Infiltration and Denial: Germany’s Islamism Blind Spot

There is good news and bad news when it comes to the debate about the dangers of Islamism in Germany.

The good news first: what could long only be whispered is now being discussed increasingly openly and is finding greater attention. The bad news: the lobby that has allowed this danger to grow to such proportions still exists and continues to reach deep into government and mainstream media circles—and is pushing back with might.

Two quite different news reports, and the way they have been handled, illustrate this.

The first, from June 7, stated, “Domestic intelligence agency warns of Islamist influence on German institutions.” The warning originated from a confidential briefing of parliamentarians by Germany’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz), which was leaked to journalists at Bild, who reported on it. The story spread quickly on social media and was then picked up by a few smaller newspapers (among them the Jewish weekly Jüdische Allgemeine).

The second, from June 24, stated, “Alliance presents overview of the extent of anti-Muslim sentiment in Germany.” Unlike the first report, this item was carried by Germany’s state TV and public radio broadcaster DLF in a way that ensured maximum attention. Its message: Islamophobia has reached new heights and poses a grave danger.

The contrasting treatment of these two reports—one subversive and underhand, with little coverage in the mainstream media; the other actively promoted by Germany’s public broadcasters—illustrates the deep-seated imbalance underlying the debate on Islamism in Germany.

It’s certainly concerning that the public hasn’t been given the chance to scrutinise the Verfassungsschutz’s report or the scale of the problem it describes. Quoting Sinan Selen, the agency’s head, Bild reported that Islamists—the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, though not exclusively—were attempting to “gradually transform social and political decision-making processes,” focused not on short-term action but on long-term strategy, with the aim of reaching deep into state institutions, including political parties and state-sponsored NGOs.

Whatever the report’s evidentiary basis, the claim itself is not new. For years, critical voices like Susanne Schröter—professor of ethnology and one of Germany’s best-known researchers on Islamism—have issued similar warnings. Schröter has also tirelessly pointed to the naivety of large sections of the German establishment, which for years treated jihadism as the only problem worth watching, while ignoring political Islam altogether.

Investigative journalist Sascha Adamek has likewise addressed the issue, not least in his book Unterwanderung (Infiltration), published in March. As its blurb puts it: Hamas and Hezbollah use Germany as a safe haven for terrorist financing, while the leaders of political Islam—mosque associations funded from abroad—pursue a successful strategy of infiltrating German politics, media, and culture. For years, a network of leftist and Islamic NGOs has been fed with millions in taxpayer funds, while critics of this trend are smeared as “anti-Muslim racists.”

In an interview, Adamek explains that many NGOs regarded as objects of investigation by the Verfassungsschutz a decade ago were subsequently cleared as a result of political pressure and legal challenges. In some instances, the pressure came from prominent politicians—often, though not always, with Muslim roots. One person he names is Sawsan Chebli (SPD), the daughter of Palestinian immigrants, known for her radical activist views, who served as Berlin’s representative to the federal government and state secretary for civic engagement and international affairs from 2016 to 2021. Chebli—who has now allegedly taken on a position in Qatar—used her influence within her party and on the government to secure funding for organisations and halt their surveillance by the Verfassungsschutz, making it impossible, as Adamek explains, to report critically on these organisations’ networking without risking legal charges.

While critical voices have either been ignored or, all too often, even ostracised, the treatment of those reporting on the supposed scourge of Islamophobia has been quite different.

The coyness with which the recent Verfassungsschutz warning has been treated is easily explained: the report is an embarrassment to those in the media and political class who have for years portrayed Muslims almost exclusively as victims—looking the other way when it came to the problems of Islamist networks, crying “Islamophobia” instead, and thereby allowing these problems to grow almost unchecked.

Islamophobia has certainly been one of the establishment’s favourite political topics. In March this year, for example, Berlin’s government (a CDU–SPD coalition) introduced a Day Against Islamophobia, which the city authorities intend to ‘celebrate’ annually. In addition, state-funded reporting centres against Islamophobia have been springing up everywhere.

