Italy is preparing for one of the most consequential institutional consultations of recent years. On March 22 and 23, Italians will go to the polls to vote in a referendum on a far-reaching constitutional reform of the justice system, promoted by Giorgia Meloni’s government and approved by parliament without reaching the two-thirds supermajority that would have made a popular vote unnecessary.
This is neither a technical nor a marginal reform. The proposal directly affects the internal balance of the judiciary, the relationship between judges and prosecutors, and ultimately the delicate system of checks and balances between branches of the state in a democracy historically shaped by the political weight of the magistracy.
The referendum is confirmatory in nature and does not require any turnout threshold. A simple majority will suffice: if the ‘yes’ vote prevails, the reform will enter into force; if not, it will be definitively rejected.
At the heart of the proposal lies the separation of judicial careers. Until now, judges and prosecutors have entered the magistracy through a single career path and, despite increasing restrictions, have been able to switch roles during their professional lives. Under the reform, candidates would be required from the outset to choose between a judicial career (judge) and a prosecutorial one (public prosecutor), with no possibility of reversing that choice.
The government argues that this separation strengthens judicial impartiality and prevents structural ties with the prosecution that could undermine the right to a fair trial. Critics, however, maintain that the problem is largely symbolic and point out that career switches currently affect only a minimal percentage of magistrates.
The reform goes beyond career paths. The current High Council of the Judiciary would be split into two separate bodies, one for judges and one for prosecutors. Both would continue to be presided over by the president of the Republic, but their composition would change substantially.
Members would no longer be elected but selected by lottery, both from among magistrates and from lists of legal experts drawn up by parliament. The stated aim is to eliminate the influence of internal factions and political bargaining that have shaped judicial self-governance for decades and enabled judicial activism that has undermined the right-wing government’s efforts to curb illegal migration.
In addition, a separate High Disciplinary Court would be established, tasked exclusively with judging disciplinary offences committed by magistrates. This body would concentrate a particularly sensitive function in a country where internal judicial scandals have severely eroded public trust in the system.
The announcement of the referendum date has raised political tensions. Committees opposed to the reform accuse the executive of rushing the timetable and forcing a restrictive interpretation of the Constitution. The government responds that the consultation is fully legitimate and that the final decision now rests with the citizens.
Justice Minister Carlo Nordio, the architect of the reform, argues that the changes do not subject the judiciary to political power but rather bring it into line with the adversarial criminal justice model introduced in Italy at the end of the last century and with practices common in other European countries.
The opposition remains divided. Parts of the Left view the reform as an attempt to curb prosecutorial autonomy and influence politically sensitive investigations. Other forces, including centrist parties, argue that separating judicial careers addresses a long-standing Italian anomaly that should finally be corrected.
Javier Villamor is a Spanish journalist and analyst. Based in Brussels, he covers NATO and EU affairs at europeanconservative.com. Javier has over 17 years of experience in international politics, defense, and security. He also works as a consultant providing strategic insights into global affairs and geopolitical dynamics.
