In late October 2025, a stabbing incident in Podgorica’s Zabjelo neighborhood sparked widespread protests and unrest in Montenegro, highlighting tensions over immigration, particularly from Turkey. On October 25, 2025, a 25-year-old local man, identified as M.J., was stabbed multiple times during an altercation outside a bar. Police investigations implicated foreign nationals—initial reports mentioned three Azerbaijanis and one Turkish citizen.
This led to the arrests of suspects (one Azerbaijani and one Turkish) and the detention of around 45 Turkish and Azerbaijani individuals for questioning on residency and potential involvement. Several faced deportation or fines. Prior complaints about migrant-related disturbances, including traffic violations and crime, had fueled resentment.
Citizens accused authorities of downplaying incidents to preserve diplomatic relations and economic benefits from investment schemes. Social media amplified these grievances, often facing censorship. The next day, hundreds gathered in Zabjelo, chanting anti-Turkish slogans and lighting flares. Protesters vandalized vehicles with Turkish plates, ransacked a Turkish-owned bar, and targeted other symbols of Turkish presence. Three Turkish citizens sought shelter in a casino before police intervened.
Demonstrations spread to government buildings, demanding visa restrictions. In response, Prime Minister Milojko Spajić announced a temporary suspension of the visa-free regime for Turkish citizens on October 27, 2025, to maintain public order while reviewing controls. Protests continued into early November, with smaller rallies and online campaigns.
Beyond the incident, the unrest reflected deeper anxieties about rapid Turkish migration. Official figures as of September 2025 showed over 13,300 Turkish citizens with temporary residence or work permits, dwarfing the native Turkish minority (about 1,800). Many arrived via golden visa programs requiring investments (e.g., €250,000 in real estate). Critics alleged that corruption, fictitious companies, and inconsistent enforcement inflated actual numbers.
Turkish buyers have acquired significant real estate, transforming neighborhoods and inflating prices, seen by locals as demographic shifts rather than mere investment.
Central to these fears is Turkey’s neo-Ottoman foreign policy under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, aiming to revive influence in former Ottoman territories. Agencies like TIKA and Diyanet fund mosques and cultural centers, while Erdoğan emphasizes Balkan ties. Migration, via economic settlers and investors, is viewed by critics as a tool for cultural and demographic influence, shifting the region from its European heritage.
In Montenegro (population approximately 633,000; about the size of Riga, Latvia, or Palermo, Italy), with a delicate multi-ethnic balance—native Muslims (Bosniaks, Albanians) coexisting moderately with Orthodox and Catholic majorities—an influx of conservative Turks raises concerns about radicalization, sectarian divides, and political shifts.
Protesters in Zabjelo voiced fears of losing national identity to historical Ottoman echoes through ‘peaceful’ demographic and economic means.
While visa suspension and stricter controls are steps forward, some argue broader action is needed: tying Western aid to migration oversight, sanctioning corruption, and countering Neo-Ottomanism Turkish influence.
The Zabjelo events signal alarm over identity and sovereignty in a vulnerable nation.
The Zabjelo Uprising: Fears of Turkish Neo-Ottomanism in Montenegro
The Wounded Montenegrin (1882), a 114 × 186 cm oil on canvas by Paja Jovanović , located in the Gallery of Matica Srpska in Novi Sad, Serbia
Paja Jovanović, Public Domain, via Wikimedia Commons
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In late October 2025, a stabbing incident in Podgorica’s Zabjelo neighborhood sparked widespread protests and unrest in Montenegro, highlighting tensions over immigration, particularly from Turkey. On October 25, 2025, a 25-year-old local man, identified as M.J., was stabbed multiple times during an altercation outside a bar. Police investigations implicated foreign nationals—initial reports mentioned three Azerbaijanis and one Turkish citizen.
This led to the arrests of suspects (one Azerbaijani and one Turkish) and the detention of around 45 Turkish and Azerbaijani individuals for questioning on residency and potential involvement. Several faced deportation or fines. Prior complaints about migrant-related disturbances, including traffic violations and crime, had fueled resentment.
Citizens accused authorities of downplaying incidents to preserve diplomatic relations and economic benefits from investment schemes. Social media amplified these grievances, often facing censorship. The next day, hundreds gathered in Zabjelo, chanting anti-Turkish slogans and lighting flares. Protesters vandalized vehicles with Turkish plates, ransacked a Turkish-owned bar, and targeted other symbols of Turkish presence. Three Turkish citizens sought shelter in a casino before police intervened.
Demonstrations spread to government buildings, demanding visa restrictions. In response, Prime Minister Milojko Spajić announced a temporary suspension of the visa-free regime for Turkish citizens on October 27, 2025, to maintain public order while reviewing controls. Protests continued into early November, with smaller rallies and online campaigns.
Beyond the incident, the unrest reflected deeper anxieties about rapid Turkish migration. Official figures as of September 2025 showed over 13,300 Turkish citizens with temporary residence or work permits, dwarfing the native Turkish minority (about 1,800). Many arrived via golden visa programs requiring investments (e.g., €250,000 in real estate). Critics alleged that corruption, fictitious companies, and inconsistent enforcement inflated actual numbers.
Turkish buyers have acquired significant real estate, transforming neighborhoods and inflating prices, seen by locals as demographic shifts rather than mere investment.
Central to these fears is Turkey’s neo-Ottoman foreign policy under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, aiming to revive influence in former Ottoman territories. Agencies like TIKA and Diyanet fund mosques and cultural centers, while Erdoğan emphasizes Balkan ties. Migration, via economic settlers and investors, is viewed by critics as a tool for cultural and demographic influence, shifting the region from its European heritage.
In Montenegro (population approximately 633,000; about the size of Riga, Latvia, or Palermo, Italy), with a delicate multi-ethnic balance—native Muslims (Bosniaks, Albanians) coexisting moderately with Orthodox and Catholic majorities—an influx of conservative Turks raises concerns about radicalization, sectarian divides, and political shifts.
Protesters in Zabjelo voiced fears of losing national identity to historical Ottoman echoes through ‘peaceful’ demographic and economic means.
While visa suspension and stricter controls are steps forward, some argue broader action is needed: tying Western aid to migration oversight, sanctioning corruption, and countering Neo-Ottomanism Turkish influence.
The Zabjelo events signal alarm over identity and sovereignty in a vulnerable nation.
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