The result is that not only have organisations tied to the Muslim Brotherhood remained intact, as Adamek says—so have the political structures that supported them. The reason lies in politicians’ desire to deflect pressure from critics of immigration policy. To the establishment, public anger at mass migration from Muslim countries is itself one of the key drivers behind the rise of populism—namely the AfD (a party whose founding was preceded, at least in part, by the rise of the anti-Islamic Pegida movement in 2014). The charge of ‘Islamophobia’ has since been wielded as a weapon against these critics and their sympathisers.

One way in which this is achieved is by using the term to cover any form of criticism of Islam. Take the report on Islamophobia mentioned above. It was produced by a non-profit organisation (a gGmbH under German law) which, according to its own website, is currently funded entirely by public money, federal and state. The figures it presents sound dramatic: in 2025, it reports, there were over 975 incidents in Berlin alone. Yet the picture changes once one notes that the majority consist of “insults”—many of which, as public broadcaster Deutschlandfunk puts it, fall “below the threshold of criminal liability.” Of the listed cases, 6.6% involve physical violence (65 incidents), and of those, around 0.8% (8 cases) were classified as “severe physical violence”.

At Berlin’s Day Against Islamophobia, the city’s senator for integration claimed that a majority of Berliners harbour anti-Muslim prejudices, basing this on a survey known as the ‘Berlin Monitor.’ The survey found that 36% of the respondents affirmed that “Muslims plan to Islamise the West step by step.” It is ironic that this has been cited by some politicians as proof of deep-seated anti-Muslim racism. Of course, few would argue that every Muslim migrant plans to Islamise the West. But the survey offered respondents only a simple ‘yes/no choice.’ What should Berliners who wished to point to the danger have responded? And should the Verfassungsschutz, by also highlighting this very real problem, perhaps now also be called Islamophobic?

The charge of Islamophobia has also served Islamists well, as Schröter explains. It has allowed them to dodge scrutiny and isolate their critics, often with state approval. Civil servants and others in positions of authority, who might have been more critical, quickly learned it was preferable to look away, since doing otherwise invited trouble and accusations of bigotry.

As a result of this culture, Germany has experienced some spectacular failures and far-reaching mistakes. One is the far-too-uncritical cooperation with organisations propagating political Islam in state schools for far too long. Several German federal states have cooperated with DITIB, the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs. DITIB is Germany’s largest Islamic umbrella organization and operates under the direct authority of Turkey’s state religious body, Diyanet—which has itself increasingly aligned with Muslim Brotherhood networks and radical Islamist rhetoric. In recent years, tens of thousands of Muslim children have taken part in DITIB-linked religious lessons: 60,000 in 2020 alone, despite repeated warnings from critics. 

Another point is the uncritical funding of radical activists and NGOs, such as the Claims alliance responsible for the latest Islamophobia report. A few weeks ago, it emerged that the German government had also funded an organisation called Islamic Relief Germany, which the Office for the Protection of the Constitution had likewise accused of cooperating with the Muslim Brotherhood. The scandal broke when Germany’s Federal Court of Auditors (Bundesrechnungshof) sharply criticised the government for the funding. Here too, the responsible body—the Foreign Office—refused to release the auditor’s report, citing supposed security interests; the document only came to light after journalists filed a lawsuit. (The magazine Focus reports total payments of €15 million to the organisation.)

It’s high time to stop the secrecy about the nature and scope of the close networks that have developed between the state and Islamism. Though many of these organisations claim to pursue peaceful aims, reality tells a different story. When a conference on Muslim Brotherhood connections took place last week in the Neukölln town hall—one of Berlin’s districts with the largest Muslim population—it required massive police protection.

It didn’t take the Verfassungsschutz to make the problem clear to ordinary citizens; many have long been observing the changes in their neighbourhoods and the problems in their children’s schools on their own. Yet for much of the political class, even this overdue warning is unlikely to cure them of their Islamophilia. Conducting an honest, open, and fair debate about Muslim migration and the infiltration of radical Islamism will remain the task of a genuine opposition.