Karl Popper’s social theory has long been the basis for university courses in political science and sociology. For some, he is considered a “champion of critical rationalism” and one of the most “important philosophers of the 20th century.”
One of the more impactful applications of his social theory, more specifically, his thoughts on the “open society,” has been validated by the Open Society Foundations, founded by George Soros. Soros’ concept is seemingly unpretentious: apply ‘philanthropic work’ to ‘open up’ ‘closed societies.’ The Open Society Foundations pride themselves on having invested money to break down South African Apartheid, achieve ‘marriage equality’ in the U.S. (i.e. fighting for LGBT rights), and involvement in ‘nurturing democracy’ worldwide. The Foundations consider themselves an ‘engine for social change,’ wherever they see fit. The goal of all these efforts is to create a ‘more open world,’ according to their ideological framework.
When Popper’s book was published in 1945, it was not unanimously acclaimed. The book, which examines the thoughts of Plato, Hegel, Marx, and others, claims that the social and political philosophies of these thinkers demonstrate all the essential qualities that underpin totalitarian systems. Popper especially denounces Plato as a propagandist, who believed that the more a society moved away from its state of nature towards liberalization and emancipation from traditions, the more that society would fall into decay. Plato saw these developments as signs of decadence, degeneration, and deterioration. In short: Plato’s thoughts lead to ‘closed societies.’
Popper’s antithetical proposal was the ‘open society,’ characterized not by a pre-planned systematic approach (that he purportedly detected in Plato), but rather a pluralistic approach, based on continuous evolution, the ability to improve and administer self-correction when and where necessary. This famously spawned the idea that society has to be tolerant, but only to those it deems ‘tolerant’: “if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them.”
This idea will morph into the “repressive tolerance” on which Frankfurt School’s Marcuse elaborates.
Popper’s intense Plato criticism is summoned by none other than prominent Platonic thinker and political prodigy Eric Voegelin, who features the result of his Platonic studies within the larger context of political science and his opus magnum, Order and History.
Voegelin’s take on Popper is as refreshing as it is damning.
Quoting from his letter correspondence with Leo Strauss from 1950 is in order: “May I ask you to let me know sometime what you think of Mr. Popper,” asks Strauss, not veiling his own negative impression:
He gave a lecture here, on the task of social philosophy, that was beneath contempt, it was the most washed-out, lifeless positivism trying to whistle in the dark, linked to a complete inability to think ‘rationally,’ although it passed itself off as ‘rationalism’—it was very bad.
Voegelin, who had apparently only been waiting for such an opportunity to express his frustration, did not hold back:
Dear Mr. Strauss, The opportunity to speak a few deeply felt words about Karl Popper to a kindred soul is too golden to endure a long delay. This Popper has been for years, not exactly a stone against which one stumbles, but a troublesome pebble that I must continually nudge from the path, in that he is constantly pushed upon me by people who insist that his work on the Open Society and its Enemies is one of the social science masterpieces of our times.
After confirming his negative impression of Open Society that he had just finished reading, Voegelin elaborates:
I feel completely justified in saying without reservation that this book is impudent, dilettantish crap. Every single sentence is a scandal, but it is still possible to lift out a few main annoyances.
Voegelin went on to explain that the expressions “closed” and “open society” were taken from Bergson’s Deux Sources. Popper had adopted them, according to Voegelin, “because they sound good to him.” Yet he omitted the “religious meaning” that Bergson had taken such care to create using them. Voegelin added:
Perhaps I am oversensitive about such things, but I do not believe that respectable philosophers such as Bergson develop their concepts for the sole purpose that the coffeehouse scum might have something to botch.
According to Voegelin, the original Bergsonian concept of the “open society” was “philosophically and historically tenable,” while Popper’s untenable falsification of it “is ideological rubbish.”
Further, Voegelin detected Popper’s complete unfamiliarity with the literature on the subject of Hegel and Plato specifically. His conclusion could not be harsher:
Popper is philosophically so uncultured, so fully a primitive ideological brawler that he is not able even approximately to reproduce correctly the contents of one page of Plato. Reading is of no use to him; he is too lacking in knowledge to understand what the authors say. Briefly and in sum: Popper’s book is a scandal without extenuating circumstances; in its intellectual attitude it is the typical product of a failed intellectual; spiritually one would have to use expressions like rascally, impertinent, loutish; in terms of technical competence, as a piece in the history of thought, it is dilettantish, and, as a result, is worthless.
This scathing critique could not be more fitting, considering the many negative effects of Popper’s social and philosophical theory. Popper’s alleged, unfettered openness and tolerance ignore the need for limitations and boundaries in society, necessary for sustainable stability and security. Proponents of his theory argue for an entirely ‘open’ society, without reasonable restrictions, but are blind to the erosion of social cohesion and the proliferation of harmful ideologies it effectively enables. The effects of that are evident today, George Soros’ projects could serve as an example.
Moreover, Popper’s theory lacks proper remedies for the practical challenges its implementation, for better or for worse, demands. His idealistic vision overlooks its potential for exploitation by small, ill-intentioned interest groups. Constructive criticism is blotted out at the root since tolerance can only be exercised by those who are already of the same mindset. An ‘open’ tolerance cannot guarantee safeguards to protect against hijacking by ideology. In fact, this tolerance will lead to a radicalization by those who embrace it, up to a point where they ally themselves with the very forces they claim to supersede.
