Rebeka Kis
January 9, 2026
Winning is one thing—forming a coalition, as so often in the Netherlands, is proving to be more of a challenge. Leader of D66 (Democrats 66) Rob Jetten delivers remarks to journalists the day after the Dutch parliamentary election vote, in The Hague, on October 30, 2025.
SIMON WOHLFAHRT / AFP
After three weeks of negotiations between the Christian-democratic CDA and the big winner of the last elections, the progressive-liberal D66, the Dutch parliament has approved including the center-right liberal VVD in minority coalition talks. This step became unavoidable once it became clear that the CDA–D66 discussions had failed to produce a realistic plan for a majority government.
Former CDA leader and coalition negotiator Sybrand Buma delivered his final report last Monday. He advised that a minority coalition of VVD, CDA, and D66 is the only workable outcome, given the political deadlock. A majority in parliament supported his conclusion, after which Rianne Letschert (D66), chair of the board of Maastricht University, was appointed to take over the negotiations between the three parties. The parties have until January 30th to lay down the groundwork for a “stable cabinet.”
Most other combinations collapsed before they even began. D66 ‘doesn’t prefer’ a cooperation with conservative-liberal JA21, which rose from one to nine seats in the last election cycle. This makes the so-called center-right coalition of CDA, D66, VVD, and JA21, already one seat short of a majority, even more unlikely.
Meanwhile, the VVD, for the first time in years, kept its election promise by refusing to govern with the merged GreenLeft–Labour Party (GL–PvdA), thereby blocking any left-wing alternative. The PVV of Geert Wilders, despite finishing with the same number of seats as D66, has been excluded by all three centrist parties. A truly right-wing government is therefore impossible within the current political landscape. Yet, Wilders has hinted that if CDA and D66 fail to form a coalition, he wants to have a go at it. “Well, if D66/CDA with Buma doesn’t work out, then it’s the PVV’s turn to try to form a cabinet and draw up a draft agreement with other parties!” Additionally, Wilders has announced that he will try to do everything in his power to bring down a future centrist cabinet. “The PVV will never support the destruction of the Netherlands. We will not allow the Netherlands to be destroyed. By nothing and by no one. Because this is our country.”
Before VVD joined the talks, D66 and CDA drafted a joint document outlining their shared policy direction. The text shows no significant break from the political course of former prime minister, now NATO secretary-general, Mark Rutte, whose framework has dominated Dutch politics for more than a decade.
The nitrogen goals for 2030 and 2035, for example, remain untouched. Farmers are expected to be ‘persuaded’ to scale down their highly productive farming where it stands in the way of these goals. In practice, this means continued buyouts. As the document states, “Therefore, the voluntary termination schemes will continue.”
Migration levels remain high as well. Asylum capacity stays at 70,000 people per year, with only limited improvements: three-year temporary residence permits and faster processing. At the same time, the role of the pro-migration NGO Refugee Work expands, while the most significant restrictions are deferred to the EU Migration Pact, which many analysts, such as migration scientist Jan van de Beek, see as flawed and ineffective.
The document also doubles down on current foreign policy. It states, for example, that “the path of Ukrainians towards NATO and EU membership is irreversible.” All in all, the text contains no sign of a fundamental political course change.
The rise of the centrist parties began earlier this year when the previous coalition collapsed. Even though the PVV achieved an enormous victory in the 2023 elections, the government that followed failed to deliver on its expectations. It quickly earned the reputation of a cabinet that, despite its historic majority, ‘did not get anything done.’
This disappointment pushed many voters back toward the familiar center. D66 emerged as the largest party, together with the PVV. During the campaign, D66 leader Rob Jetten had tried to make D66 appear more patriotic by symbolically “reclaiming” the Dutch flag from patriotic right-wing parties, a shift amplified by mainstream media coverage. CDA also regained strength, while the VVD was the only former coalition partner that avoided major losses.
Supporters of the prospective centrist minority coalition may hope that VVD, CDA, and D66 offer a “magical formula” to address the many problems facing Dutch society. But the parties’ past roles raise doubts.
VVD governed in all of the last five coalitions, while CDA participated in three and D66 took part in two. These parties were central in shaping the policies that produced the crises now dominating Dutch politics: mass migration, the farmer and nitrogen crisis, the housing shortage, and accelerating climate regulation. The document produced by CDA and D66 also does not strengthen confidence that these parties are willing to break with the Rutte-era status quo.
In the coming period, it will become clear whether the VVD can introduce any rightwing balance into the D66–CDA blueprint. Yet the VVD has been one of the main architects of this course for over a decade. It is therefore unlikely that the party will steer the negotiations, or the eventual government, in a different direction.
As the outlines of a minority government take shape, Dutch society may once again be confronted with political continuity it did not ask for, a continuation of the same centrist policies that many hoped to leave behind.
