When ‘EU Values’ Suddenly Become Optional 

The EU embarked on a historic and rare course correction this week when the European Commission announced its new Automotive Package. The measures symbolise a significant U-turn away from some of the most punishing aspects of the Green Deal—notably, the 2035 target, which had previously mandated the phase-out of combustion engines across the bloc. 

Initially, the EU had ordered that all new passenger cars and vans should be “zero-emission” by 2035. This would have effectively outlawed combustion engines. The updated scheme revises this from an absolute target to a goal of reducing emissions by 90% compared with 2021 levels, instead giving manufacturers the ability to ‘make up’ the rest through alternative means, like the use of low-carbon steel produced in the European Union or credits linked to the use of synthetic fuels and biofuels. So, from 2035, hybrid and traditional combustion vehicles will continue to be allowed on the European market.

This might seem like a minor rollback (after all, the new measures still place a 90% reduction target on manufacturers), but it is a significant concession to the automotive industry. In particular, Germany and Italy have been lobbying hard for an easing of the stringent Green Deal rules. This change represents a clear shift in priorities, away from dogmatic ideological targets and towards policies that more accurately reflect the realities and restrictions of European industries.

It is also a sign that so-called EU values—in this case, green ideology and the Net Zero agenda—are not always as inflexible as we’ve been led to believe. Sometimes, it seems, these values can be subject to change and revision, especially when enough powerful member states gang up on the Commission over an issue. This also looks set to happen with the EU’s plan to confiscate frozen Russian assets and use them to fund aid for Ukraine. The pressure in this case is coming primarily from Belgium, an unusual candidate for rebellion against the EU. But the majority of the Russian assets are held at Euroclear in Brussels and, as such, Belgium could be held responsible if Russia launched legal action against the bank. Prime Minister Bart De Wever remarked, “This is money from a country with which we are not at war. It would be like breaking into an embassy, taking out all the furniture, and selling it.” Italy, Malta, and Bulgaria have also joined Belgium in speaking out against the EU’s heavy-handed approach to confiscating Russian assets. 

That is why Brussels is now scrambling for a workaround, looking for a more cautious architecture designed to stop Belgium’s financial system from becoming collateral damage. One reassurance on the table is to make the freeze effectively indefinite, so Belgium isn’t repeatedly exposed every time sanctions roll over. Another is a formal, EU-level “risk sharing” package, in which Belgium has demanded “autonomous” guarantees so it isn’t left alone if litigation or retaliation hits Euroclear. The Commission has been working on guarantee/backstop designs to spread that exposure beyond Brussels. In theory, the EU is united on the moral claim that Russia should pay for the war in Ukraine. In practice, it is negotiating around the interests of the member state that would bear the legal and liquidity risk. 

We saw another example of this when it came to the Migration and Asylum Pact, which is due to be implemented in 2026. The scheme essentially forces EU nations to choose between taking in at least 30,000 asylum seekers who have entered the EU and making financial contributions into a “Solidarity Pool.” States would have to pay around €20,000 per non-relocated person, or €600 million in total, for not fulfilling the quota. Despite the large cost, many governments have decided they would rather pay the price than continue accepting asylum seekers. Czechia, Estonia, Croatia, Austria, and Poland have already been granted either full or partial exemption from fulfilling the quota, on the grounds that they have already taken in enough migrants. Hungary, too, has declared that it “will not take a single migrant in, and we will not pay for others’ migrants.” Although the country is technically not eligible for an exemption, it still refuses to participate in the pact. 

Despite the Commission maintaining that a veritable open-borders policy is a fundamental aspect of ‘EU values,’ the bloc is clearly very much divided on the Migration Pact. As a result of this division, the EU has had to soften certain aspects of the policy to make it workable and more palatable to member states. For starters, the very first annual cycle of the pact has been scaled down. Instead of the Commission’s preferred baseline of 30,000 relocations or a €600 million contribution, 2026 will have a quota of 21,000 relocations or a €420 million contribution—because the scheme doesn’t go live until June, meaning that states would have otherwise been subjected to a full year of obligations, rather than just six months’ worth. The pact also allows so-called return hubs to be set up in non-EU countries—something that, just a few months ago, Italy was punished for doing in Albania. 

It is not the case that the EU is beginning to see the error of its way on these issues by itself. Naturally, Brussels remains perfectly happy to punish nations like Hungary when their refusal to toe the line does not directly threaten EU power. Billions in EU funds for Hungary have been frozen or conditioned under rule-of-law mechanisms, with roughly €19 billion still suspended as of early 2025. Similarly, the Commission has kept Hungary tied up in high-profile infringement cases, including the referral of its 2021 child protection law, which forbids the public endorsement of LGBT ideology, to the EU court. 

EU values—if there even is such a thing—are not sacrosanct. They are merely methods of control, enforced under threat of legal, financial, and political punishment. That is, unless the cost of doing so proves too high. When the price lands on powerful capitals like Brussels and Berlin, these supposedly fundamental beliefs suddenly become a whole lot more flexible. 

In a way, this is positive. We certainly cannot rely on Brussels to come to the correct conclusions on its own. But change is still possible from within, provided that enough member states kick up a fuss.