Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and his French counterpart, Emmanuel Macron, on Wednesday, August 20th, committed to “finalize the dialogue” to conclude the trade agreement between the European Union and Mercosur, after more than two decades of negotiations marked by disagreements. The stated objective of both leaders is to sign the deal this semester, before Brazil’s pro tempore presidency of the South American bloc ends in December.
The pact, long-awaited in Brasília and Buenos Aires, would grant Mercosur economies privileged access to the European market, especially in the agricultural and livestock sectors. However, resistance in Europe—led precisely by Macron—has stalled the process. France has insisted that the treaty could devastate its farmers, rendering them unable to compete with beef, poultry, or cane sugar production unburdened by EU regulations in South America.
In a message posted on his official X account, Macron stressed that he will only accept an “ambitious” agreement that guarantees the preservation of French and European agriculture. Behind this declaration lies the fact that practically the entire French political spectrum, from Left to Right, rejects a pact they consider devastating for the French countryside and its way of life. The possibility of offering financial compensation to farmers has been discussed in Brussels and Paris. Still, it will hardly succeed in quelling the discontent of a sector that sees the agreement as a death sentence for their farms.
Meanwhile, Brazil emerges as the primary potential beneficiary. The imposition of a 50% tariff by the United States on Brazilian exports, the result of the trade war driven by Donald Trump, has pushed Lula to urgently seek new markets for his products. The agreement with the EU thus appears as a lifeline for a country that needs to place its agricultural surpluses and reinforce its role as a global supplier.
However, beyond the conflicting interests, the negotiations once again highlight the fragility of European trade policy. Although the European Commission acts on behalf of the twenty-seven, in practice, the member states maneuver separately to safeguard their own strategic sectors. Macron, who was at the head of the blocking minority against the agreement until recently, has now chosen to soften his stance and is ready to support the pact if he obtains guarantees for French agriculture. In other words, Paris seeks to shield its interests while leaving the rest of the EU exposed to global competition.
This scenario confirms that, despite Brussels’ rhetoric about unity and multilateralism, when it comes to strategic decisions, the European Union becomes “every man for himself.” Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has shown little ability to articulate a coherent strategy, as evident in her erratic negotiations with Washington. Now, faced with pressure from Mercosur and Brazil’s push, member states are repositioning themselves according to their national interests, relegating the European project to the background.
The outcome could arrive in December, at the Mercosur summit in Brazil. If Lula manages to extract conditional support from Macron, the agreement could finally be signed, although its ratification in European parliaments promises to be a new battlefield. For European farmers, the result will be the same: greater competition, lower margins, and the sense that their governments have chosen to sacrifice them in the name of a globalization ideal that only benefits the major exporting economies.
