One million signatures. That is, in theory, all it takes for European citizens to knock on the Commission’s door and demand new legislation. As we recently explained, the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) is presented as the most direct instrument of participatory democracy in the Union.
But what happens when a campaign that is marketed as spontaneous begins to look like a strategically designed operation?
The recently registered initiative to immediately ban the remaining imports from Russia—including steel, inorganic chemicals, and potash fertilisers—is presented as an act of moral coherence: to stop financing the Kremlin’s war machine. However, behind the rhetoric of “citizen outrage” there are signs of a possible convergence of corporate and state interests.
If confirmed, this would amount to a case of lobbying channelled through a mechanism designed for popular participation.
The official narrative
On January 29, 2026, the European Commission registered the initiative titled “Stop Funding Russia’s War: Phase Out Harmful and Useless Russian Imports into the EU.” Its objective is to eliminate the “import dependencies” that, according to the organisers, the EU maintains with Russia and Belarus in sectors where viable alternatives allegedly exist.
The proposal sets out binding import bans on certain iron and steel products—particularly ‘slabs’—inorganic chemicals such as anhydrous ammonia and calcium phosphates, as well as potash fertilisers under specific tariff codes.
The central argument is political coherence: Europe cannot proclaim its support for Ukraine while continuing to transfer billions of euros to the Russian state through trade. According to the annex of the initiative, these imports generated tens of billions of euros in 2024.
The language is firm and urgent. But trade policy does not respond only to principles; it also reflects economic and strategic interests.
The invisible architecture
Formally, the initiative is promoted by two citizens: Salvatore Ricci (resident in Belgium) and Amalio Trombetta (resident in Italy). However, according to publicly available information, Ricci reports directly to the vice president for government affairs at ArcelorMittal and defines the company’s position on trade defence and regulatory matters.
ArcelorMittal is one of the world’s largest steel and mining groups, with operations in several member states and a presence in Ukraine. A ban on Russian ‘slabs’ would alter the competitive balance of the European steel market.
In addition, its Ukrainian subsidiary has explored the use of steel slag as a fertiliser or soil improver, adding an economic dimension to the fertiliser debate.
Another striking element is the documentary trail associated with the initiative. The economic data attached to the file appear to have been created by Emanuel Allroth, deputy director at Sweden’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, before being modified by Ricci and submitted to the Commission.
If this is correct, it would imply that a senior government official materially contributed to an initiative presented as independent and citizen-driven.
There is no public evidence of illegality. But the convergence of state strategy, corporate positioning and “citizen” mobilisation is, at the very least, noteworthy.
The political moment
Sweden and Finland are now pushing to include Russian fertilisers in the sanctions regime after 19 previous packages in which the sector was partially excluded or subject to tariff-rate quotas.
The question is obvious: why now?
If prospects for negotiations or a ceasefire in Ukraine were to gain momentum, the EU’s ability to expand structural sanctions could diminish. Locking in a definitive decoupling now would shield trade policy from future diplomatic developments.
In this context, the initiative acts as a political catalyst, transforming a complex trade strategy into a moral demand formally backed by citizens.
Potassium is an essential input for European agriculture. Although alternative suppliers, such as Canada or Jordan, are mentioned, diversification entails logistical adjustments, contract renegotiations and, most likely, higher prices in the short and medium term.
An increase in fertiliser costs translates into higher agricultural production costs and, ultimately, higher food prices.
The proposal provides for firm prohibitions with a limited transitional regime for existing contracts. It is not a symbolic declaration but a regulatory architecture with immediate economic effects.
European farmers—already under pressure from energy costs, regulatory requirements and international competition—would be among the first affected, with consumers following closely behind.
