“There’s no such thing as replacement theory; it’s a replacement fact”—Center for Immigration Studies Executive Director Mark Krikorian

Mark Krikorian is the Executive Director of the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), one of the leading institutions in the United States to analyze and formulate immigration policy. For decades, he has studied the impact of immigration on social cohesion, the economy, and national security, both in the U.S. and Europe. His analysis starts from a premise uncomfortable for many governments: mass immigration is not an inevitable phenomenon but the direct result of political decisions.

For Krikorian, the problem is not only the scale of immigration but also the systematic refusal of ruling classes to accept that legitimate limits exist.

In this interview conducted during the MCC Feszt in Esztergom, Hungary, the analyst offers an unflinching look at the mistakes of the United States and Europe, warns about demographic replacement, and points out that the political battle of our time is not so much between left and right, but between those whose primary loyalty is to their nation and those who have adopted a post-national vision.

How would you describe the current model of immigration in both the United States and the European Union?

Even though it’s a cliché, the United States is, at least in part, a nation of immigrants. This means that immigration is something we have dealt with throughout our history, and our institutions, society, and culture have evolved in ways that make it somewhat easier for us to absorb newcomers—though not without problems. For most of its countries, Europe is experiencing mass immigration as a relatively new phenomenon, and its states are structured differently from ours.

Most European countries are conventional ethno-states. Their national identities are deeply tied to shared ancestry, language, and historical continuity, making large-scale immigration much more difficult to integrate. In the U.S., the “borders” of belonging—meaning the definition of who is considered part of the mainstream—are fuzzier. While America is not simply “an idea” or a purely creedal nation, a significant element of shared civic identity allows us to be more flexible.

France, for example, in the 19th century absorbed many immigrants—Italians, Spaniards, Germans, Irish, and others—but these were overwhelmingly Christian and European. France also has a strong assimilationist ethos, which made integration possible. But this model is not infinitely scalable. Receiving large numbers of Muslim immigrants poses a different challenge, especially given that European civilization as we know it today developed after resisting Islamic invasions for a thousand years.

Migration numbers have soared since 2018. Are we living the consequences of global agreements like the Marrakesh Pact?

Migration is not entirely “natural.” People have always moved, but large-scale migration flows almost always depend on government policy—a historical example from the U.S. In the 1940s, we launched the Mexican guest worker program. Interestingly, most workers didn’t come from the Mexican states closest to the U.S. border—which were sparsely populated—but from West-Central Mexico. Why? Because the Mexican government encouraged migration from there, as that region had been the center of armed uprisings against the regime in the 1920s and 30s. Sending politically troublesome men north to work kept them from taking up arms again.

The same applies globally. France’s large Algerian population is directly linked to colonial history. Germany’s Turkish community stems from a “guest worker” program tied to its special relationship with the late Ottoman Empire. The U.K.’s South Asian population is a direct legacy of empire. In the U.S., we have far more Filipinos than Indonesians despite their geographic and cultural similarities—because we colonized the Philippines, not Indonesia.

Global agreements like the Marrakesh Pact are sold to the public as tools to prevent uncontrolled migration. In practice, they often stimulate it, creating expectations, networks, and legal frameworks that make migration easier and more attractive.

Some now talk about immigration as a weapon in hybrid warfare. Is that real?

Yes, but it’s usually localized rather than part of some global master plan. The concept—what I call “weapons of mass migration”—has plenty of precedents. Belarus pushed migrants toward the Polish border. Turkey used the Syrian migration crisis to extract money and concessions from the EU. Cuba used the Mariel boatlift in 1980 to dump tens of thousands of people—many with criminal records—on the United States.

In Europe, the term “instrumentalizing migration” is used, but I find “weaponizing migration” more accurate and evocative. Migration can become a pressure tool, a bargaining chip, or even a punishment against neighboring countries.

Where’s the red line? When does immigration become unsustainable?

The real problem is that political elites in the U.S. and Europe don’t honestly believe in limits. They may not want all 7 billion people to move to their countries, but deep down, they reject the idea that citizens of self-governing nations have the right to keep others out.

In the U.S., critics of the Biden administration’s immigration policy often ask: “What were they thinking?” Some assume they’re importing future voters, inflating census numbers, or serving the business lobby with cheap labor. Those factors exist, but the deeper driver is ideology—globalism. The same applies in Europe, whether it’s the Tories in Britain promising to cut immigration but increasing it, or other supposedly conservative governments.

When I debate politicians, I sometimes offer a hypothetical: “Let’s say we admit 10 million immigrants a year—an absurdly high number. What do we do with immigrant number 10,001, who’s a decent, law-abiding person but came illegally?” The answer is always the same: “We wouldn’t remove him.” That is, by definition, support for unlimited immigration—they just won’t admit it.

What about demographic replacement?

There’s no such thing as “replacement theory”—it’s a replacement fact. The math is straightforward: high immigration plus low native birth rates equals population replacement over time. In the U.S. in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, immigration increased populations because natives also had high fertility. Today, with very low native birth rates, immigration changes the composition of the population.

In many major cities, a third or more of births are to immigrant families. In some, the majority of children are of immigrant origin. That means replacement will happen within a generation, even if the national percentage still looks overwhelmingly native-born today. The key question is democratic legitimacy: did voters ever consent to this? If not, calling it “democracy” is a sham.

Can immigration solve low birth rates?

Absolutely not. To adapt Margaret Thatcher’s phrase: eventually you run out of other people’s people. Birth rates are falling almost everywhere—Mexico, Tunisia, Iran, Turkey—all below replacement level. Sub-Saharan Africa is the exception for now, but even there, fertility rates will eventually drop, though demographic momentum will keep populations growing for decades.

Using immigration as a solution simply delays the inevitable and transforms the national population in the process. It only works if you see a nation as just an economic unit where people are interchangeable, rather than a historical and moral community with continuity over time.

What about countries like Hungary that resist mass immigration?

Small nations in the EU face special challenges. Membership limits sovereignty in ways that make border control harder. Brexit showed that even leaving doesn’t guarantee control if the political class is committed to open borders—the Tories actually increased immigration afterward.

How is the political landscape shifting?

Today’s main divide is between patriots and post-patriots, not traditional left and right. Before the end of the Cold War, political debates often centered on the size of government, taxes, and regulation. Since then, the central issues have become sovereignty, borders, language, and national identity.

This has fractured the right. Free-market globalists who once fit under the conservative umbrella increasingly align with the left because they share a post-national worldview. We’re seeing similar patterns across Europe: the rise of AfD in Germany, the Sweden Democrats, and new parties in the Netherlands and France all stem from the mainstream right abandoning national sovereignty.

Final message to citizens?

Don’t be afraid to say you’re against mass immigration. Patriotism isn’t inherently right-wing. We also need a patriotic left—one that defends borders and national identity while debating other policy issues within that framework. Without that, our political systems risk becoming unmoored from the very nations they’re supposed to serve.