In March 2026, Italian voters will be called to decide on a constitutional referendum addressing one of the most persistent structural ambiguities in the country’s legal system: the unity of careers between judges and public prosecutors. This referendum is the culmination of decades of reform efforts and raises a question that is not technical or corporatist but profoundly democratic: how to ensure judicial impartiality, accountability, and public trust within a modern constitutional framework.
Far from undermining judicial independence, the proposed reform aims to strengthen it by clarifying roles, reinforcing the principle of a fair trial, and aligning Italy with the institutional standards of advanced liberal democracies.
The debate on the separation of judicial careers in Italy dates back at least to the late 1980s, when the country adopted a new Code of Criminal Procedure (1988) inspired by the accusatorial model. That reform transformed the structure of criminal proceedings, introducing adversarial dynamics, oral hearings, and a clearer distinction between accusation and defence.
Yet the institutional framework remained unchanged. Judges and public prosecutors continued to belong to the same career, to be governed by the same self-governing body, and to share professional trajectories. This inconsistency has generated a systemic tension: a formally adversarial process administered by a judiciary organised according to an inquisitorial logic.
Over the years, multiple reform proposals, such as constitutional bills, parliamentary initiatives, and expert reports, have attempted to resolve this contradiction. None succeeded. The 2026 referendum represents the first realistic opportunity to complete this unfinished transition.
At the heart of the reform lies the separation of careers between judges and public prosecutors. This does not mean hierarchical subordination, nor political control. Public prosecutors remain autonomous and independent, subject only to the law, in full compliance with constitutional guarantees.
The reform preserves Article 104 of the Italian Constitution, which states that the judiciary constitutes an autonomous and independent order from every other power. At the same time, it gives concrete effect to Article 111, which enshrines the principles of the fair trial and the impartiality, both actual and perceived, of the judge.
A central institutional actor in this reform is the CSM (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura), the constitutional self-governing body of the judiciary. In English-language constitutional scholarship, the CSM is commonly referred to as the High Council of the Judiciary, which is not a separate institution but the official translation of the same body. The referendum clarifies the role of the CSM as an administrative and guarantee authority, not a political chamber. It also introduces a reformed system for selecting its members, combining parliamentary designation and controlled sortition—selection by lottery, but with rules to ensure the chosen group matches certain criteria—with the explicit aim of reducing the excessive influence of internal judicial factions.
The referendum is confirmatory, following parliamentary approval that did not reach a qualified majority, and its outcome will be binding only if the majority of voters approves it. In addition to separating careers, the reform modifies multiple constitutional articles and establishes a new Alta Corte Disciplinare (Disciplinary High Court) to evaluate magistrates’ professional responsibility. Some members of the reformed CSM and disciplinary bodies will be selected through controlled sortition among legal and academic experts, increasing independence and reducing factional influence.
Opponents of the reform often frame it as a threat to democracy. Comparative evidence tells a different story. In Germany, public prosecutors belong to a separate professional corps and do not share careers with judges. The same is true in Spain, Portugal, and France, where the distinction between judging and prosecuting functions is structurally embedded. In the United States, the separation is even more radical, with prosecutors often being elected or appointed outside the judiciary altogether. None of these systems is considered less democratic for this reason. On the contrary, institutional separation is widely regarded as a safeguard for judicial impartiality.
Another frequent claim is that separation would subject prosecutors to the executive. This is factually incorrect. The reform does not alter the constitutional status of public prosecutors, who remain independent and protected from political interference. Independence is guaranteed by constitutional design, not by career promiscuity. Finally, critics argue that the reform disrupts the balance of powers. In reality, it restores it. By ensuring that judges are institutionally distinct from the parties before them, the reform reinforces the separation of powers rather than weakening it.
Voting ‘Yes’ means strengthening the foundations of justice. It guarantees a truly impartial judge, as separation of careers places the judge in a position of clear and visible equidistance from prosecution and defence, reinforcing the credibility of judicial decisions. It also improves the quality of justice for citizens, allowing prosecutors to develop specialised investigative expertise while judges are freed from cultural proximity to the accusatory function.
Accountability is enhanced through the establishment of an independent High Disciplinary Court, which ensures that professional responsibility is assessed on objective criteria, insulated from factional dynamics. Reforming the selection of the CSM’s members weakens the power of internal currents that have, for decades, influenced appointments and promotions within the judiciary. Overall, the reform aligns Italy with the standards of mature democracies, completing the transition to an authentically adversarial system.
By voting ‘Yes,’ citizens also approve a referendum that addresses seven constitutional articles, confirms the new disciplinary structures, and increases transparency, independence, and accountability in the evaluation of magistrates.
The referendum has revealed a clear political divide. Fratelli d’Italia and the centre-right support the reform as a matter of constitutional coherence and democratic responsibility. Parts of the Left and the National Association of Magistrates oppose it, often conflating legitimate institutional reform with an attack on judicial independence. This divide reflects two visions of justice: one focused on transparency, accountability, and constitutional balance; the other on preserving an inherited system that has shown structural weaknesses.
