“Europe Does Not Decide This War, But It Pays the Price Again”—Professor Alexandre Muns

Roughly 20% of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz, a maritime corridor barely 24 kilometers wide, along with natural gas and products essential for fertilizers. For weeks, Washington insisted that its opening had to be guaranteed militarily. But the position changed abruptly when Donald Trump suggested that if Europe was worried, it should take responsibility for keeping the passage open itself.

The episode sums up one of the contradictions of this war. The United States and Israel have severely damaged Iran’s military capabilities, yet Tehran still retains the ability to disrupt maritime traffic and drive up energy prices using much cheaper means: drones, mines, coastal missiles, or simple harassment attacks. The result is a crisis in which nobody wants to intervene militarily, but for which everyone pays the consequences.

To analyze the economic and geopolitical impact of this situation, we spoke with Alexandre Muns, a professor at Spain’s EAE Business School with a Ph.D. in contemporary history. He is a former adviser and speechwriter to presidents of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, contributor to several media outlets, and author of seven books, including Globalism versus Nativism: How to Close the Digital Divide. Muns argues that Washington’s great mistake has been to underestimate Iran’s ability to keep the Strait of Hormuz practically paralyzed without having to defeat the United States militarily.

In his view, the crisis will not trigger an energy shock comparable to that of the 1970s, but it does make one thing clear: Europe still depends on an energy security architecture it no longer controls and on an Atlantic alliance increasingly shaped by American domestic politics. Europe once again discovers that it does not decide the war, but it still pays the bill.

Until very recently, we were being told that an international coalition was essential to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Suddenly, Trump says it is not his problem and that if Europe is concerned, Europe should deal with it. Who is really affected by Hormuz?

Technically, 20% of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Natural gas also passes through it, as does ammonia, which is essential for producing fertilizers. We are talking about the oil exported by Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.

Much of that oil indeed goes to Asia, especially China, India, Japan, and South Korea. But the price of oil is global. Even if the crude physically goes to Asia, if Hormuz is blocked, the impact is felt by everyone.

Brent crude has risen by more than 50% since the military operation began on February 28. West Texas Intermediate, the American benchmark, has risen by more than 40%. Both have moved above $100 a barrel. That eventually feeds into gasoline prices, transport costs, and inflation.

If the blockade continues, who suffers more: the West or Asia?

We all suffer, but in different ways. Asia depends more directly on the oil coming through Hormuz. Europe, by contrast, depends on the global price and enters this crisis after having given up Russian gas and exhausted much of its political room for maneuver after Ukraine.

The International Energy Agency has announced the release of 400 million barrels from its reserves. The United States has said it will put another 172 million barrels on the market. That helps stabilize prices, but it does not happen overnight. It is not simply a matter of turning on a tap.

What matters is that it is already clear that neither Europe nor Asia is going to send military assets to escort oil tankers. Nobody wants to be dragged into an open war with Iran. And that is where the problem lies.

Because Iran can still block Hormuz without having to win the war.

Exactly. The Strait of Hormuz is barely 24 kilometers wide. Normally, around 138 ships pass through it every day. Now only eight are getting through. Iran does not need a large navy to disrupt traffic. Mines, speedboats, coastal artillery, missiles, and drones are enough.

The United States has destroyed much of the Iranian navy and air defenses, but Iran still retains the ability to wage asymmetric warfare. And that is a very cheap war for Tehran and a very expensive one for Washington.

An Iranian drone may cost between $30,000 and $50,000. Shooting it down with Aegis systems or Patriot batteries costs millions. That is where I think Trump and his team miscalculated.

Trump promised a limited operation, with no troops on the ground. But it seems difficult to keep Hormuz open without doing exactly that.

That is the dilemma. Polls show that Republican voters supported action against Iran, but they do not want “boots on the ground.” They do not want another Iraq or Afghanistan. Trump campaigned promising precisely the opposite.

The problem is that without troops you cannot fully guarantee the reopening of the Strait. And Trump knows that if he sends Marines to occupy islands or secure the passage, he loses the support of an important part of his electoral base.

Europe, meanwhile, is beginning to talk about saving energy and reducing consumption. Are we facing a crisis comparable to the 1970s?

No. I do not think we are facing a crisis of that magnitude. Nor do I think it will fully resemble 2022.

My impression is that Trump is looking for a quick exit. He has already hinted that the United States could withdraw from the operation even if Hormuz is not completely reopened. And once the bombings stop, Iran has an interest in normalizing the situation.

We should not forget that 90% of Iranian oil goes to China. Iran also has no interest in keeping Hormuz closed for months. China needs that oil, and Tehran needs to sell it. That is why I believe that within two or three weeks the situation may begin to normalize and prices will gradually return to their previous levels.

Beyond oil, many people do not understand what the strategic objective of this war was. There does not seem to be any clear benefit.

I think Trump believed he could repeat in Iran something similar to what he tried to do in Venezuela: provoke a rapid political change and then open the country to energy and investment agreements.

But Iran is not Venezuela. Iran has 90 million inhabitants, a vast territory, the Revolutionary Guard, and a much more solid power structure. Regime change was impossible without a ground invasion. And that was never really on the table.

That said, there are some effects that Washington considers positive. Iran’s capacity to launch missiles and drones and enrich uranium has been seriously degraded. And the Gulf countries have become much more united against Iran.

Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Bahrain, and Kuwait were divided not long ago. Now they are coordinating and moving away from Tehran. It is even possible that Saudi Arabia and Qatar will eventually normalize relations with Israel in the coming years. That is probably the strategic benefit the United States is seeking.

And how does Europe emerge from all this?

Europe emerges as a prudent actor but also as an irrelevant one. It decided that this was not its war, and it was probably right. But that does not change the fact that it depends on what Washington decides and on what Iran does.

The transatlantic relationship has gone through other crises: Suez, Iraq, Trump’s first term. I do not think NATO is going to break apart. But I do think this crisis makes one thing very clear: the United States expects European support when costs have to be borne, but Europe is no longer willing automatically to follow Washington into wars it sees as alien or counterproductive.

And that raises a concern even more urgent than the closure of Hormuz itself: if Europe does not want to take part in America’s wars but cannot protect its own energy routes either, how much real autonomy does it actually have?