“A diplomatic solution is still possible. In fact, it remains the only path to lasting security,” U.S. President Joe Biden told the United Nations General Assembly on 24 September following Israeli special operations and air strikes against Hezbollah assets across Lebanon. As Israel shifted forces north to begin a ‘new phase’ in the conflict, not everyone appears to agree with the addled president, who withdrew from his reelection bid in July and will leave office in January 2025. Since Hamas’ brutal 7 October 2023, attack on Israel, which resulted in massive Israeli retaliation against Hamas positions in Gaza, Biden’s administration has spent nearly a year floundering in its attempts to broker ceasefires on both fronts. A new initiative floated on Wednesday also seems doomed to failure as Israel announced preparations for a ground invasion of Lebanon. Hezbollah equally shows no inclination to cease its attacks on Israel, which the organization has said will end only if Israel and Hamas reach a ceasefire.
Biden’s feckless negotiators may be ‘working tirelessly to achieve’ a ceasefire over Lebanon that will allow him to leave office as a peacemaker—and hand that legacy to Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris—but the plain fact is that no party to the conflict respects or fears either Biden or his foreign policy team. Indeed, with Biden leaving office in less than four months, all international antagonists are incentivized to advance their positions maximally before he goes, and especially before the U.S. presidential election determines his successor on November 5th. A Harris victory will likely mean a continuation of inconclusive American diplomacy, which will reduce deterrents against Hezbollah, whose Iranian sponsor cannot be placated through incentive-based diplomacy (the Democratic foreign policy consensus has long believed otherwise, despite the overwhelming evidence). A victory by former president and Republican nominee Donald J. Trump, who, during his first administration, took a much tougher stance toward Iran and its proxies, and a much friendlier approach to Israel, will likely mean stronger U.S. support for escalated Israeli military action.
Either way, both sides of the conflict have every reason to keep their escalating war going. If Hezbollah (as well as Hamas, Iran, and their Houthi allies in Yemen) agrees to deescalate now, it will lose momentum that could otherwise continue in the event of a Harris administration, or that would give it a stronger position against Israel if Trump wins. If Israel agrees to show restraint, on the other hand, it will lose momentum that could otherwise continue in the event of a new Trump administration, or give it a stronger position against Hezbollah if Harris wins. Continuing Israel’s offensive will also help Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continue to ward off criminal investigations, domestic unrest, and a forthcoming inquiry into his government’s lack of preparedness last October. Continuing Hezbollah’s counterstrikes will help that organization continue its decades-long charade of posing as the leader of Lebanon’s national ‘resistance’ and justify its dominant role in Lebanese politics despite massive deficiencies implicated in the horrific internal crises that have beset Lebanon since 2019.
How the continuing confrontation will play out is anyone’s guess. Israel’s last invasion of Lebanon, in 2006, quickly bogged down in a stalemate as Hezbollah mounted an effective resistance on its home turf despite a massive asymmetry of forces in Israel’s favor. Israeli forces failed to come even close to their objectives, and a postwar defense review found serious deficiencies in their combat operations. Since then, Hezbollah forces have gained combat-grade experience on battlefields in neighboring Syria, where they were sent to support Bashar al-Asad’s regime as it confronted unrest arising from the Arab Spring. Asad’s victory in turn meant that Syria, an Iranian client, became a major land-based conduit for Iranian military hardware to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s rocket forces, in particular, are believed to be as much as ten times greater than they were in 2006, while much of the rest of the organization’s military technology has been updated by Iran. Counterstrikes over the past week have revealed that Hezbollah can strike deeper into Israeli territory than before, and in some cases even penetrate Israeli anti-missile defenses, threatening significant civilian casualties in addition to military losses.
Israel, however, has had 18 years in which to address its combat deficiencies. Since last October, its soldiers fighting Hamas in Gaza have gained valuable experience in both regular combat and counterinsurgency operations. The latter will be vital in fighting Hezbollah, which relies on guerilla warfare to defend its territory. In Israel’s increasingly destructive firefights with Hezbollah, moreover, it has systematically destroyed enemy facilities, installations, and weapons, and targeted important commanders—advantageous steps it did not take in 2006. This process of downgrading Hezbollah’s capabilities accelerated dramatically with the recent attack on the organization’s low-tech pager and walkie-talkie communications networks and more aggressive bombings, which have killed virtually all of the remaining Hezbollah commanders—including the organization’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Hezbollah’s morale is said to be low, its effectiveness shaken, and its ‘resistance’ role increasingly doubted by the Lebanese people, who are exhausted and impoverished and may soon realize that they deserve better than serving as human shields for a radical Shiite Muslim terrorist organization.
Israel, for its part, appears far more willing to accept serious casualties than it was in 2006, particularly if an escalation in hostilities can deliver a knockout blow that neutralizes or eliminates Hezbollah as a threat to Israeli security. It is important to recall that the 2006 invasion was provoked by the killing of eight Israeli soldiers and the capture of three others during a Hezbollah ambush on Israeli territory. In dramatic contrast, the October 2023 attacks witnessed the worst slaughter of Jews since the Holocaust. Hamas, which Hezbollah supports, brutally killed more than 1,200 Israel civilians, with scores more taken into captivity, where some remain and from which others never returned alive. The October attack also led to the firefights with Hezbollah, which have displaced nearly 70,000 Israelis from their homes near the country’s northern border. The scale of loss, trauma, and vulnerability is vastly greater. Despite some misgivings about the potential costs and persistent doubts about Netanyahu’s leadership, more than two-thirds of Israelis favor a military solution in the north, with nearly half supporting attacks deep inside Lebanese territory.
Surprise diplomacy may defuse the situation, but the chances are bleak. War has come to Lebanon, and the overwhelming probability is that it will remain there.
