Brussels has decided to partially correct course on one of the most controversial policies of the Green Deal. The European Commission on Tuesday presented its new Automotive Package, a set of measures that in practice represents a step back from the most rigid climate roadmap approved in recent years. The most significant change is the relaxation of the 2035 target, which no longer mandates the total phase-out of cars with combustion engines and allows their continued sale under certain conditions.
Until now, the European regulatory framework established that from 2035, all new passenger cars and vans should be “zero-emission,” which in practice amounted to banning any vehicle with a thermal engine. The new proposal replaces this absolute approach with a target of a 90% reduction in tailpipe emissions compared to 2021 levels. The remaining 10% may be offset through alternative mechanisms, such as the use of low-carbon steel produced in the European Union or credits linked to the use of synthetic fuels and biofuels.
This shift introduces a substantial change in the design of the transition. From 2035 onwards, plug-in hybrids, range-extender vehicles, mild hybrids, and even traditional internal combustion engine vehicles will still be able to have a place in the European market, provided manufacturers meet overall emissions targets through compensation mechanisms recognised by Brussels.
The Commission insists on the narrative that this is not an abandonment of climate neutrality, whose horizon remains set for 2050, but rather a “pragmatic” adaptation to the industrial and technological difficulties that have become evident in recent years. In other words, they know that what was approved under pressure from the left and the Greens is an absolutely impossible and extremely damaging objective, and that it is time to backtrack.
The rectification is not limited to the 2035 horizon. The package includes other relevant relaxations in the short and medium term. In the case of vans, where electrification is progressing more slowly, the emissions reduction target for 2030 is lowered from 50% to 40%. In addition, a multiannual compliance system is introduced for the period between 2030 and 2032, allowing manufacturers to offset shortfalls in one year with better results in others, thus avoiding automatic penalties. Specific adjustments are also envisaged for heavy-duty vehicles in order to facilitate compliance with the next decade’s targets without formally altering the level of climate ambition.
These changes demonstrate that the imposed timetable was not aligned with market realities or with Europe’s industrial capacity. Demand for electric vehicles has slowed in several member states, prices remain high for broad segments of the population, and dependence on China for batteries and strategic raw materials has generated growing concern. In this context, combustion and hybrid technologies appear as the only fields in which European manufacturers can still compete on relatively equal terms with Asian giants.
The new approach is nevertheless accompanied by a strengthening of EU industrial policy. The Commission has announced a specific programme to boost the battery value chain in Europe, endowed with €1.8 billion, to reduce external dependence and improve the competitiveness of the electric sector. At the same time, incentives are being introduced for the development of small electric cars manufactured in the EU, with systems of “super credits” and a differentiated regulatory framework for models up to 4.2 metres in length, aimed at lowering the cost of access to electric vehicles.
Another novelty of the package is the attempt to reduce the bureaucratic burden weighing on the industry. Through the so-called Automotive Omnibus, Brussels proposes to simplify technical standards, eliminate regulatory duplications, and adjust certain administrative requirements that, according to the Commission itself, have penalised the competitiveness of European manufacturers without providing proportional environmental benefits.
Although the official discourse insists that “the future is electric,” the architecture of the new package reveals a shift in priorities. The Commission moves from an ideological and linear approach to a more flexible model, based on technological neutrality and the acceptance of intermediate solutions. The transition is no longer conceived as a forced substitution but as a process conditioned by industrial capacity, real demand, and the geopolitical context. Beyond the political narrative, what is ultimately being accepted are the proposals that patriotic and sovereigntist groups have been calling for for years. Along the way, billions have been lost, along with market shares that are almost impossible to recover, and thousands of jobs have been destroyed or moved overseas.
