Is the Two-State Solution Truly Ideal for the Holy Land?

In recent days, Netanyahu has repeatedly announced his intention to permanently occupy the Gaza Strip. This is also a predictable reaction to statements made by several Western powers—France, the United Kingdom, and Canada—that they plan to recognize the sovereignty and independence of Palestine in order to encourage a de-escalation of the Israeli offensive. 

It is reasonable to assume, however, that such recognitions are driven not only by international dynamics but also by domestic political calculations: in many Western countries, Muslims represent a growing share of the electorate. According to some projections, they will constitute, in the coming decades, a significant—and in some contexts even majority—portion of the voting public.

The Catholic Church has also made its voice heard and expressed its position on the matter. In the Vatican, on the sidelines of the Jubilee of Digital Influencers on July 28th, Secretary of State Pietro Parolin stated that the only “solution” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the “recognition of two States, living side by side, independently but also in cooperation and security.” The cardinal recalled how the small state at the heart of Italy was a pioneer in recognizing Palestine, a step taken during the reign of John Paul II, in the year 2000.

A journalist pointed out that such a solution might be “premature” today, but the cardinal responded firmly: “Why premature? In our view, the solution lies in direct dialogue between the two sides, with the goal of establishing two autonomous state entities.”

It is, however, interesting to delve into the reasons that might lead one to consider the two-state solution not only “premature,” as the journalist suggested during the press conference, but even unrealistic. The goal, noble as it may be, is not feasible for three main reasons.

The first reason, which is far from negligible, concerns the fact that the partition of the Holy Land into two political entities by international bodies was the origin of the longstanding conflict. The difficulties lie primarily in the complexity of the dynamics and beliefs of the peoples inhabiting those territories, which often elude internationally established interpretative frameworks.

The current dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—here we find the second reason—are no longer primarily based on nationalism, but on opposing and irreconcilable theological visions. Originally, the religious dimension played an instrumental role in nationalism. However, with the crisis of twentieth-century nationalisms, the rise of Hamas, and the affirmation of Benjamin Netanyahu, supported by the ultra-religious Jewish right, the conflict has increasingly taken on the traits of an identity-based confrontation founded on exclusive and absolute conceptions of one’s legitimacy over the land.

On one side, the Jews claim—based on the Torah—that God promised the descendants of Jacob possession of all the territories between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. On the other side, Hamas maintains that Palestine is waqf, meaning a ‘land consecrated’ to Allah and, as such, the collective property of the Ummah, the Islamic community, until the Day of Judgment.

The waqf is a legal institution of Islamic sharia, usually applied to religious buildings such as mosques or to land designated for charitable purposes. Once granted, waqf status makes the property inalienable, dedicated exclusively to Allah and the community, and therefore non-transferable and non-negotiable. Hamas, a Sunni Islamist movement, extends this concept to the entire Palestinian territory. This view is based on sacred events linked to the region, including the famous Isra’ and Mi’raj, the miraculous journey in which—according to the Qur’an—the prophet Muhammad was transported from Mecca to Jerusalem in a single night, and from there ascended to Heaven.

In this context fits Iran’s—the main Shiite power—support for Hamas, despite the historical tensions between Sunnis and Shiites. Tehran’s theocracy sees the Palestinian cause as a religious struggle against Israel and considers the defense of Palestine an Islamic duty, beyond doctrinal differences. From this arises a strategic and ideological alliance, based on a shared vision: Palestine belongs to those who profess faith in Allah, the one God of the Qur’an.

The third reason, therefore, is that the conflict between Israel and Palestine is only one piece of a much broader regional conflict—that between Israel and Iran. As is well known, the Shiite Empire has long aspired to become a geopolitical power, at least in the Middle East region, and this goal is not welcomed by Israel, which harbors similar ambitions. In recent years, Iran has made extensive use of a network of alliances and influences—Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen—that has allowed it to exert considerable pressure on Israel and on its other major rival in the region, Saudi Arabia. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, therefore, cannot be resolved without addressing the major geopolitical tension with Iran.

If one truly wishes to consider a concrete and effective solution for the Holy Land, all rhetorical ambitions must be set aside to confront the problem in its rawest reality. A real solution, at least in the short to medium term, can only come through the marginalization and neutralization of religious extremist forces, both Islamic and Jewish. As long as politics remains hostage to apocalyptic ideologies and theocratic radicalism, every negotiation attempt will be doomed to fail. Major geopolitical players must stop tolerating—whether out of interest or calculation—such extremisms and begin to act to contain them.

This alone would not be enough. There is an urgent need to completely change the way we think about coexistence among people. Today, we still tend to reason according to a 19th-century perspective in which each state must have its own territory: one for the Jews, one for the Arabs, and so on. But this logic can only lead to irreparable divisions. Instead, we should rediscover another model that has already worked in the past: that of multinational empires, such as the Austro-Hungarian or Ottoman Empire. 

In those contexts, different peoples, religions, cultures, and even legal traditions coexisted within the same state, while still maintaining their own identities. Citizenship did not depend solely on the land one lived in, but on the person, the community, the language, the religion. In a word, on culture, each rooted in its own tradition. Israel is already a nation of this kind, but for it to function optimally, the moderate forces need to overrule the religious hardliners.

This logic of legal coexistence, where Jews, Christians, and Muslims can inhabit the same land without necessarily dividing it into ethnic or religious states, can truly overcome the opposition between a “Jewish State” and an “Islamic State” and build a peace founded on mutual respect for individuals and communities, not on territorial partition. Peace will not come from division, but from a reform of the very concept of belonging.