. But they won’t be able to do politics against a majority forever. It is the establishment’s profound fear of change that has granted the AfD its greatest momentum. If, as Marx famously observed, revolutions are the locomotives of history, then populism has become today’s driving force of disruption. It demands precisely the transformation that the establishment so deeply dreads—yet which society increasingly requires.
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